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This thesis, which consists of four studies, investigates bank diversification in the context of 
bank stability, banks’ market power, and bank competition, by constructing new diversification 
indicators to capture the degree of diversification at the market and country levels. 
The first essay empirically tests a theory regarding the influence of diversification on bank 
systemic risk and investigates whether this effect is different for bank standalone risk. I 
construct a new country-level diversification measure to reflect the risk distribution among 
banks, which makes my study more suitable to evaluate the mechanical reasons behind the 
theory tested than traditionally used bank-level diversification indicators. My results confirm 
the Wagner’s theory according to which diversification leads to more systemic risk but less 
bank standalone risk. 
The second essay investigates the role of the regulatory environment, bank size, and capital in 
the diversification-bank stability nexus, which extends my findings in the first essay. I find that 
the negative relationship between diversification and bank systemic stability becomes weaker 
in countries with greater supervisory power of regulatory agencies, higher stringency of capital 
regulations, more restrictions on the scope of banks’ activities, and more private monitoring. 
Moreover, I show that bank size and capital alleviate the negative diversification-systemic 
stability relationship, which implies that larger and well-capitalized banks are less subject to 
systemic risk when the degree of diversification in a country is high. To the best of my 
knowledge,  my study is the first to confirm the moderating role of cross-country regulatory 
environments and banks’ essential characteristics in the relationship between diversification 
and bank stability. 
The third essay investigates how diversification influences banks’ market power, which fills 




a determinant or source of banks’ market power. Diversification may enable banks to gain 
market power from obtaining new sources of revenues but could also weaken market power by 
inducing new costs. I find an inverse U-shaped relationship between revenue diversification 
and banks’ market power in both lending and funding markets. This implies that diversification 
is an important determinant or source of banks’ market power and potentially affects market 
power by changing banks’ output prices and marginal costs of production, or a combination of 
both. In addition, this inverse U-shaped relationship is much more manifest in large banks than 
in small banks, which indicates that it is dominated by large banks.  
The last essay investigates the role of market diversification in the relationship between 
competition and bank stability in the dimensions of individual bank stability and systemic 
stability, by constructing novel market-level diversification measures. My study is important 
to reconcile the mixed conclusions regarding the competition-stability nexus in the literature 
by considering the potential changing associations between competition and bank stability 
conditional on different degrees of diversification in the market. I find that the negative 
relationship between competition and systemic stability is exacerbated when the market 
diversification is high while this negative competition-systemic stability relationship turns to 
be positive when the market diversification is low. However, I do not find a significant 
interacting effect of market diversification on the competition-individual bank stability 
relationship. Lastly, I show a positive association between competition and diversification, 
which suggests that restrictions in banks’ diversification activities in a competitive 
environment may help in maintaining systemic stability. 
My research provides useful implications for bank managers and policymakers. First, it offers 
bank managers knowledge of how diversified activities are related to banks’ standalone and 
systemic risks and suggests the feasibility of managing banks’ market power by formulating 




proposes that promoting diversification would be beneficial to bank standalone stability if 
banks’ diversification strategy is well formulated and executed but could bring additional costs 




Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background on bank diversification 
Bank diversification is defined from different angles in the literature. Mercieca, Schaeck, and 
Wolfe (2007) propose that bank diversification can be viewed from three dimensions: (1) 
diversification across banks’ products and financial services, (2) diversification through 
geographic expansion, and (3) diversification through a combination of business lines and 
geographic expansion. There are a number of existing studies viewing diversification on the 
dimension of geographic expansion and linking geographic diversification to issues in bank 
valuations and risk (Hughes et al., 1999; Akhigbe and Whyte, 2003; Deng and Elyasiani, 2008; 
Goetz, Laeven, and Levine, 2013; Chu, Deng, and Xia, 2019). With the recent decades of 
financial liberalization and technology development, financial institutions have been 
encouraged to seek new opportunities by expanding into non-traditional activities, such as fees, 
commissions, insurance underwriting, and investment banking services, from traditional 
interest-income-generating activities. This process is typically accompanied with banks’ 
activities of diversifying their services or business lines. As such, in my thesis, I focus on the 
bank diversification as the scope of activities that banks can engage in and the extent to which 
banks can generate revenues from different businesses or financial services. 
There are different explanations on why banks engage in diversified activities. Bank managers 
choose to diversify to reduce the risk of each specific activity according to the portfolio theory 
that the expansion of investments into activities or businesses that are not perfectly correlated 
can decrease the risk of an investment portfolio. This risk-reducing effect of diversification 
meets the interests of shareholders who value overall volatilities of firms’ revenues (Smith and 




financial institution than specific diversified portfolios of banks (Berger, Molyneux, and 
Wilson, 2014). Moreover, expanding the scope of bank business lines can create value for 
banks’ shareholders. Such values may come from the economy of scale since banks can reuse 
the extensive customer information gathered from long-term customer relationships in the area 
of other non-related activities by cross-selling multiple products to the same customers (Stiroh 
and Rumble, 2006). In addition, bank managers may have non-profit-maximizing motives to 
protect firm-specific human capital and private benefits through diversification (Berger, 
Demsetz, and Strahan, 1999; Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003). Besides these above desirable 
aspects of diversification, there could be negative consequences for banks when they engage 
in diversification. The shift into non-interest-generating activities may lead to additional costs 
because newly engaged business lines are typically associated with high volatility and risk 
(DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004a; Stiroh, 2006; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Lepetit et 
al., 2008a). Moreover, the market values of financial conglomerates that engage in diversified 
activities can be lower than if those that specializing in individual activities (Laeven and Levine, 
2007). 
In the literature, bank diversification has been linked to a number of issues in banking, which 
includes bank stability (Lepetit et al., 2008a; De Jonghe, 2010; Wagner, 2010; Sanya and Wolfe, 
2011; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Amidu and Wolfe, 2013a; Raffestin, 2014; Williams, 2016; 
Abuzayed, Al-Fayoumi, and Molyneux, 2018), bank performance (DeYoung and Rice, 2004; 
Stiroh, 2004b, 2006; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe, 2007; 
Chiorazzo, Milani, and Salvini, 2008; Goddard, McKillop, and Wilson, 2008; Sanya and Wolfe, 
2011), and bank valuation (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Elsas, Hackethal, 
and Holzhäuser, 2010). Nevertheless, there are still some questions on bank diversification that 
remain to be answered: How does diversification differently affect banks’ systemic risk and 




country’s regulatory framework and banks’ own essential characteristics? How does 
diversification influence banks’ market power? What role does market diversification play in 
the relationship between competition and bank stability? To address these questions, my thesis 
provides four empirical studies that investigate bank diversification in the context of bank 
stability, banks’ market power, and bank competition. 
 
1.2 Objectives and main findings 
Chapter 2 aims at empirically testing the theory of Wagner (2010) regarding the influence of 
diversification on bank systemic risk and investigating whether this effect is different for bank 
standalone risk. Wagner (2010) proposes a model showing that diversification at financial 
institutions makes systemic crises more likely because a higher diversification leaves 
institutions exposed to common risks by holding similar portfolios, although diversification is 
expected to reduce each institution's standalone risk according to the modern portfolio theory. 
Using a large dataset that consists of 1,395 international publicly listed banks from 49 countries 
between 1998 and 2018, I show that an increase in revenue diversification in a country leads 
to more systemic risk while reducing a bank’s idiosyncratic risk. My results have provided 
empirical evidence in supporting Wagner’s theory. 
Chapter 3 aims to investigate the role of the regulatory environment, bank size, and capital in 
the diversification-bank stability nexus, which extends my findings regarding the direct 
relationship between diversification and bank stability in Chapter 2. I focus on four aspects of 
a country’s regulatory framework (official supervisory power, capital regulations, bank activity 
restrictions, and private monitoring) and two essential banks’ risk determinants (bank size and 
capital), and examine the associations of these factors with the relationship between 




from 49 countries between 1999 and 2015, I find that the negative relationship between 
diversification and bank systemic stability identified in Chapter 2 becomes weaker in countries 
with greater supervisory power of regulatory agencies, higher stringency of capital regulations, 
more restrictions on the scope of banks’ activities, and more private monitoring. In addition, I 
show that bank size and capital have a positive moderating effect on the negative 
diversification-systemic stability relationship, which suggests that larger and well-capitalized 
banks are less subject to systemic risk when the degree of bank diversification in a country is 
high. 
Chapter 4 aims at investigating how diversification influences banks’ market power. No prior 
study addresses the question about whether diversification is a determinant or source of banks’ 
market power. Using a large sample of around 9,991 U.S. commercial banks and bank holding 
companies between 1991 and 2017, I find an inverse U-shaped relationship between 
diversification and banks’ market power, and this relationship holds for banks’ market power 
in both lending and funding markets. Moreover, this inverse U-shaped relationship is more 
manifest for large banks than for small banks. 
Chapter 5 aims to investigate the role of market diversification in the relationship between 
competition and bank stability in dimensions of both idiosyncratic and systemic stability. The 
literature shows mixed findings on the competition-bank stability relationship, including 
competition-stability views (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005; Schaeck, Čihák and Wolfe, 2009; 
Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu, 2014a) and competition-fragility views (Keeley, 1990; 
Allen and Gale, 2004; Repullo, 2004; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2006). The 
controversy about the relationship between competition and bank stability indicates the need 
to provide new evidence to discuss the potential mechanism behind this relationship. Based on 
my findings in Chapter 2 regarding the influence of diversification on bank stability, I assume 




stability, and investigating this moderating effect can help in explaining why competition has 
different effects on bank stability. Through an analysis based on the sample of 467 publicly 
listed U.S. banks over the period between 1994 and 2017, I find that the negative relationship 
between competition and systemic stability is exacerbated when market diversification is high 
while this negative relationship turns out to be positive when market diversification is at a low 
level. This interacting effect of diversification is not significant on the competition-individual 
stability relationship. Moreover, I find a positive association between competition and market 
diversification, which suggests that restrictions in banks’ diversification activities in a 
competitive environment may help in maintaining systemic stability. 
 
1.3 Contributions 
First, my thesis contributes to the literature by conducting an empirical analysis to test the 
theoretical study of Wagner (2010) on the relationship between diversification and bank 
stability in Chapter 2. Wagner’s theory has received considerable attention because it provides 
a novel insight into bank systemic risk by identifying a mechanical reason for the adverse effect 
of diversification even under normal circumstances. Nevertheless, this theory has not been 
empirically tested yet in the context of banking due to the challenge in constructing a 
diversification measure that can reflect the mechanism in which diversification influences bank 
risk.  
Furthermore, my research provides three empirical analyses to fill the gaps in the literature 
regarding bank diversification in the context of stability and market power. Chapter 3 
contributes to the literature by examining whether a country’s regulatory framework and banks’ 
essential risk determinants (bank size and capital) are associated with the observed 




regulatory environments across countries and in size and capital between banks. This study 
enriches the literature regarding the direct relationship between diversification and bank 
stability (Wagner, 2010; DeYoung and Torna, 2013; Raffestin, 2014; Williams, 2016; 
Abuzayed, Al-Fayoumi, and Molyneux, 2018). This study is the first to explicitly take into 
account potential moderating factors in the relationship between diversification and bank 
stability, which helps in understanding whether there is uniform impact of diversification on 
idiosyncratic and systemic risk for banks with different sizes and capitalization levels and in 
countries with distinct regulatory environments. Chapter 4 contributes to the literature by 
linking diversification to banks’ market power. Since a diversified bank earns revenues not 
only from traditional lending activities but also from activities that generate non-interest 
incomes such as fee- and trading-based services, diversified activities may enable banks to gain 
market power by obtaining new sources of revenues or deteriorate market power by bringing 
additional costs that make banks less likely to lower marginal costs. Studies most relevant to 
my research link market power to revenues and margins (Maudos and Fernández de Guevara, 
2004; Valverde and Fernández, 2007; Nguyen, Skully, and Perera, 2012a). However, previous 
literature does not investigate possible links between diversification and banks’ market power. 
This gap motives me to expect a connection between them and investigate whether 
diversification can be regarded as a determinant or source of banks’ market power. My study 
is the first to investigate both linear and non-linear relationships between diversification and 
banks’ market power, which aims to show a full picture on the extent to which banks’ market 
power can be influenced by diversification. Moreover, this chapter employs seven distinct 
diversification indicators to show comprehensive information regarding the degree of bank 
diversification in terms of revenues, loans, and deposits (Laeven and Levine, 2007; Mercieca, 
Schaeck, and Wolfe, 2007;  Elsas, Hackethal, and Holzhäuser, 2010). Chapter 5 provides new 




relationship by introducing the moderating effect of bank diversification. That is, this chapter 
takes into account the potential changing associations between competition and bank stability 
conditional on different degrees of diversification in the market. 
Lastly, my thesis develops new measures to reflect bank diversification at country and market 
levels. In Chapter 2, I build up a new diversification measure to reflect the overall level of bank 
diversification at the country level. This indicator can capture the distributions of banks’ 
revenues and is suitable to test Wagner’s theory. In Chapter 5, I propose the “market 
diversification” definition and constructs a new diversification indicator to capture it, which 
provides a new perspective on showing the degree of diversification in a specific market that 
banks operate. My market diversification indicator reflects the degree of diversification 
considering both an individual bank and its competitors, which extends the scope of 
information inherent in previously used diversification indicators in the literature (Laeven and 
Levine, 2007; Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe, 2007) and makes it possible to examine how 









2.1 Introduction  
Wagner (2010) proposes a model showing that diversification at financial institutions makes 
systemic crises more likely since a higher diversification makes institutions exposed to 
common risks through holding similar portfolios, although diversification is expected to reduce 
each institution's standalone risk according to the modern portfolio theory. In an event of 
systemic shock, banks have to liquidate their assets at fire-sale prices to meet their liquidity 
needs in the market or regulatory requirements. Such actions may generate severe distress for 
banks that hold similar portfolios because the action of selling assets of one bank encourages 
other banks holding common assets to jointly liquidate their assets at much lower prices, which 
results in systemic risk (Allen, Babus and Carletti, 2012). 
Wagner’s theory has received considerable attention because it provides a novel insight into 
bank systemic risk by identifying a mechanical reason for the adverse effect of diversification 
even under "normal circumstances." Nevertheless, this theory has not been empirically tested 
yet in the context of banking due to the challenge in constructing a diversification measure that 
can reflect the mechanism in which diversification influences risk. While most existing studies 
focus on examining how diversification affects bank idiosyncratic risk, there is little empirical 
research investigating this question from the perspective of systemic risk. My study aims to 
empirically test Wagner’s theoretical study on the influence of diversification in systemic risk, 
and further investigates whether this effect is different for bank standalone risk.  
The main contribution of this chapter is conducting a new empirical analysis to test Wagner’s 




systemic stability.1 To the best of my knowledge, no empirical study has been conducted to 
validate the abovementioned theory. The second contribution is to build up a new 
diversification measure to reflect the overall level of revenue diversification of banks in a 
country. My country-level diversification indicator utilizes revenue data of individual banks in 
a country and reflects the risk distributions among banks by capturing the distributions of banks’ 
revenues. This characteristic of my diversification measure makes the empirical analysis more 
suitable to test the mechanical reasons of Wagner (2010) than other studies that employ 
traditionally used bank-level diversification indicators (Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe, 2007; 
Laeven and Levine, 2007; Elsas, Hackethal, and Holzhäuser, 2010). 
Using a large dataset that consists of 1,395 international publicly listed banks from 49 countries 
from 1998 to 2018, I document that an increase in bank revenue diversification in a country 
leads to more systemic risk while reducing bank idiosyncratic risk, which confirms theoretical 
conclusions of Wagner (2010). My results are robust to several robustness tests, for example, 
using alternative diversification and bank risk indicators, considering the potential influence of 
the global financial crisis, and taking into account additional regulatory and institutional control 
variables. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents an overview of the 
relevant literature. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 introduce the data, measures and methodology 
employed in this research. In Section 2.5, I report the empirical findings, followed by 









2.2 Literature review 
Most of the existing literature focuses on the impact of diversification on bank standalone risk, 
and typically links the influence of diversification with the nature of non-interest income- 
generating activities that banks engage in. Using a sample of bank holding companies (BHCs), 
Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt (1993) investigate the influence of the expansion into non-banking 
activities through mergers in banks’ risk, and the authors conclude that the exact influence of 
diversification depends on the nature of the new activities that banks expand into. Mergers of 
BHCs with security firms or real estate firms would increase risk while mergers of BHCs with 
life insurance or property insurance firms may decrease risk. Based on a sample of U.S. 
commercial banks between 1988 and 1995, DeYoung and Roland (2001) find that fee-based 
activities lead to higher revenue and earnings volatilities, which implies that the trend towards 
engaging in non-traditional activities would result in some extent of instability to banks. Other 
studies such as Stiroh (2004a), Stiroh (2006), Stiroh and Rumble (2006) and Lepetit et al. 
(2008a) provide further evidence to support the fact that non-interest-generating activities are 
associated with high volatilities and risks. Stiroh (2004a) empirically evaluates the potential 
diversification benefits in the U.S. banking industry and finds that banks with more reliance on 
non-interest revenues, especially trading incomes, are more likely to endure higher risk and 
lower profits. Stiroh (2006) investigates the impact of increased non-interest income on banks’ 
return and risk profiles by using market-based risk indicators. This study also concludes that 
banks with reliance on non-interest income-generating activities tend to be riskier and do not 
perform better in terms of returns yielded because they engage in more non-interest income- 
generating activities. Stiroh and Rumble (2006) examine whether diversification benefits from 
non-interest income generating activities exist in a sample of U.S. financial holding companies 
over the period 1997–2002. They find that diversification benefits are not sufficient to cover 




the expansion into non-interest income activities leads banks to higher insolvency risk than the 
expansion of interest income-generating activities does. DeYoung and Torna (2013) examine 
whether non-traditional incomes contribute to the collapse of hundreds of U.S. commercial 
banks during the financial crisis, and conclude that the impact of non-traditional activities on 
bank stability depends on the nature of activities that banks engage in. Asset-based non-
traditional activities such as investment banking and securitization result in a higher probability 
of bank failures, whereas pure fee-based non-traditional activities such as securities brokerage 
and insurance sales reduce the chance of bank failures. 
Few studies examine the impact of diversification on bank systemic stability. Focusing on a 
sample of European listed banks, Baele, De Jonghe, and Vennet (2007) compare the 
performances and risk profiles of diversified and specialized banks, and find that the 
diversification of revenue streams from distinct financial activities leads to higher the systemic 
risk of banks while this has a predominately downward-sloping effect in reducing banks’ 
idiosyncratic risk. De Jonghe (2010) employs a market-based systemic risk exposure to 
investigate the impact of revenue diversity on European banking systemic stability. The author 
finds that a diversity towards non-traditional banking activities increases banks’ tail betas and 
decreases bank systemic stability, and banks’ interest incomes are less risky than other types 
of revenues. Wagner (2010) provides theoretical evidence that diversification affects financial 
stability differently depending on the dimensions of banks’ risk. More specifically, this study 
concludes that diversification decreases individual banks’ probability of default whereas it 
makes systemic crises more likely because of greater similarities among banks’ portfolios and 
activities as the degree of diversification grows. Ibragimov, Jaffee, and Walden (2011) develop 
a model to show that intermediaries’ diversification actions are optimal for individual financial 
institutions but suboptimal for the society, and the negative externality generated from 




proposes models to quantify the externality of contagion and compare it with the risk-reducing 
effect of individual market participants, and finds that the probability of market participants 
failing simultaneously is larger than the probability of individual bankruptcies at a high degree 
of diversification. Chu, Deng, and Xia (2019) investigate the causal effect of geographic 
diversification on systemic risk by using the U.S. interstate banking deregulation as exogenous 
shocks to bank geographical expansion. They find that bank geographical diversification leads 
to more systemic risk due to greater asset similarities between banks. 
Other studies find a certain extent of benefits from diversification on bank stability even though 
these positive effects are limited. Goddard, McKillop, and Wilson (2008) examine the effect 
of revenue diversification in the financial performance of U.S. credit unions over the period 
1993–2004. They find that a credit union heavily diversified between interest income and non-
interest income-generating activities would have lower risk-adjusted returns. Sanya and Wolfe 
(2011) analyze the effect of revenue diversification on bank performance and risk based on a 
sample of listed banks in emerging economies, and they find that diversification across and 
within banks’ interest and non-interest revenue-generating activities reduces bank insolvency 
risk. Based on a sample of listed and unlisted banks from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
countries between 2001 and 2014, Abuzayed, Al-Fayoumi, and Molyneux (2018) find that 
banks’ income diversification does not improve bank stability. In addition, the authors show 
evidence of a non-linear relationship between non-interest income and bank stability, which 
implies the existence of a risk-reducing effect at higher degree of diversification.  
In addition to focusing on bank risk, another strand of literature links the impact of 
diversification on bank performance. Laeven and Levine (2007) suggest the existence of a 
diversification discount in market valuations of financial conglomerates in a sample of 
international financial institutions. The authors state that institutions with a greater diversity of 




activities, potentially because financial conglomerates are subject to greater agency problems 
in the process of engaging in multiple activities, which implies that economies of scale are not 
sufficient to produce diversification premium. Focusing on small European banks in the period 
of 1997–2003, Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe (2007) propose that there are no direct 
diversification benefits within and across banks’ business lines and that banks’ non-interest 
activities are negatively associated with bank performance. Chiorazzo, Milani, and Salvini 
(2008) find that income diversification increases banks’ risk-adjusted returns, and this effect is 
stronger for larger banks. 
Through reviewing relevant studies, I identify two gaps in the literature that motivates me to 
conduct new research in this chapter. First, although Wagner (2010) provides a novel insight 
into bank systemic risk by identifying a mechanical reason for the adverse effect of 
diversification even under normal circumstances, this theory has not been empirically tested 
yet in the context of banking. Second, the literature traditionally uses bank-level diversification 
indicators (Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe, 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Elsas, Hackethal, 
and Holzhäuser, 2010), and there is a lack of diversification indicator showing the overall 
degree of diversification among all banks from a country’s perspective. This chapter aims to 
empirically test Wagner’s theory by constructing a new country-level diversification measure 
to reflect the risk distribution among banks.  
 
2.3 Data and measures 
2.3.1 Data 
This chapter constructs an unbalanced panel dataset composed of 1,395 international publicly 
listed banks from 49 countries, which covers the period from 1998 to 2018. Table 2.1 presents 
the list of countries in my sample. My study uses annual bank-specific accounting information 




indicator. I use consolidated balance sheets and income statements to avoid counting 
duplications. To calculate bank systemic risk measures, I obtain banks’ stock price information 
from CRSP, Datastream and Compustat Global. My sample consists of only listed banks since 
I need market stock pricing information to build up bank systemic risk measures. In addition, 
focusing on international banks enhances cross-country comparability among banks because 
international publicly listed banks tend to comply with international accounting standards, 
which reduces the concern that differences in accounting standards could drive the results. 
 
Table 2.1. The List of Countries in the Sample 
Notes: The countries in my sample are restricted to the ones with at least three listed banks included in the 
Worldscope in order to alleviate the concern about the low representativeness of a country-level diversification 
indicator in countries with too few listed banks. The sample includes both listed and delisted banks to treat the 
survivorship bias.
Country Number of banks Country Number of banks 
Argentina 7 Mexico 7 
Australia 10 Morocco 6 
Austria 6 Netherlands 3 
Belgium 3 Nigeria 14 
Brazil 22 Norway 3 
Canada 5 Peru 4 
Chile 6 Philippines 14 
China 12 Poland 14 
Colombia 8 Portugal 4 
Denmark 30 Republic of Korea 12 
Egypt 10 Russian Federation 6 
Finland 3 Singapore 4 
France 9 Slovakia 3 
Germany 13 South Africa 10 
Greece 9 Spain 17 
Hong Kong 11 Sri Lanka 6 
India 39 Switzerland 12 
Indonesia 30 Taiwan 29 
Ireland 3 Thailand 14 
Israel 7 Tunisia 5 
Italy 19 Turkey 14 
Japan 91 United Kingdom 16 
Kenya 7 United states of America 794 
Luxembourg 3 Venezuela 8 




2.3.2 Country-level diversification measure 
I propose a country-level revenue diversification (CRD) indicator and use it to capture the 
overall degree of bank diversification of each country in the sample. The CRD is computed as 
follows: 










]    (2.1) 
where subscripts 𝑖, j, and 𝑡 denote bank i, country j and year t. For bank i from country j, 𝐼𝑁𝑇 
is bank i’s interest income and 𝑁𝑂𝑁 is non-interest income. 𝑁𝑂𝑁 is total operating income, 
𝑇𝑂𝑃 = |𝐼𝑁𝑇| + |𝑁𝑂𝑁| . I use the absolute values of  𝐼𝑁𝑇  and 𝑁𝑂𝑁  to ensure that my 
computed diversification measures are not largely distorted by banks’ business unit 
performance since my study is more interested in the relative scales of interest-income and 
non-interest income generating activities rather than whether these activities are profitable or 
not.2 I calculate the CRD by separately taking the sum of each component of revenues of all 
banks from a specific country and then calculate this indicator with reference to the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index based diversification indicators used in previous banking studies (Mercieca, 
Schaeck, and Wolfe, 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Elsas, Hackethal, and Holzhäuser, 
2010).3 To generate a more straightforward diversification measure, I modify the CRD by using 
one minus the original form of HHI measure given by the expressions in brackets in the 
equation above.4 Under this modification, a high value of CRD indicates a high degree of 
diversification between banks’ interest and non-interest income generating activities from a 
country’s perspective. 
 
2 Net revenues have both positive and negative streams, so the values of diversification measures could take on 
large negative values in the case that the sum of total operating revenues is smaller than its single component 
given that negative revenues compensate for positive ones. This would be contrary to the normal case, and it 
would be hard to interpret the meaning of the HHI-based measure with a value far below zero. 
3 The details of the calculation of bank-level diversification is shown in the Appendix. 
4 The original ‘HHI’ form of bank diversification measure inversely represents the diversification level, with a 




Compared with traditionally used bank-level diversification indicators (Mercieca, Schaeck, 
and Wolfe, 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Elsas, Hackethal, and Holzhäuser, 2010), my 
country-level diversification indicator shows the degree of bank diversification from a new 
perspective. My measure simultaneously utilizes revenue data of individual banks in a country 
and reflects the risk distributions between banks by capturing the distributions of banks’ 
revenues among banks. This characteristic makes my empirical analysis more suitable to test 
the mechanical reasons of Wagner (2010) than those traditionally employed bank-level 
diversification indicators. Particularly, for the mechanical reasons on the adverse effect of 
diversification in bank systemic stability, Wagner (2010) argues that the higher homogeneity 
of banks’ portfolios or activities due to more diversification leads to more systemic risks. Thus, 
the nature of my country-level diversification measure that reflects the information on the risk 
distributions between banks allows me to better empirically test this theory than using bank-
level indicators that only capture the distributions of revenues within individual banks. In 
addition, building up a country-level measure enables me to explore how banks’ idiosyncratic 
and systemic risks can differently respond to changes in the degree of diversification from a 
country’s perspective. 
Since my sample consists of only publicly listed banks in each country in order to build up the 
market-based systemic risk measure, the construction of the CRD is only based on the income 
statements information of a country’s listed banks. Therefore, I am not able to construct this 
measure by including all listed and non-listed banks in each country. Nevertheless, my country-
level diversification measure may not be subject to considerable limitations due to the absence 
of non-listed banks because of the following reasons. First, compared with non-listed banks, 
listed banks are typically the largest banks in a nation and have much more significant presence 
in the domestic market in terms of total assets and scales of streams of revenues. Second, 




contributions than non-listed relatively small banks. Third, listed banks typically have more 
diverse business lines than non-listed banks do, which provides more comparable panels to 
capture a country’s overall degree of diversification based on a sample of banks with similar 
capabilities of engaging in different financial activities. To alleviate the concern regarding the 
low representativeness of a country-level diversification indicator of countries with too few 
listed banks included in the sample, I drop countries with less than three banks included in the 
sample. That would make each country’s diversification measure not dominated by a single 
bank, especially for countries with only one or two banks included. 
 
2.3.3 Bank stability measure 
2.3.3.1 Individual stability measure  
I use the Z-Score as the measure of idiosyncratic risk of a bank. The Z-Score is an accounting-
based bank stability measure and is used in previous banking studies (Laeven and Levine, 2009; 
Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013; Ijtsma, Spierdijk, and Shaffer, 2017). The Z-Score can 
be interpreted as the distance from bank insolvency (Roy, 1952), or the number of standard 
deviations by which banks’ realized returns have to decrease from their mean to wipe out all 
banks’ equity (Boyd and Runkle, 1993). A higher Z-Score implies a lower probability of bank 
insolvency and a higher degree of individual bank stability. The Z-Score is computed at the 






    (2.2) 
where 𝑅𝑂𝐴 is the return on assets for bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡. E A⁄  represents the equity to asset ratio. 
I use a three-year rolling time window, rather than the whole sample period, to compute the 
standard deviation of return on assets, 𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴), to allow for time variations in the denominator 




over time are exclusively driven by the variations in the levels of capital and profitability 
(Schaeck and Čihák, 2010). I take the natural logarithm of Z-Score to mitigate the influences 
from the high skewness of this measure. 
 
2.3.3.2 Systemic stability measure 
I use the conditional value-at-risk (∆CoVaR) proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) as 
the systemic risk indicator of a bank. ∆CoVaR is constructed by computing the value-at-risk 
(CoVaR) of the banking system conditional on a financial institution being in distress. More 
specifically, a bank’s contribution to systemic risk is defined as the difference between the 
CoVaR of the banking market conditional on this bank being in distress and the banking 
market’s CoVaR in the median state of this bank. The systemic risk contribution of bank 𝑖 to 







    (2.3) 
where 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑀|𝑖
 represents the VaR of banking system 𝑀 when the asset returns of bank 𝑖 are 
at the qth percentile, and 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅50%
𝑀|𝑖
 denotes the VaR of the market returns conditional on bank 
𝑖 being in its median state. The term ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑀|𝑖
 captures how much a bank contributes to the 
overall systemic risk. The conditional market CoVaR is calculated as follows: 
𝑋𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛾𝑖𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡
𝑖    (2.4) 
𝑋𝑡
𝑀 = 𝛼𝑀|𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀|𝑖𝑋𝑡
𝑖 +  𝛾𝑀|𝑖𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡
𝑀|𝑖
    (2.5) 
where 𝑋𝑡
𝑖 is the growth rate of market-value total assets of bank 𝑖, and relevant data required 
are daily market-value total equity and quarterly book-value total assets and equity. The daily 





𝑀 is the market capitalization weighted average of each bank’s asset returns. 𝑀𝑡−1 denotes a 
vector of lagged state variables that capture time variation in the conditional moments of asset 
returns. The state variables include weekly change of 3-month T-bill rate, term spread, market 
return (computed from S&P 500 return), and VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility 
Index). The parameters α, β, and γ are estimated by using quantile regression on a weekly basis. 
The CoVaR of the banking system is computed by using the estimated parameters in the 
abovementioned equations: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛾𝑖𝑀𝑡−1    (2.6) 
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑀|𝑖
= 𝛼𝑀|𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀|𝑖𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖 +  𝛾𝑀|𝑖𝑀𝑡−1    (2.7) 






𝑖(50%)]    (2.8) 
In this study, I compute ∆CoVaR at both q=1% and q=5% levels to obtain more robust results.5 
A higher ∆CoVaR implies a lower systemic risk contribution and a higher systemic stability. 
 
2.3.4 Control variables 
With reference to De Jonghe (2010), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), Amidu and Wolfe 
(2013), Leroy and Lucotte (2016) and Williams (2016), my study includes several bank-
specific control variables that possibly affect bank stability into the regressions. These control 
variables are bank-level diversification (RD), bank size (Bank Size), capitalization 
(Capitalization), non-performing loans (NPL), loan growth ratio (Loangrowth), deposit ratio 
(Deposit) and loan ratio (Loan). RD is included to control for the possibility of the presence of 
 
5 Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) that propose this indicator estimate ∆CoVaR for both the q=1% and q=5% 




biased information on the degree of diversification in a country if the distribution of interest 
and non-interest revenues within each bank is not considered.6 Bank Size equals the natural 
logarithm of total bank assets in millions of U.S. dollars, and controls for the effect that larger 
banks expect to be more stable than smaller ones because of economies of scale in transaction 
costs, monitoring, and information management. I include the equity to total asset ratio 
(Capitalization) to control for the influence that better capitalized banks face lower bankruptcy 
costs and are less vulnerable to market shocks. I use the NPL to control for bank credit risk 
since banks with a bad quality of loan portfolio typically face higher probability of default. 
Loangrowth is included to control for the influence of the increasing rate of a bank’s main asset 
on bank stability. Deposit and Loan are included to control for banks’ funding and lending 
structures. I also include a group of macroeconomic variables to control for their effects on 
bank stability. GDP growth rate (GDPgrowth) and GDP per capita (GDPpercap) control for 
the influence of variations in economic development across countries. Inflation rate (Inflation) 
is included to control for the effect of changes in prices of products or services on bank financial 
performance. Table 2.2 shows the definitions of all variables used in my study.
 
6 Consider two extreme situations regarding the distributions of interest and non-interest revenues of two banks 
in a country. Assuming that these two banks have the same total operating revenues (the sum of interest and non-
interest revenues), in the first situation, one bank is fully concentrated on interest incomes while the other one is 
concentrated on non-interest incomes. In the second situation, the distribution of revenues of these two banks is 
perfectly balanced between interest and non-interest revenues. The values of country-level diversification would 
be the same under these two extreme situations according to my specification. Therefore, it is necessary to include 




Table 2.2. Definitions of Variables 
Variables Definitions 
  
Bank stability measures 
∆CoVaR (∆CoVaR) The systemic risk measure that is defined as the difference between the CoVaR of the banking market conditional on 
this bank being in distress and the banking market’s CoVaR in the median state of this bank (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 
2016). Source: CRSP, Datastream, Compustat Global, and authors’ calculation. 
Marginal expected shortfall (MES) Alternative bank systemic risk indicator and is calculated as the average of a bank’s stock return during the 5% worst 
trading days for the overall market return in one financial year (Acharya et al., 2017). Source: CRSP, Datastream, 
Compustat Global, and authors’ calculation. 
Z-Score (Z-Score) The idiosyncratic risk measure and is calculated as the sum of return on assets and the equity ratio divided by the 
standard deviation of bank return on assets. Source: Worldscope and authors’ calculation. 
Return volatility (ReturnVol) 
 
Alternative bank standalone risk indicator and is calculated as the standard deviation of bank stock returns on a yearly 





The country-level diversification measure calculated based on the form of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by taking 
sum of each type of revenue streams of banks in each country included in the sample. Source: Worldscope and authors’ 
calculation. 
Revenue diversification (RD) Measure of bank-level revenue diversification between interest income and non-interest income (Mercieca, Schaeck, 
and Wolfe, 2007). Source: Worldscope and authors’ calculation. 
Country-level income diversity 
(CID) 
The country-level diversification measure calculated by taking the difference between the sum of interest revenues of 
banks in a country and the sum of other operating incomes divided by the sum of total operating incomes. Source: 
Worldscope and authors’ calculation. 
Income diversity (ID) Alternative bank-level diversification measure that captures the diversity between interest and other operating incomes 
(Laeven and Levine, 2007). Source: Worldscope and authors’ calculation. 
  
Bank-specific control variables 
Bank size (Bank Size) Natural logarithm of bank total assets. Source: Worldscope. 
Equity to total assets ratio 
(Capitalization) 
The ratio of total equity to total assets. Source: Worldscope. 
Non-performing loans ratio (NPL) The ratio of bank impaired loans to total gross loans. Source: Worldscope. 
Loan growth rate (Loangrowth) The growth rate of bank loans. Source: Worldscope. 
Deposit ratio (Deposit) The ratio of bank deposits over total assets. Source: Worldscope. 




Notes: This study retrieves accounting data from the Worldscope on an annual basis to construct bank diversification, idiosyncratic risk and bank-specific control variables, and download stock 
market data from Datastream, CRSP and Compustat Global on daily basis to calculate systemic risk indicator. Macroeconomic control variables are obtained from the World Bank database. 
Accounting- and market-based measures have been converted to the same data frequency before conducting the regression analyses.
Table 2.2 (continued). Definitions of Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Macroeconomic control variables  
GDP growth rate (GDPgrowth) Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Source: The World Bank. 
GDP per capita (GDPpercap) GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Source: The World Bank. 
Inflation ratio (Inflation) Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average 
consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as 






To investigate the effect of diversification on bank stability, I employ the fixed effects model 
to control for unobserved time-invariant bank and country fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
Fixed effect models have been widely used in the banking literature to control for unobserved 
time-invariant variables (Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe, 2007; Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Zhu, 2014a; Leroy and Lucotte, 2016; Goetz, 2017). My model is specified as follows: 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ×  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿1 × 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 +
𝛿2 × 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡    (2.9)  
where subscripts 𝑖 , 𝑗  and 𝑡  denote bank 𝑖  in country 𝑗  in year  𝑡 . Bank risk represents bank 
systemic (∆CoVaR) or idiosyncratic risk (Z-Score) measures. 7  Diversification denotes the 
country-level diversification measure (CRD). I use time lagged values of the diversification 
indicator to mitigate the issue of reverse causality from bank risk to diversification. 
Bank-specific controls  and Macroeconomic controls  are vectors of bank-specific and 
macroeconomic control variables that control for their potential effects on bank stability. 𝜇𝑖, 𝜈𝑗 
and 𝜏𝑡 capture bank, country and year fixed effects, respectively. 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the error term. 𝛼, 𝛽, 
and 𝛿 are the parameters to be estimated. 
 
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2.3 and 2.4 present the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this chapter and their 
pairwise correlations, respectively. My diversification indicators, CRD and RD, have means 
0.355 and 0.407, respectively. Their maximum values are equal to their theoretical maximum 
values, which indicates that banks in at least one country or at least one bank among all banks 
 
7 All dependent variables employed in my thesis, such as Z-score, ∆CoVaR, MES and Lerner Index, have no 




in my sample are fully diversified between interest and non-interest income generating 
activities. The Z-Score has a mean of 24.28 with the range from -3.343 to 115.7, and the 
∆CoVaR has a mean of -0.0352 and falls between -0.202 and 0.0392, which shows that these 
key risk indicators are in their expected ranges. As for the pairwise correlations, I find a 
negative correlation between CRD and ∆CoVaR, which indicates a negative relationship 
between country-level diversification and systemic stability. The correlation between CRD and 
Z-Score is also negative, and this indicates that country-level diversification is also negatively 
correlated with individual bank stability. In the next section, I will investigate the relationships 
between country-level diversification and both individual and systemic dimensions of bank 
stability by running regressions after controlling a group of variables. 
 
Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics  
Notes: This table contains information on the descriptive statistics of all variables used in the chapter. N represents 
the number of observations for each variable. SD is the standard deviation of each variable. Mean, Min, and Max 
indicate the mean, minimum, and maximum value of each variable, respectively. Detailed information on each 
variable’s definition and calculation are reported in Table 2.2. To account for the influence of extreme values and 
outliers, all variables are winsorized and the bottom 1% and top 1% of observations for each variable are set 
respectively to the value of the 1st and 99th percentiles. Source: Worldscope, CRSP, Datastream, Compustat 
Global, and authors’ calculation.
Variables N Mean SD Min Max 
CRD 29,378 0.355 0.109 0 0.500 
RD 20,720 0.407 0.100 0.0176 0.500 
Z-Score 20,635 24.28 16.21 -3.343 115.7 
∆CoVaR 20,835 -0.0352 0.0423 -0.202 0.0392 
Bank Size 21,541 15.28 2.155 8.334 21.14 
Capitalization 21,483 0.0874 0.510 -34.04 1.210 
NPL 18,535 0.0281 0.0452 0 0.711 
Loangrowth 20,129 0.126 0.259 -0.748 2.576 
Loan 20,747 0.659 0.146 0 0.989 
Deposit 21,327 0.716 0.167 0 0.948 
GDPgrowth 29,001 0.0262 0.0251 -0.148 0.251 
GDPpercap 29,001 10.24 1.068 6.206 11.63 




Table 2.4. Correlation Matrix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
  (1) CRD 1.000 
  (2) RD 0.188* 1.000 
  (3) Z-Score -0.042* 0.104* 1.000 
  (4) ∆CoVaR -0.101* -0.046* 0.003 1.000 
  (5) Bank Size 0.010 -0.368* -0.135* 0.186* 1.000 
  (6) Capitalization -0.012 0.004 0.062* 0.005 0.016* 1.000 
  (7) NPL 0.116* -0.034* -0.217* 0.062* 0.124* -0.179* 1.000 
  (8) Loangrowth -0.015* -0.030* -0.050* -0.074* -0.093* 0.023* -0.162* 1.000 
  (9) Loan 0.012 0.099* 0.031* -0.019* -0.128* -0.052* -0.004 0.057* 1.000 
  (10) Deposit -0.003 0.286* 0.134* 0.043* -0.262* -0.050* -0.015* -0.041* 0.234* 1.000 
  (11) GDPgrowth -0.068* -0.169* -0.066* 0.026* 0.008 -0.005 -0.026* 0.228* -0.066* 0.025* 1.000 
  (12) GDPpercap -0.033* 0.298* 0.266* -0.022* -0.145* 0.031* -0.318* -0.064* 0.108* 0.035* -0.410* 1.000 
  (13) Inflation -0.003 -0.123* -0.188* -0.026* -0.023* 0.005 0.053* 0.049* -0.115* -0.103* 0.060* -0.395* 1.000 
Notes: This table presents the pairwise correlations of main variables.CRD is the country-level diversification measure calculated based on the form of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by taking 
sum of each type of revenue streams of banks in each country included in the sample. RD is the bank-level revenue diversification indicator. Z-Score is individual bank stability measure that is 
the sum of return on assets and the equity ratio divided by the standard deviation of bank return on asset. ∆CoVaR is bank’s systemic risk measure that is defined as the difference between the 
CoVaR of the banking market conditional on the bank being in distress and the banking market’s CoVaR in the median state of the bank. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. 
Capitalization is the ratio of total equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired loans to total gross loans. Loangrowth is the growth rate of bank total loans. Loan represents the ratio of 
bank total loans on total assets. Deposit is the ratio of bank total deposits on total assets. GDPgrowth represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local 
currency. GDPpercap is the gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Inflation is the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer 




2.5.2 Empirical results 
Table 2.5 shows the results on the relationship between country-level diversification and bank 
stability in the dimensions of idiosyncratic and systemic stability. I employ both fixed effects 
estimations and two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions in order to confirm that my findings 
are consistent and less subject to the endogeneity problem. I am concerned about the 
endogeneity between diversification and bank stability because there could exist omitted 
variables associated with banks’ diversified activities affecting bank stability. Although my 
diversification and bank stability indicators are computed at country and bank levels, 
respectively, the majority of countries in my sample include a relatively lower number of banks. 
Excluding the U.S. and Japanese banks of which have far more banks than the other countries,8 
the remaining 45 countries have around 10 banks on average. Therefore, it is possible that 
banks from these countries have omitted bank-specific factors that are associated with their 
corresponding country-level diversification because a country-level indicator is more likely to 
be distorted by individual characteristics of its components as the number of banks decreases 
in a country. 
According to the results of fixed effects estimation in columns (1) to (4), I find positive and 
significant coefficients of country-level diversification in columns (1) and (2), which indicates 
that a higher diversification decreases a bank’s idiosyncratic risk.9  This finding could be 
explained by the modern portfolio theory that a firm’s idiosyncratic risk can be reduced by 
holding a well-diversified portfolio (Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964). Sanya and Wolfe (2011) 
also show similar results that diversification across interest and non-interest income-generating 
activities reduces bank-level insolvency risk. In contrast, I find negative and significant 
 
8 The U.S. and Japan include 794 and 91 banks, respectively, according to the information shown in Table 2.1. 




coefficients of CRD in the dimension of system stability in columns (3) and (4).10 These 
findings provide empirical evidence in line with the theory of Wagner (2010) according to 
which diversification makes systemic crisis more likely since diversification tends to increase 
the similarity across banks in terms of activities or portfolios as they become more exposed to 
common risks. In addition, my results also confirm the theoretical study by Ibragimov, Jaffee, 
and Walden (2011). My findings suggest that the degree of overall diversification in a country 
may lead to different effects on bank stability depending on the dimensions of risk. 
I present the 2SLS regression results in columns (5) to (8) in Panel A of Table 2.5. I use the 
Diversification Index as the instrument of diversification indicator. The Diversification Index 
is a variable constructed based on two survey questions from the Bank Regulation and 
Supervision Survey, and this index shows whether there are any regulatory rules or supervisory 
guidelines regarding assets diversification and whether banks are allowed to make loans 
abroad.11 The information implicit in this index affects the engagement of banks in diversified 
activities and, via this channel, it has an influence on banks’ risk. Since the Diversification 
Index contains the information on the regulations and guidelines applying to all banks in a 
particular country, I can assume that this IV has no direct relation with unobserved factors (e.g. 
risk appetite, managers’ skills) that are specific for each bank. I calculate the pairwise 
correlation coefficients between the Diversification Index and the risk measures analyzed and 
find that their correlations are very low (-0.0284 with Z-Score and 0.0186 with ∆CoVaR). In 
addition, the OLS regressions between the Diversification Index and the risk indicators show 
no direct signification association between the Diversification Index and the risk measures as 
 
10 Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.6 present the results that use ∆CoVaR calculated at q=1%. The results do not 
change when ∆CoVaR is computed at q=5%, and relevant results are available upon request. 
11 This database can be accessed through the website: https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/brief/BRSS. The 
value of the Diversification Index ranges between 0 and 2, and a higher value indicates more diversification. The 
two survey questions used to construct this index are: (1) Are there any regulatory rules or supervisory guidelines 





shown in Panel B of Table 2.5. Therefore, I employ the Diversification Index as the 
instrumental variable for the diversification indicator. Although the values of the 
Diversification Index are constant between two consecutive surveys, I do not expect that the 
instrumental variable is time-invariant because my study uses a relatively long period of data 
collected from the past five surveys conducted in 1999, 2002, 2006, 2011, and 2016, 
respectively. Therefore, the variations of this instrument in a country cannot be absorbed by 
the time-invariant fixed effects and will not be controlled for in that estimation procedure. To 
check the relevance of instruments with the endogenous variable, I report the F-statistic in the 
first-stage of the 2SLS regressions to test the hypothesis that the coefficients of instrumental 
variables are zero. According to the results of the first-stage regressions shown in Table 2.5, 
the values of the F-statistics are higher than their relevant critical values at 1% significance 
level, which rejects the null hypothesis and indicates the relevance of the instruments. Based 
on the second-stage results, I find consistent negative and significant relationship between 
diversification and idiosyncratic risk in columns (5) and (6) while a positive and significant 
relationship in the dimension of systemic risk exists in columns (7) and (8). 
For the control variables, as introduced in Section 2.3.4, I include the bank-level diversification 
indicator (RD) into every regression to control for the distributions of revenues within each 
bank, which distinguishes different scenarios with the same values of country-level 
diversification (CRD). Since my study is only interested in the degree of diversification at the 
country level, the interpretations of the sign and significance of RD are not the focus of my 
study. I do not find consistent results on the coefficients of RD under different specifications 
of regressions, which implies that diversification within individual banks is differently 
associated with banks’ idiosyncratic and systemic risks. I only find consistent significant 
coefficients of RD for bank standalone risk under different model specifications (in columns 1, 




coefficients of RD in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6) indicate a negative effect of revenue 
diversification in individual bank stability, which is consistent with previous studies that non-
interest-generating activities are associated with high volatilities and risks of individual banks 
(Stiroh, 2004a; Stiroh, 2006; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Lepetit et al., 2008a). For other bank-
specific control variables, I find that bank size, non-performing loans ratio, deposit ratio are 
consistently negatively associated with individual bank stability (in columns 1, 2, 5 and 6), 
which indicates that larger banks and banks holding more deposits and non-performing loans 
tend to have more standalone risk. The negative relationship between bank size and the Z-Score 
is consistent with Schaeck and Cihak (2014) that larger banks tend to have lower individual 
stability. Stiroh (2006) also shows that banks with higher non-performing loan ratios tend to 
be more risker. However, these effects are not consistently significant on the dimension of 
systemic risk, which implies that the bank-specific control variables could determine bank risks 




Table 2.5. Baseline results: The relationship between diversification and bank stability 
Panel A Dependent Variables  
 Z-Score Z-Score ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR Z-Score Z-Score ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 





         
CRD 3.673*** 3.360*** -0.00980*** -0.000610** 47.62*** 15.10* -1.104*** -0.0161** 
 (0.808) (0.687) (0.00279) (0.000265) (6.946) (8.714) (0.0817) (0.00770) 
RD -3.808*** -5.483*** 0.0220*** -0.000314 -12.26*** -6.914*** 0.244*** 0.00244 
 (0.827) (0.819) (0.00549) (0.000546) (1.647) (1.736) (0.0223) (0.00153) 
Bank Size -0.611** -1.908*** 0.0249*** -6.96e-05 -0.536*** -1.859*** 0.0250*** -8.71e-05 
 (0.259) (0.301) (0.00125) (0.000133) (0.153) (0.171) (0.00200) (0.000164) 
Capitalization 0.576 0.766 -0.00456 -1.25e-05 0.399 0.645* 0.00821 0.000126 
 (0.680) (0.640) (0.00566) (0.000129) (0.339) (0.345) (0.0111) (0.000151) 
NPL -3.759* -7.435*** 0.0351** 0.000647 -10.61*** -10.97*** 0.220*** 0.00273* 
 (2.111) (1.998) (0.0155) (0.000902) (1.917) (1.960) (0.0245) (0.00163) 
Loangrowth -0.302 -0.0314 -0.00321** 9.84e-05 -0.423* -0.147 0.00234 8.66e-06 
 (0.217) (0.216) (0.00134) (0.000196) (0.237) (0.221) (0.00321) (0.000194) 
Loan 0.944 2.209** -0.0326*** -0.000541 0.277 1.848*** -0.00628 2.92e-05 
 (1.016) (1.064) (0.00595) (0.000426) (0.718) (0.692) (0.00914) (0.000523) 
Deposit -8.016*** -11.99*** 0.0438*** 0.000540 -9.430*** -12.17*** 0.0911*** 0.000752 
 (1.410) (1.405) (0.00851) (0.000474) (0.881) (0.806) (0.0120) (0.000578) 
GDPgrowth 13.71*** 14.31*** 0.164*** 0.00529** 38.59*** 14.83*** -0.302*** 0.0110*** 
 (2.528) (4.015) (0.0126) (0.00215) (4.542) (4.265) (0.0597) (0.00415) 
GDPpercap 7.673*** 1.029 0.104*** 5.29e-05 10.03*** -0.766 -0.0117 -0.00171 
 (1.011) (1.249) (0.0102) (0.000498) (0.914) (1.067) (0.0125) (0.00107) 
Inflation -0.949 -1.296 0.0804*** 0.00378*** 4.130* -1.825 -0.166*** 0.00563*** 
 (1.790) (1.619) (0.0157) (0.00138) (2.408) (1.464) (0.0455) (0.00184) 
Constant -39.19*** 49.86*** -1.501*** -0.117***     
 (8.267) (11.65) (0.0929) (0.00460)     
Number of Observations 16,901 16,901 16,018 16,018 15,219 15,219 14,473 14,473 
Number of Banks 1,346 1,346 1,342 1,342 1,317 1,317 1,317 1,317 
R-squared 0.040 0.079 0.342 0.993 -0.376 0.047 -6.102 0.990 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effect NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 




Notes: This table presents the regression results on the relationship between country-level diversification and bank stability. Sample consists of 1,395 international publicly listed banks from 49 
countries over the period between 1998 and 2018. Regression variables are calculated using annual bank level data. CRD is the country-level diversification measure calculated based on the form 
of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by taking sum of each type of revenue streams of banks in each country included in the sample. RD is the bank-level revenue diversification indicator. Z-Score 
is individual bank stability measure that is the sum of return on assets and the equity ratio divided by the standard deviation of bank return on asset. ∆CoVaR is bank’s systemic risk measure that 
is defined as the difference between the CoVaR of the banking market conditional on the bank being in distress and the banking market’s CoVaR in the median state of the bank. Bank Size is the 
natural logarithm of bank total assets. Capitalization is the ratio of total equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired loans to total gross loans. Loangrowth is the growth rate of bank 
total loans. Loan represents the ratio of bank total loans on total assets. Deposit is the ratio of bank total deposits on total assets. GDPgrowth represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP 
at market prices based on constant local currency. GDPpercap is the gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Inflation is the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage 
change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services. Panel A reports the regression results of the fixed effects estimation in columns (1)-(4) and the IV-2SLS 
by employing the Diversification Index as the instrument for CRD in columns (5)-(8). The result of testing weak instruments (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic) is reported. Panel B reports the 
OLS results that regress risk measures, Z-Score and ∆CoVaR, on the IV-Diversification Index. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and clustered at 
the bank level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.5 (continued).  Baseline results: The relationship between diversification and bank stability 
Panel B   Dependent Variables  
     Z-Score ∆CoVaR 
     OLS regression 
IV-Diversification Index -0.209 0.0000586 




2.6 Robustness check 
2.6.1 Alternative diversification measures 
To test whether my results hold for different specifications of the diversification measure, I 
construct an alternative county-level diversification indicator, country-level income diversity 
(CID). Following Laeven and Levine (2007), I first construct the bank-level income diversity 
(ID) for each bank in my sample, and then further build up this indicator at the country level to 
reflect the overall degree of diversification in a country in accordance with my objective. ID 
and CID are calculated as: 
𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 1 − |
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡
|    (2.10) 
𝐶𝐼𝐷𝑗,𝑡 = 1 − |
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−∑ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡
∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡
|    (2.11) 
By using CID as an alternative diversification indicator, I find consistent results with my 
baseline findings showing that diversification has significant negative impacts on bank 
systemic stability (in columns 3, 4, 7 and 8 in Table 2.6) while there are positive impacts on 




Table 2.6. Robustness check: Results based on alternative diversification measure 
Notes: This table presents the robustness check results on the relationship between country-level diversification and bank stability. Sample consists of 1,395 international publicly listed banks from 49 countries over the period between 1998 and 2018. 
Regression variables are calculated using annual bank level data. CID and ID are the country- and bank-level income diversity measures, respectively. Z-Score is individual bank stability measure that is the sum of return on assets and the equity ratio 
divided by the standard deviation of bank return on asset. ∆CoVaR is bank’s systemic risk measure that is defined as the difference between the CoVaR of the banking market conditional on the bank being in distress and the banking market’s CoVaR 
in the median state of the bank. This table presents the results of using ∆CoVaR calculated at q=1%. The regression results do not change when ∆CoVaR is computed at q=5%, and relevant results are available upon request. Bank Size is the natural 
logarithm of bank total assets. Capitalization is the ratio of total equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired loans to total gross loans. Loangrowth is the growth rate of bank total loans. Loan represents the ratio of bank total loans on total 
assets. Deposit is the ratio of bank total deposits on total assets. GDPgrowth represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. GDPpercap is the gross domestic product divided by midyear 
population. Inflation is the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services. This table reports regression results of the fixed effects estimation in columns (1)-
(4) and the IV-2SLS by employing the Diversification Index as the instrument for CID in columns (5)-(8). The result of test for checking weak instruments (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic) is reported. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates and clustered at the bank level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variables Z-Score Z-Score ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR Z-Score Z-Score ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Fixed effects estimation IV-2SLS 
         
CID 0.989*** 0.981*** -0.00389*** -0.000130* 28.04*** 6.858* -0.633*** -0.00688** 
 (0.255) (0.202) (0.000792) (6.68e-05) (4.054) (3.759) (0.0533) (0.00334) 
ID -2.648*** -3.778*** 0.0124*** -0.000158 -8.277*** -4.637*** 0.147*** 0.00111 
 (0.406) (0.411) (0.00280) (0.000288) (1.057) (0.814) (0.0170) (0.000738) 
Bank Size -0.629** -2.012*** 0.0250*** -7.06e-05 -0.601*** -2.005*** 0.0270*** -3.51e-05 
 (0.259) (0.302) (0.00125) (0.000133) (0.184) (0.169) (0.00286) (0.000162) 
Capitalization 0.593 0.802 -0.00471 -1.34e-05 0.380 0.683** 0.0113 9.87e-05 
 (0.680) (0.639) (0.00567) (0.000129) (0.332) (0.345) (0.0136) (0.000140) 
NPL -3.104 -6.753*** 0.0334** 0.000616 -14.19*** -10.95*** 0.309*** 0.00313* 
 (2.095) (1.974) (0.0156) (0.000905) (2.447) (2.101) (0.0354) (0.00178) 
Loangrowth -0.330 -0.0500 -0.00315** 9.80e-05 -0.622** -0.187 0.00552 2.23e-05 
 (0.216) (0.216) (0.00134) (0.000196) (0.288) (0.225) (0.00481) (0.000198) 
Loan 0.884 2.140** -0.0320*** -0.000555 -0.856 1.588** 0.0174 0.000159 
 (1.014) (1.059) (0.00594) (0.000430) (0.823) (0.719) (0.0124) (0.000558) 
Deposit -7.646*** -11.76*** 0.0429*** 0.000528 -8.341*** -11.82*** 0.0711*** 0.000515 
 (1.406) (1.401) (0.00849) (0.000477) (1.053) (0.831) (0.0176) (0.000585) 
GDPgrowth 12.60*** 14.87*** 0.166*** 0.00516** 43.04*** 15.10*** -0.390*** 0.0106*** 
 (2.477) (3.979) (0.0125) (0.00214) (5.497) (4.112) (0.0842) (0.00399) 
GDPpercap 7.495*** 0.691 0.103*** 0.000101 10.99*** -1.139 -0.0326* -0.00139 
 (1.004) (1.245) (0.0102) (0.000500) (1.096) (0.959) (0.0171) (0.000953) 
Inflation -1.461 -1.546 0.0820*** 0.00377*** -1.130 -3.294* -0.0446 0.00705*** 
 (1.771) (1.592) (0.0156) (0.00139) (2.318) (1.844) (0.0433) (0.00226) 
Constant -36.36*** 55.51*** -1.502*** -0.118***     
 (8.131) (11.63) (0.0927) (0.00463)     
         
Number of Observations 16,901 16,901 16,018 16,018 15,219 15,219 14,473 14,473 
Number of Banks 1,346 1,346 1,342 1,342 1,317 1,317 1,317 1,317 
R-squared 0.042 0.084 0.342 0.993 -1.496 0.007 -20.272 0.989 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effect NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES 




2.6.2 Alternative bank risk measures 
In addition, I build up alternative bank idiosyncratic and systemic risk indicators. Following 
Laeven and Levine (2009), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010), and Anginer, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Zhu (2014b), I use the stock return volatility (ReturnVol) as an alternative indicator 
of bank standalone risk, which is calculated as the standard deviation of bank stock returns on 
a yearly basis using the daily stock price information. Higher values of the ReturnVol indicator 
are associated with greater return volatilities and risks. For bank systemic risk, I employ the 
marginal expected shortfall (MES) to capture a bank’s contribution to systemic risk (Acharya 
et al., 2010, 2017). MES is computed as the average of a bank’s stock returns during the 5% 
worst trading days of the overall market return in a financial year. A high value of MES 
indicates low bank’s systemic risk contributions.12 The marginal expected shortfall for a given 




    (2.12) 
where 𝑅𝑖 denotes the daily stock return of bank i during the 5% market’s worst trading days in 
year t. 𝑁 is the number of 5% worst days of the market return. According to the results shown 
in Table 2.7, by using ReturnVol  and MES as alternative bank risk indicators, I find consistent 
results with the baseline results according to which the overall degree of income diversity in a 
country has significant negative impacts on bank systemic stability (in columns 2 and 4) while 
positive impacts occur on individual bank stability by reducing stock return volatility (in 
columns 1 and 3).
 
12 In this study, I keep the original form of the marginal expected shortfall (MES). Typically, it has a negative 




Table 2.7. Robustness check: Results based on alternative bank risk measure 
Notes: This table presents the robustness check results on the relationship between country-level diversification and bank 
stability. Sample consists of 1,395 international publicly listed banks from 49 countries over the period between 1998 and 
2018. Regression variables are calculated using annual bank level data. CRD is the country-level diversification measure 
calculated based on the form of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by taking sum of each type of revenue streams of banks in 
each country included in the sample. RD is the bank-level revenue diversification indicator. ReturnVol is an alternative bank 
standalone risk indicator and is calculated as the standard deviation of bank stock returns on a yearly basis using the daily 
stock price information. MES is an alternative bank systemic risk indicator and is calculated as the average of a bank’s stock 
return during the 5% worst trading days for the overall market return in one financial year. Bank Size is the natural logarithm 
of bank total assets. Capitalization is the ratio of total equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired loans to total 
gross loans. Loangrowth is the growth rate of bank total loans. Loan represents the ratio of bank total loans on total assets. 
Deposit is the ratio of bank total deposits on total assets. GDPgrowth represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at 
market prices based on constant local currency. GDPpercap is the gross domestic product divided by midyear population. 
Inflation is the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a 
basket of goods and services. This table reports regression results of the fixed effects estimation in columns (1)-(2) and the 
IV-2SLS by employing the Diversification Index as the instrument for CRD in columns (3)-(4). The result of test for checking 
weak instruments (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F-statistic) is reported. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below 
the coefficient estimates and clustered at the bank level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.
Dependent Variables ReturnVol MES ReturnVol MES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Fixed effects estimation IV-2SLS 
     
CRD -0.0151*** -0.00400* -0.373*** -0.291*** 
 (0.00459) (0.00222) (0.0345) (0.0271) 
RD 0.00563* -0.00222 -0.0689*** 0.0604*** 
 (0.00323) (0.00268) (0.00950) (0.00753) 
Bank Size -0.000483 -0.00823*** -0.000948 -0.00717*** 
 (0.000608) (0.000446) (0.000800) (0.000616) 
Capitalization -0.0742*** -0.0216*** -0.136*** 0.0237*** 
 (0.0129) (0.00558) (0.0160) (0.00889) 
NPL 0.106*** -0.0236*** 0.0536*** 0.0230*** 
 (0.0126) (0.00582) (0.0123) (0.00831) 
Loangrowth 0.000977 -0.00178** -0.000883 -0.00184* 
 (0.000995) (0.000719) (0.00124) (0.000973) 
Loan 0.00342 -0.00925*** -5.15e-05 -0.00320 
 (0.00354) (0.00251) (0.00393) (0.00303) 
Deposit -0.0107** 0.0117*** -0.0232*** 0.0234*** 
 (0.00435) (0.00307) (0.00466) (0.00372) 
GDPgrowth -0.217*** 0.223*** -0.0387 0.0733*** 
 (0.0155) (0.0144) (0.0252) (0.0198) 
GDPpercap -0.0166*** 0.0341*** 0.0113** 0.0110*** 
 (0.00362) (0.00240) (0.00546) (0.00419) 
Inflation -0.0107 -0.0378*** 0.0456** -0.0831*** 
 (0.00892) (0.00681) (0.0213) (0.0145) 
Constant 0.212*** -0.245***   
 (0.0318) (0.0201)   
     
Number of Observations 16,355 16,337 14,855 14,836 
Number of Banks 1,342 1,342 1,316 1,315 
R-squared 0.114 0.145 -1.624 -1.308 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effect YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F-
statistic 




2.6.3 Checking whether the results are driven by the financial crisis 
To check the consistency of my results, I also consider whether my results could be driven by 
the global financial crisis. The financial crisis may have brought about structural changes to 
the banking market by influencing risk-taking decisions of banks or the scope of activities that 
banks are allowed to engage as required by the regulatory agencies in different countries. I run 
subsample regressions by setting the pre-crisis sample from 1998 to 2007 and post-crisis 
sample between 2010 and 2018. The usage of 2SLS estimation does not technically apply to 
the post-crisis sample because the data for building up my instrumental variable is from only 
two surveys, and the instrument takes relatively constant values during the post-crisis period 
(2010–2018), so the instrumental variable hardly explains the variations in the values of the 
endogenous variable during that period. Therefore, I only report the fixed effects results for 
this robustness test in Table 2.8. According to the results as shown in Table 2.8, my observed 




 Table 2.8. Robustness check: Considering the financial crisis 
Notes: This table presents the robustness check results on the relationship between country-level diversification and bank 
stability. The whole sample is divided into two subsamples by excluding the observations during the crisis period. The pre-
crisis sample covers the period from 1998 to 2007 and the post-crisis sample starts from 2010 to 2018. Regression variables 
are calculated using annual bank level data. CRD is the country-level diversification measure calculated based on the form of 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by taking sum of each type of revenue streams of banks in each country included in the 
sample. RD is the bank-level revenue diversification indicator. ReturnVol is an alternative bank standalone risk indicator and 
is calculated as the standard deviation of bank stock returns on a yearly basis using the daily stock price information. MES is 
an alternative bank systemic risk indicator and is calculated as the average of a bank’s stock return during the 5% worst trading 
days for the overall market return in one financial year. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Capitalization 
is the ratio of total equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired loans to total gross loans. Loangrowth is the growth 
rate of bank total loans. Loan represents the ratio of bank total loans on total assets. Deposit is the ratio of bank total deposits 
on total assets. GDPgrowth represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local 
currency. GDPpercap is the gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Inflation is the consumer price index 
reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services. This 
table reports regression results of the fixed effects estimation. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the 
coefficient estimates and clustered at the bank level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively.
Dependent Variables ReturnVol MES ReturnVol MES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Pre-crisis sample Post-crisis sample 
     
CRD -0.0166*** -0.00171* -0.00977** -0000403* 
 (0.00568) (0.000912) (0.00385) (0.000200) 
RD -0.00251 -0.000139 -0.00337 0.000649** 
 (0.00350) (0.000816) (0.00535) (0.000299) 
Bank Size -0.00267** -0.000545** -0.00398** -0.000129 
 (0.00112) (0.000274) (0.00174) (0.000199) 
Capitalization -0.0185 0.00434* -0.000843 3.27e-05 
 (0.0119) (0.00257) (0.00181) (9.72e-05) 
NPL 0.0438*** 0.00249 0.0647*** 0.000336 
 (0.0142) (0.00202) (0.0181) (0.000658) 
Loangrowth 0.000292 0.000592** -0.00656*** 0.000500* 
 (0.000926) (0.000281) (0.00199) (0.000283) 
Loan -0.00774* -0.00211*** -0.00458 -0.000240 
 (0.00467) (0.000657) (0.00633) (0.000572) 
Deposit 0.00676 0.00231** -0.0145* -0.000831 
 (0.00698) (0.000947) (0.00787) (0.000674) 
GDPgrowth -0.00744 0.00466 0.0197 0.00154 
 (0.0253) (0.00309) (0.0472) (0.00180) 
GDPpercap 0.00520 -0.000121 -0.0159** -0.00182* 
 (0.0101) (0.00191) (0.00648) (0.00105) 
Inflation -0.00952 -0.00106 -0.00510 0.00386 
 (0.00986) (0.00121) (0.0191) (0.00238) 
Constant 0.0232 -0.108*** 0.266*** -0.0223** 
 (0.100) (0.0189) (0.0743) (0.0108) 
     
Number of Observations 7,803 7,813 6,424 6,426 
Number of Banks 1,213 1,213 954 954 
R-squared 0.115 0.994 0.046 0.995 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effect YES YES YES YES 




2.6.4 Additional regulatory and institutional control variables 
It is important to consider the regulatory framework and institutional variables in different 
countries to draw solid conclusions on the relationship between diversification and bank 
stability. This is because the diversification level in a country as well as bank stability could be 
directly or indirectly affected by its specific regulatory and institutional environments with 
respect to the scope of activities and financial services that banks are allowed to engage in. If 
my results regarding the influence of diversification on bank stability are driven by such 
regulatory and institutional variables, controlling for these additional variables will make the 
key explanatory variables become less significant or insignificant. Hence, not considering the 
potential effects of these regulatory and institutional factors could possibly lead to spurious 
correlations between diversification and bank risks. With reference to Mercieca, Schaeck, and 
Wolfe (2007) and Amidu and Wolfe (2013), I consider three regulatory and institutional 
variables: Banking Freedom, Activity Restriction, and Supervisory Power. Banking Freedom 
is an index that assesses an economy’s overall level of financial freedom that provides ease and 
effective access to financing opportunities for people and businesses in the economy. 
Increasing values of this index indicate more freedom in the banking market in a country. 
Activity Restriction is an index that indicates whether activities/services of banks in securities, 
insurance and real estate activities in a country are unrestricted, permitted, restricted or 
prohibited. Higher values of this index indicate more restrictions. Supervisory Power is an 
index that captures the extent to which regulatory agencies have the authority to take actions 
to prevent banking problems in a country. This index is increasing in the power of regulatory 
authority. I retrieve the data on Banking Freedom from the Heritage Foundation13 and on 
Activity Restriction and Supervisory Power from the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013) based 
on four surveys conducted by the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey. I 
 




report the robustness test results that consider these three regulatory and institutional control 
variables in Table 2.9. Banking freedom is negatively associated with Z-Score in column (1), 
and Activity Restriction and Supervisory Power are positively associated with ∆CoVaR in 
columns (5) and (6). In spite of such variations in the associations of these regulatory and 
institutional variables with bank risk, the signs and significances of the key explanatory 
variables hold on the dimensions of bank idiosyncratic and systemic risks by using both the 
fixed effects and IV-2SLS estimations after factoring in additional control variables, which 





Table 2.9. Robustness check: Considering the regulatory and institutional control variables 
Notes: This table presents the robustness check results on the relationship between country-level diversification and bank stability. Sample consists of 1,395 
international publicly listed banks from 49 countries over the period between 1998 and 2018. Regression variables are calculated using annual bank level data. 
CRD is the country-level diversification measure calculated based on the form of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by taking sum of each type of revenue streams 
of banks in each country included in the sample. RD is the bank-level revenue diversification indicator. Z-Score is individual bank stability measure that is the 
sum of return on assets and the equity ratio divided by the standard deviation of bank return on asset. ∆CoVaR is bank’s systemic risk measure that is defined as 
the difference between the CoVaR of the banking market conditional on the bank being in distress and the banking market’s CoVaR in the median state of the 
bank. This table presents the results of using ∆CoVaR calculated at q=1%. The regression results do not change when ∆CoVaR is computed at q=5%, and relevant 
results are available upon request. Banking Freedom is an index that assesses an economy’s overall level of financial freedom that provides ease and effective 
access to financing opportunities for people and businesses in the economy. Supervisory Power is an index that indicates the strength of official supervisory power 
of regulatory agencies in a country. Activity Restriction is an index that indicates whether activities/services of banks in securities, insurance and real estate 
activities in a country are unrestricted, permitted, restricted or prohibited. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Capitalization is the ratio of total 
equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired loans to total gross loans. Loangrowth is the growth rate of bank total loans. Loan represents the ratio of 
bank total loans on total assets. Deposit is the ratio of bank total deposits on total assets. GDPgrowth represents the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at 
market prices based on constant local currency. GDPpercap is the gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Inflation is the consumer price index 
reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates and clustered at the bank level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent 
Variables 
Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
CRD 2.987*** 3.460*** 3.115*** -0.000607** -0.000607** -0.000853*** 
 (0.674) (0.751) (0.733) (0.000266) (0.000279) (0.000314) 
RD -5.449*** -4.879*** -5.068*** -0.000322 -0.000516 -0.000591 
 (0.820) (0.988) (0.833) (0.000548) (0.000476) (0.000544) 
       
Banking Freedom -0.0379***   6.55e-07   
 (0.00941)   (3.18e-06)   
Supervisory Power  -0.0364   6.60e-05*  
  (0.0765)   (3.70e-05)  
Activity Restriction   0.109   0.000113** 
   (0.0709)   (5.40e-05) 
       
Bank Size -1.878*** -1.851*** -2.130*** -7.19e-05 -9.39e-05 -0.000117 
 (0.302) (0.345) (0.323) (0.000134) (0.000171) (0.000155) 
Capitalization 0.720 1.019 1.163 -6.42e-06 3.51e-05 -2.86e-06 
 (0.639) (1.006) (1.029) (0.000131) (0.000128) (0.000133) 
NPL -8.651*** -12.95*** -9.727*** 0.000693 0.000381 0.000743 
 (2.074) (2.176) (2.235) (0.000915) (0.00148) (0.00112) 
Loangrowth -0.0848 -0.187 -0.217 1.00e-04 9.24e-05 7.42e-05 
 (0.217) (0.240) (0.230) (0.000196) (0.000226) (0.000224) 
Loan 2.344** 2.240* 2.132* -0.000542 -0.000528 -0.000552 
 (1.081) (1.206) (1.118) (0.000429) (0.000502) (0.000485) 
Deposit -12.37*** -13.65*** -12.58*** 0.000536 0.000872 0.000638 
 (1.437) (1.665) (1.536) (0.000482) (0.000659) (0.000613) 
GDPgrowth 13.11*** 17.17*** 13.49*** 0.00543** 0.00787*** 0.00452** 
 (4.023) (4.434) (3.889) (0.00219) (0.00302) (0.00200) 
GDPpercap 2.005* -2.260 -0.795 4.20e-05 -4.71e-05 -0.000116 
 (1.195) (1.381) (1.282) (0.000499) (0.000687) (0.000593) 
Inflation -0.920 1.159 -1.254 0.00379*** 0.00522*** 0.00418*** 
 (1.714) (1.930) (2.038) (0.00139) (0.00180) (0.00150) 
Constant 42.29*** 83.70*** 71.18*** -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.115*** 
 (11.21) (13.11) (12.11) (0.00464) (0.00658) (0.00555) 
       
Number of 
Observations 
16,868 14,040 15,382 15,985 13,220 14,534 
Number of Banks 1,342 1,314 1,335 1,338 1,305 1,331 
R-squared 0.081 0.074 0.074 0.993 0.993 0.993 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 





Using a dataset with 1,395 international listed banks from 49 countries over the period from 
1998 to 2018, this chapter contributes to the literature by empirically testing the theoretical 
model developed by Wagner (2010) regarding the differential effects of diversification on bank 
idiosyncratic and systemic risk. Second, this chapter contributes by building up a new 
diversification indicator to reflect the degree of diversification from a country’s perspective 
and show the risk distributions among banks by capturing the distributions of banks’ revenues. 
The nature of this indicator makes my empirical analysis more appropriate to test the theory 
proposed in Wagner (2010) in the literature than other studies that employ traditionally used 
bank-level diversification indicators. 
I find that an increase in diversification in a country leads to more systemic risk measured by 
∆CoVaR, which is possibly due to higher similarities in activities and portfolios among banks 
if banks become more diversified. My results confirm the findings of the aforementioned 
theoretical study. My findings also indicate that diversification has a contrasting effect on 
banks’ idiosyncratic risk measured by Z-Score, which is consistent with the modern portfolio 
theory (Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964). My conclusions remain the same under several 
robustness checks, for example, using alternative diversification and bank risk indicators, 
considering the potential influence of the global financial crisis, and taking into account 
additional regulatory and institutional control variables. The findings of my study suggest that 
policies promoting banks’ diversification activities, if well executed, may have benefits to 
individual bank’s stability. However, they could also bring additional costs to banks and 
exacerbate systemic stability. Therefore, my study implies a desired degree of diversification 




Chapter 3: Diversification and Bank Stability: The Role of 




In Chapter 2, I empirically test the theory on the direct relationship between diversification and 
bank idiosyncratic and systemic risk by constructing a new diversification indicator. In line 
with Wagner (2010), my findings confirm the theory that diversification has a negative effect 
on bank systemic stability while it has a positive influence on individual bank stability. Based 
on the conclusions in the previous chapter, in this chapter, I extend my research by investigating 
whether the diversification-bank stability relationship may vary according to a country’s 
regulatory framework and banks’ core risk determinants. To the best of my knowledge, my 
research is the first work that explicitly accounts for the role of regulatory framework, bank 
size and capital in assessing the effect of diversification on bank stability. 
The variations in the regulatory environment across countries and mixed conclusions on the 
effect of regulation on bank stability 14  arouse my interests in investigating whether the 
regulatory framework is associated with the diversification-bank stability relationship in 
countries with different regulatory environments. Banks’ diversification activities could have 
an interacting effect with a country’s regulatory framework, which leads to a joint influence on 
bank stability. For example, regulatory authorities have cross-country differences in 
supervisory power, so they may have different expertise to discipline banks to establish sound 
corporate governance and monitor banks’ risk-taking activities, which may moderate the effect 
of diversification on bank risk in a country. In addition, banks in countries with distinct private 
 
14 Details in previous studies that discuss the mixed findings on the relationship between bank regulation and 




monitoring environments may have varying levels of excessive risk-taking incentives, which 
possibly shows different reactions of banks in terms of taking diversified activities. 
In addition to the regulatory framework, I also examine the moderating effects of banks’ 
characteristics on the relationship between diversification and bank stability. Following Laeven, 
Ratnovski, and Tong (2016), my study focuses on two bank-specific risk factors – bank size 
and capital – as the recent global financial crisis has brought about the debate on these two 
characteristics as key determinants of bank systemic risk. Moreover, the literature shows mixed 
findings on the relationship between bank size, capital, and risk,15 which is different for other 
risk indicators that have a uniform effect on bank risk such as non-performing loan and leverage 
ratio. Therefore, the mixed conclusions of these risk factors above raise my interests in 
exploring whether bank size and capitalization can moderate the relationship between 
diversification and bank risk. 
This chapter contributes to the literature in two aspects. Firstly, this chapter is the first to 
investigate the role of the regulatory environment in the relationship between diversification 
and bank stability. This investigation is especially important to understand whether the 
diversification-bank stability relationship is conditional on the country-specific regulatory 
environment. Based on the cross-country database on bank regulation and supervision 
presented by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013), my study focuses on four aspects of the 
regulatory framework of a country: official supervisory power, capital regulations, bank 
activity restrictions, and private monitoring. These variables are the core in the agenda of 
policymakers and have also been employed to investigate their direct or indirect impacts on 
bank stability (Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras, 2011; Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu, 2014a; 
Noman, Gee, and Isa, 2018). Second, my study is the first to investigate a potential association 
 
15 Detailed theories in explaining the relationship between bank size, capital, and risk are presented in Section 3.2 




between banks’ two essential risk determinants (bank size and capital) and the diversification-
bank stability relationship. This investigation is important to understand whether the 
relationship between diversification and banks stability uniformly applies to all banks or is 
conditional on banks with different characteristics, which provides insights to banks managers 
to formulate suitable diversification strategies based on banks’ characteristics.  
Using a large sample of 1,395 international listed banks from 49 countries from 1999 to 2015, 
I find a negative association between diversification and bank systemic stability that is 
mitigated in countries with powerful supervisory agencies, higher stringency of capital 
regulations, more restrictions on the scope of banks’ activities, and more private monitoring. 
Moreover, my study shows that bank size and capital have a positive moderating effect on the 
negative association between diversification and systemic risk, which implies that larger and 
well-capitalized banks are less subject to systemic risk when the degree of diversification in a 
country is high. My findings have important policy implications as the effect of diversification 
on bank stability is possibly conditional on the country-specific regulatory framework and 
banks’ own characteristics, which provide regulators and bank managers with new guidance in 
regulating diversified activities of banks in the market and formulating diversification 
strategies. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents previous research 
relevant to my study. Section 3.3 introduces the data and regulatory variables used in this 
chapter. Section 3.4 shows the methodology employed in this research. Section 3.5 reports my 
empirical findings, followed by robustness tests in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes and 





3.2 Literature review 
There are significant cross-country variations in terms of bank regulation and supervision such 
as capital requirements, power of official supervisory agencies, permissible banking activities, 
and deposit insurance (Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013; Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2013). 
Such cross-country differences in regulatory framework may explain why existing studies 
show mixed findings on the effect of bank regulation on bank risk. Previous studies show no 
convincing or limited evidence supporting the idea that regulation results in better performance 
and stability (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2011; Klomp 
and De Haan, 2012; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) state that 
policies inducing accurate information disclosure and incentives for private-sector corporate 
control of banks work best to promote banking sector stability. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2011) find no evidence supporting the hypothesis that better regulation and 
supervision result in sounder banks. Klomp and De Haan (2012) find that bank regulation and 
supervision does not have a uniform impact on banking risk. Beltratti and Stulz (2012) find no 
evidence that tighter regulation in general is associated with better bank performance during 
the global financial crisis or with less risky banks before the crisis. González (2005) states that 
regulation may even increase banks’ incentives to engage in risk-taking activities since their 
charter values are eroded in a stricter regulatory environment.  
The literature shows mixed conclusions regarding the relationship between bank size and risk. 
There are three theories supporting the conclusions that larger banks are subject to more risks. 
First, according to the moral hazard theory, large banks are more likely to induce significant 
externalities to the market than smaller ones, which consequently increases the chances of 
receiving more subsidy from the deposit insurance scheme and government’s guarantees and 
leads to greater risk-taking incentives for large banks (Kareken and Wallace, 1978; Sharpe, 




suggests that large and complex banks have incentives to take on excessive risks with the 
expectation of government bailouts (O’Hara and Shaw, 1990; Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; 
Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia, 2020). Third, large and complex banks 
will suffer from severe agency problems through engaging in multiple activities, which can 
transfer into risks (Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro, 2007; Laeven and Levine, 2007). In contrast 
with generating more risks, large banks are more resilient and less vulnerable to 
macroeconomic shocks because larger ones have advantages in the acquisition of information 
and the economy of scale (Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Williamson, 1986; 
Allen, 1990) and can benefit more from engaging in diversified activities (Matutes and Vives, 
2000; Boyd, De Nicolo, and Smith, 2004). 
As for the role of capital on bank risk, the literature suggests that greater capitalization provides 
banks with buffers to sustain huge losses in financial distress (Repullo, 2004; Von Thadden, 
2004), improves borrower screening and risk monitoring (Coval and Thakor, 2005; Allen, 
Carletti, and Marquez, 2011), and mitigates the moral hazard issue in banks’ investment 
(Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Laeven, Ratnovski, and Tong, 2016). On the contrary, other studies 
show that higher capital may lead to greater risks by increasing portfolio risks (Koehn and 
Santomero, 1980; Calem and Rob, 1999). After summarizing different strands of literature 
regarding how bank regulation and supervision, bank size and capital are related to bank risk, 
I will investigate whether or not countries’ regulatory framework or bank size and capital are 





3.3 Data and measures 
3.3.1 Data 
This study retrieves cross-country regulation and supervision data from a comprehensive 
database provided by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013),16 which is compiled based on four 
consecutive versions of the World Bank’s Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey. These 
four surveys were conducted in 1999, 2002, 2006 and 2011, respectively, and contain detailed 
and comprehensive information on a wide scope of regulation and supervision practices, such 
as official supervisory power, private monitoring, deposit insurance, capital regulation, and 
activity restriction. Therefore, these surveys provide excellent grounds to investigate whether 
bank regulatory framework plays a role in the relationship between diversification and bank 
stability. Since the values of country-level regulatory variables remain constant between 
consecutive surveys, following Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu (2014a), I use the data from 
the previous survey until a new survey is available as the values of regulatory variables between 
two consecutive surveys. More specifically, I use the survey data of 1999 for years from 1999 
to 2001, the survey data of 2002 for years from 2002 to 2005, the survey data of 2006 for years 
from 2006 to 2010, and the survey data of 2011 for years 2011 to 2015. 
The dataset in this chapter is an extension of the original dataset used in Chapter 2. One 
difference though is that the ending year in this chapter is 2015, which is one year before the 
most recent Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey that was initially undertaken in 2016. I 
drop observations for year 2016-2018 from the original database because the database of Barth, 
Caprio, and Levine that includes the information on the regulatory variables constructed based 
on the latest version of Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey has not been released so far. 
The accounting data used to construct bank diversification, idiosyncratic risk and bank-specific 
control variables is obtained from the Worldscope, and the stock market data for calculating 
 




systemic risk indicator is retrieved from Datastream, CRSP and Compustat Global. 
Macroeconomic control variables are obtained from the World Bank database. 
 
3.3.2 Regulatory variables  
I consider four aspects of a country’s regulatory framework: official supervisory power, capital 
regulations, bank activity restrictions, and private monitoring. To avoid repetition, I do not 
introduce the same variables that are employed in Section 2.3 from Chapter 2 of the thesis, 
such as bank risk, diversification, bank-specific, and macroeconomic control variables. 
3.3.2.1 Official supervisory power 
I employ the supervisory power index to capture the information on whether bank supervisors 
can take actions against banks’ directors, management, auditors, and owners on issues 
regarding whether the supervisory agency can meet with external auditors without the approval 
of the banks, take legal action against auditors for negligence, force a bank to change its internal 
organization structure, constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses, suspend 
dividends, bonuses and management fees, supersede the rights of shareholders, and remove 
and replace management and directors (Schaeck, Čihák and Wolfe, 2009; Agoraki, Delis, and 
Pasiouras, 2011; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Klomp and De Haan, 2012; Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine, 2013; Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu, 2014a; Hoque et al., 2015; Noman, Gee, and 
Isa, 2018). This index has values between zero and fourteen, with higher values indicating more 
supervisory powers of regulatory authorities in a country.  
3.3.2.2 Capital regulations 
I use the capital regulation index to reflect the stringency of bank capital regulations regarding 
the amount of capital that banks must hold and the nature and source of bank capital (Beck, 




Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras, 2011; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Klomp and De Haan, 2012; 
Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2013; Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013; Fernández, González, 
and Suárez, 2013; Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu, 2014a; Hoque et al., 2015; Noman, Gee, 
and Isa, 2018). It depicts the regulatory approach in assessing the degree of capital at risk in a 
bank rather than showing the statutory capital requirements. This index is constructed based on 
eight questions: (1) Whether the minimum required capital-asset ratio is risk-weighted in line 
with Basel guidelines? (2) Does this ratio vary with a bank’s market risk? (3) Is the market 
value of loan losses not realized in accounting books deducted from the book value of capital? 
(4) Are unrealized securities losses deducted from the book value of capital? (5) Are unrealized 
foreign exchange losses deducted from the book value of capital? (6) Are the sources of funds 
to be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? (7) Can the initial 
disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other than cash or 
government securities? (8) Can initial disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds? 
This index takes the value from zero to eight, and a higher value shows greater stringency of 
capital requirements. 
3.3.2.3 Bank activity restrictions 
I employ the activity restriction index to indicate whether banks’ engagement in securities 
market activities (e.g. brokering, underwriting, and dealing), insurance activities (e.g. 
insurance underwriting and selling) and real estate activities (e.g. real estate investment and 
management) in a country are unrestricted, permitted, restricted or prohibited (Claessens and 
Laeven, 2003; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2006; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Schaeck, 
Čihák and Wolfe, 2009; Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras, 2011; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Klomp 
and De Haan, 2012; Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2013; Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013; 




2014a; Hoque et al., 2015; Noman, Gee, and Isa, 2018). This index has values between three 
and twelve, with higher values indicating greater restrictions on associated activities. 
3.3.2.4 Private monitoring 
I use the private monitoring index to show the degree to which regulatory and supervisory 
policies encourage the monitoring of banks by private investors (Schaeck, Čihák and Wolfe, 
2009; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Klomp and De Haan, 2012; Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2013; 
Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu, 2014a; Hoque et al., 2015). The building of this index is 
based on nine survey questions in aspects of information disclosure from bank directors and 
supervisors, involvement with international auditors and rating agencies, off-balance sheet 
items and risk management procedures information disclosure, and the existence of an explicit 
deposit insurance system. This index has values from zero and twelve, with higher values 
indicating greater regulatory empowerment of private monitoring of banks. The detailed 





Table 3.1. Definition of the Regulatory Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Supervisory power index This index has values between zero and fourteen, with higher values indicating greater official supervisory power. This index is 
calculated based on the following questions, and a value of 1 is added to the index if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise: (1) Does the 
supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? (2) Are 
auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior 
managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? (3) Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? 
(4) Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? (5) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed 
to supervisors? (6) Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors or management to constitute provisions to cover actual or 
potential losses? (7) Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors' decision to distribute dividends? (8) Can the supervisory agency 
suspend the directors' decision to distribute bonuses? (9) Can the supervisory agency suspend the directors' decision to distribute 
management fees? (10) Can the supervisory agency legally declare-such that this declaration supersedes the rights of bank 
shareholders-that a bank is insolvent? (11) Does the Banking Law give authority to the supervisory agency to intervene-that is, suspend 
some or all ownership rights-a problem bank? (12) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or 
any other government agency supersede shareholder rights? (13) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory 
agency or any other government agency supersede shareholder rights? (14) Regarding bank restructuring and reorganization, can the 
supervisory agency or any other government agency remove and replace management? (15) Regarding bank restructuring and 
reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government agency remove and replace directors? Source: Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2013). 
Capital regulation index This index has values between zero and eight, with higher values indicating higher capital stringency. This index is calculated based 
on the questions of the following questions, and a value of 1 is added to the index if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise: (1) Is the 
minimum required capital asset ratio risk weighted in line with Basle guidelines? (2) Does the ratio vary with a bank's market risk? 
(3) Is the market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books deducted from the book value of capital? (4) Are unrealized 
securities losses deducted from the book value of capital? (5) Are unrealized foreign exchange losses deducted from the book value 
of capital? (6) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? (7) Can the initial 
disbursement or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other than cash or government securities? (8) Can initial 
disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds? Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013). 
Activity restriction index This index has values between three and twelve, with higher values indicating greater restrictions. This index is calculated based on 
the questions about whether banks in a country are (1) unrestricted, (2) permitted, (3) restricted or (4) prohibited in engaging in 
securities, insurance and real estate activities. A value of 1 is added to the index if an activity is unrestricted, 2 if is permitted, 3 if is 







Table 3.2 (continued). Definition of the Regulatory Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Private monitoring index This index has values between zero and twelve, with higher values indicating greater regulatory empowerment of private monitoring 
of banks. This index is computed based on the following questions: (1) Whether bank directors and officials are legally liable for the 
accuracy of information disclosed to the public? (2) Whether banks must publish consolidated accounts? (3) Whether banks must be 
audited by certified international auditors? (4) Whether 100 percent of the largest ten banks are rated by international rating agencies? 
(5) Whether off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the public? (6) Whether banks must disclose their risk management procedures 
to the public? (7) Whether accrued, though unpaid interest/principal, enter the income statement while the loan is still non-performing? 
(8) Whether subordinated debt is allowable as part of capital? (9) Whether there is no explicit deposit insurance system and no 
insurance was paid the last time a bank failed?  Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013). 
Notes: This table presents the definitions of the regulatory variables used in this chapter. To avoid repetitions, I do not show the definitions of the same variables introduced in Chapter 2 such as 





To investigate whether regulatory framework is associated with the relationship between 
diversification and bank stability, I employ the fixed effect models to control for the bank, 
country, and time fixed effects. Fixed effect models have been widely used in the banking 
literature to control for unobserved time-invariant variables (Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe, 
2007; Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu, 2014a; Leroy and Lucotte, 2016; Goetz, 2017). My 
regression model is specified as follows: 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 ×  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2 ×  𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 +
𝛽3 ×  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 ×  𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿1 × 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +
𝛿2 × 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + νj + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡    (3.1) 
where subscripts 𝑖, 𝑗 and 𝑡 denote bank 𝑖 in country 𝑗 in year 𝑡. Diversification denotes the 
country-level diversification measure (CRD). I use time lagged values of diversification 
indicator along with its interaction terms with regulatory and core risk determinant variables to 
mitigate the issue of reverse causality from bank risk to diversification. Regulation represents 
one of my four country-level regulatory variables, Supervisory power index, Capital regulation 
index, Activity restriction index, or Private monitoring index. I include the interaction term 
between the regulatory variable and diversification indicator, Diversification×Regulation, into 
the regression to capture the moderating effects of the regulatory framework. I run separate 
regressions for each type of regulatory variable. I use the same bank risk, bank-specific and 
macroeconomic control variables as described in Section 2.3 from the Chapter 2 of the thesis. 
Bank risk stands for bank systemic (∆CoVaR) or idiosyncratic risk (Z-Score) measures. Bank 
specific controls and Macroeconomic controls are vectors of bank-specific and macroeconomic 
control variables that control for their potential effects on bank stability. I include bank-level 




performing loans (NPL), loan growth ratio (Loangrowth), deposit ratio (Deposit) and loan ratio 
(Loan) as bank control variables, and use GDP growth rate (GDPgrowth), GDP per capita 
(GDPpercap), and Inflation rate (Inflation) as macroeconomic control variables. 𝜇, 𝜈 and 𝜏 
capture bank, country and year fixed effects, respectively. 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is the error term. 𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛿 
are the parameters to be estimated. 
To examine the role of size and capital on the relationship between diversification and bank 
stability, I employ the following model: 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽4 ×  𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5 × 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 ×
 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡−1 × 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛿3 × 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 +
𝛿4 × 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + νj + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑗,𝑡    (3.2) 
where Risk determinant denotes one of my banks’ core risk determinants, bank size or capital. 
Diversification ×  Risk determinant is the interaction term of the risk determinant with 
diversification variable, which is included to capture the moderating effects of bank size and 
capital on the diversification-bank stability relationship. I run separate regressions for each type 
of risk determinant. 
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.2 shows the summary statistics for all variables used in this study. I find that there are 
great variations in the values of the regulatory variables. The Supervisory power index has a 
mean of 12.55 and a standard deviation of 1.896, and its theoretical minimum and maximum 
values are 4 and 16, respectively. A mean value of this index closer to its maximum indicates 
that the countries in my sample have a relatively high supervisory power on average. The 




of 8.032 and 1.473, respectively. The Capital regulation index has a mean of 5.497 and its 
mean is closer to its maximum value of 7, which indicates that, on average, the stringency of 
capital is high in my sample. The Private monitoring index has a mean of 9.338 with a standard 
deviation of 1.310. Especially, this index has a minimum value of 5 and is larger than the 
theoretical minimum value, which shows a certain degree of private monitoring on average for 
the countries analyzed. 
Table 3.3 shows the cross-country averages of selected essential variables, which provides 
information on the variations in these variables across countries. The Supervisory power index 
has the highest average value in Indonesia (13.923) in contrast with the lowest average value 
in South Africa (7.412). The average value of the Activity restriction index is highest in China 
(10.615), which is over three times higher than that in Hong Kong (3.286), the lowest value. 
As for the Capital regulation index, Turkey and Kenya share the highest average (7.000) 
among all countries, and Malaysia has the lowest value of 1.882. Lastly, the Private monitoring 
index is highest in Republic of Korea (10.417), which is much above that in Venezuela (5.706), 











Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics  
 Notes: This table contains information on the descriptive statistics of all variables used in this chapter. N represents the number 
of observations for each variable. SD is the standard deviation of each variable. Mean, Min, and Max indicate the mean, 
minimum, and maximum value of each variable, respectively. Detailed information on each regulatory variable’s definition 
and calculation are reported in Table 3.1 of this chapter, and on other variables such as bank risk, diversification, bank-specific, 
and macroeconomic control variables are introduced in Table 2.2 of Chapter 2. I retrieve accounting data from the Worldscope 
on an annual basis to construct bank diversification, idiosyncratic risk, and bank-specific control variables, and download stock 
market data from Datastream, CRSP, and Compustat Global on daily basis to calculate systemic risk indicator. Macroeconomic 
control variables are obtained from the World Bank database. The Regulatory variables are obtained from the datasets provided 
by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2013). Accounting- and market-based measures have been converted to the same data frequency 
before conducting the regression analyses. To account for the influence of extreme values and outliers, all variables are 
winsorized and the bottom 1% and top 1% of observations for each variable are set respectively to the value of the 1st and 
99th percentiles. Source: Worldscope, CRSP, Datastream, Compustat Global, and authors’ calculation.
Variables N Mean SD Min Max 
CRD 26,525 0.359 0.090 0 0.498 
RD 19,582 0.409 0.099 0.022 0.500 
Z-Score 19,487 24.17 16.16 -3.343 115.7 
∆CoVaR 18,495 -0.040 0.042 -0.202 0.031 
Bank Size 20,188 15.12 2.141 8.334 21.14 
Capitalization 20,123 0.089 0.408 -33.19 1.210 
NPL 17,362 0.027 0.042 0 0.524 
Loangrowth 18,895 0.132 0.266 -0.748 2.576 
Loan 19,579 0.659 0.146 0 0.989 
Deposit 19,999 0.715 0.169 0 0.948 
GDPgrowth 26,265 0.027 0.026 -0.148 0.251 
GDPpercap 26,265 10.21 1.084 6.176 11.63 
Inflation 26,265 0.032 0.066 -0.060 1.437 
Supervisory power index 21,105 12.55 1.896 4 16 
Activity restriction index 22,858 8.032 1.473 3 12 
Capital regulation index 12,374 5.497 1.470 1 7 




Table 3.3. Averages of key variables for each country’s banks 










Argentina 0.367 0.346 6.003 -0.040 9.412 7.353 4.176 8.706 
Australia 0.309 0.349 29.267 -0.045 11.588 7.294 6.417 9.588 
Austria 0.423 0.412 29.309 -0.037 11.824 4.529 2.000 6.588 
Belgium 0.393 0.365 11.922 -0.046 10.941 5.824 3.923 7.294 
Brazil 0.417 0.401 11.956 -0.032 13.471 6.118 3.000 8.706 
Canada 0.344 0.325 29.357 -0.038 8.647 5.412 2.882 8.588 
Switzerland 0.188 0.377 18.900 -0.039 12.941 4.353 5.000 7.706 
Chile 0.373 0.356 19.542 -0.036 11.706 9.412 3.000 7.824 
China 0.384 0.370 18.554 -0.024 10.000 10.615 n.a 9.538 
Colombia 0.412 0.359 9.130 -0.037 12.107 9.286 4.000 8.214 
Germany 0.429 0.405 16.506 -0.047 9.235 4.500 5.294 7.647 
Denmark 0.373 0.392 17.598 -0.036 9.706 6.647 n.a 9.000 
Egypt 0.280 0.267 16.572 -0.039 11.375 7.824 3.647 8.706 
Spain 0.392 0.325 15.302 -0.046 10.029 5.176 6.000 8.588 
Finland 0.320 0.394 16.485 -0.037 7.750 5.824 5.000 8.294 
France 0.393 0.355 20.536 -0.045 8.441 6.059 6.000 7.765 
United Kingdom 0.340 0.342 14.779 -0.048 9.750 3.706 5.000 10.000 
Greece 0.425 0.415 9.636 -0.039 10.667 6.647 4.118 7.706 
Hong Kong 0.230 0.269 23.996 -0.042 9.000 3.286 4.571 8.571 




Table 3.3 (continued). Averages of key variables for each country’s banks 










India 0.369 0.351 16.166 -0.026 9.647 8.706 6.000 8.000 
Ireland 0.379 0.326 21.429 -0.045 9.000 4.882 4.846 10.118 
Israel 0.388 0.379 22.563 -0.039 9.000 9.706 4.824 9.529 
Italy 0.412 0.395 18.674 -0.040 8.588 7.824 4.111 7.647 
Japan 0.408 0.451 24.685 -0.041 12.000 8.500 n.a 9.000 
Kenya 0.329 0.304 24.536 -0.037 13.588 8.294 7.000 7.588 
Republic of Korea 0.392 0.374 8.796 -0.048 9.706 7.882 4.833 10.417 
Sri Lanka 0.278 0.387 23.261 -0.039 9.667 7.235 3.000 8.471 
Luxembourg 0.348 0.364 16.573 -0.021 12.118 5.529 5.000 7.583 
Morocco 0.334 0.338 35.335 -0.039 12.625 8.412 5.000 8.000 
Mexico 0.364 0.374 11.110 -0.034 11.188 6.941 2.000 8.923 
Malaysia 0.240 0.237 20.930 -0.044 13.321 7.750 1.882 8.647 
Nigeria 0.416 0.384 16.716 -0.024 12.708 7.417 3.000 8.143 
Netherlands 0.404 0.398 15.014 -0.041 9.875 4.824 4.588 8.706 
Norway 0.302 0.339 17.682 -0.060 8.643 6.071 6.000 7.556 
Peru 0.360 0.342 8.884 -0.037 12.588 6.941 5.000 7.706 
Philippines 0.400 0.371 19.322 -0.042 11.000 5.000 6.000 8.083 
Poland 0.357 0.359 12.306 -0.041 10.231 8.118 5.625 8.059 
Portugal 0.371 0.344 8.394 -0.042 13.286 6.824 4.643 6.647 





Notes: This table contains information on the averages of selected key variables used in this chapter. The sample consists of 1,395 international publicly listed banks from 49 countries over the 
period from 1999 to 2015. CRD is the country-level diversification measure calculated based on the form of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by taking sum of each type of revenue streams of 
banks in each country included in the sample. RD is the bank-level revenue diversification indicator. Z-Score is individual bank stability measure that is the sum of return on assets and the equity 
ratio divided by the standard deviation of bank return on asset. ∆CoVaR is bank’s systemic risk measure that is defined as the difference between the CoVaR of the banking market conditional on 
the bank being in distress and the banking market’s CoVaR in the median state of the bank. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Supervisory power index is an index of the 
power of regulatory agencies in a country. Activity restriction index is an index capturing the degree of a country’s restrictions on banks’ activities allowed to engage in. Capital regulation index 
is an index that captures a country’s stringency of capital regulations. Private monitoring index is an index of regulatory empowerment of private monitoring of banks. To account for the influence 
of extreme values and outliers, all variables are winsorized and the bottom 1% and top 1% of observations for each variable are set respectively to the value of the 1st and 99th percentiles. Source: 
Worldscope, CRSP, Datastream, Compustat Global, and authors’ calculation. 
Table 3.3 (continued). Averages of key variables for each country’s banks 










Singapore 0.221 0.237 36.014 -0.041 13.750 6.588 6.083 9.235 
Slovakia 0.398 0.413 16.781 -0.028 12.000 7.824 3.765 7.167 
Thailand 0.375 0.359 9.292 -0.045 11.538 8.471 6.000 8.647 
Tunisia 0.238 0.234 33.182 -0.040 9.000 8.000 5.000 5.889 
Turkey 0.340 0.357 6.903 -0.035 11.625 8.000 7.000 7.750 
Taiwan 0.391 0.353 17.644 -0.037 12.235 9.824 5.000 8.000 
United States of 
America 
0.353 0.439 29.156 -0.042 13.441 8.471 6.000 9.941 
Venezuela 0.195 0.430 10.833 -0.034 12.824 8.333 3.667 5.706 




3.5.2 The role of regulatory framework on the relationship between diversification and 
bank stability 
Table 3.4 reports the results on the role of the regulatory environment on the relationship 
between diversification and bank stability, with corresponding results reported in columns (1)-
(4) and (5)-(8) for idiosyncratic and systemic risk, respectively. According to the results in 
columns (1)-(4), I do not find significant results on the association of the regulatory variables 
on the relationship between diversification and bank idiosyncratic risk as can be inferred by 
the non-significant coefficients of the interaction terms of diversification with my four 
regulatory variables. However, I find significant associations with my four regulatory variables 
in the dimension of systemic risk as shown in columns (5)-(8).17 According to the results in 
column (5), the coefficient of the interaction term of supervisory power index and 
diversification is positive and significant while the coefficient of diversification remains 
significant and negative, which suggests that diversification has a different effect on systemic 
risk depending on the degree of supervisory power of a country’s supervisory agency. To 
compute the threshold level of supervisory power index at which the diversification-bank 
systemic stability relationship changes, I take the first derivative of Equation (3.1) with respect 




𝛽3 × 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 0 . Then I have the equation −0.190 + 0.0183 ×
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 = 0 and the corresponding threshold value of supervisory power is 10.38. 
This result indicates that, when the value of supervisory power index is beyond its threshold 
value (10.38), the original negative coefficient of diversification on bank systemic stability 
turns to be positive, which suggests that the systemic risk contribution of banks’ diversification 
activities becomes weak in a country with greater supervisor power of regulatory agency.18 
 
17 The investigation on the causality from regulation and its moderating effects with diversification to bank risk is 
beyond the scope of my study. 
18 I am concerned with the marginal effect of diversification on bank risk considering a country’s regulation 




Such positive effect of official supervisory power on bank stability is also found by Klomp and 
De Haan (2012) and Hoque et al. (2015). This may be explained by the public interest view 
discussed by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006) 
that official regulatory agencies act in the interests of the public and have incentives to prevent 
market failures. A powerful supervisory agency has the expertise to discipline banks to promote 
the corporate governance and monitor banks’ risk-taking activities. 
As for the association of activity restriction with the relationship between diversification and 
bank systemic risk, I also find a positive and significant coefficient of the interaction term while 
there is a negative coefficient of diversification as shown in column (6). I obtain the threshold 
value of activity restriction index of 3.99 after taking the zero of the first derivative of Equation 
(3.1) with diversification (
∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅
∆𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 × 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 0 ), 
which indicates that the negative effect of diversification on systemic stability is mitigated as 
the degree of activity restrictions increases, and this effect turns to be positive when activity 
restrictions remain at a relatively high level. This result implies that banks contribute less to 
systemic risk with the increase in the degree of overall diversification in countries with more 
restrictions on financial services or activities that banks are allowed to engage in, which could 
be due to a decreasing homogeneity of activities among banks when there are restrictions on 
financial services imposed by regulatory agency. My result is supported by Čihák et al. (2013), 
who show that banks in countries with fewer restrictions on non-traditional activities such as 
investment banking, insurance, and real estate are more likely to suffer crisis. My finding is 
 
partial derivative of the regression equation with respect to the country-level diversification measure (CRD). The 
corresponding results of 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 × 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 are related to the coefficients of CRD (𝛽1) and 
the interaction term 𝐶𝑅𝐷 × 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥  (𝛽3 ). If we are interested in the direct association 
between diversification and bank stability, we only need to look at the individual coefficient of CRD (𝛽1) since 
𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 0 under this situation. Although the individual coefficient of Supervisory power 
index is significant, its coefficient (𝛽2) does not help in explaining the marginal effect of diversification. Hence, I 




also consistent with Boyd, Graham, and Hewitt (1993) according to whom more moral hazard 
issues can be induced if banks are allowed to take a broad range of activities.  
Column (7) of Table 3.4 shows the results regarding the effect of the stringency of capital 
regulation on the relationship between diversification and systemic stability. The positive and 
significant coefficient of the interaction term of capital regulation index and diversification 
indicates that the negative direct impact of diversification on systemic risk is conditional on 
the level of capital stringency of a specific country. In countries with higher stringency of 
capital regulations, the negative effect of diversification on systemic stability is mitigated. This 
result is in line with existing studies suggesting that more strict capital requirements result in a 
reduction in bank risk (Furlong and Keeley, 1989; Keeley, 1990; Hellmann, Murdock, and 
Stiglitz, 2000; Repullo, 2004). My finding is especially supported by Holod, Kitsul, and Torna 
(2017) given that they conclude that capital requirements are effective in decreasing bank risk 
associated with non-interest income-generating activities such as trading activity that banks 
typically diversify into. Moreover, my results are consistent with Fernández and González 
(2005), who find that more stringent capital regulations can prevent banks from taking 
excessive risks and increase banks’ ability of absorbing losses, making banks less sensitive to 
systemic risk. I also calculate the corresponding threshold value of the capital regulation index 
equal to 3.62 (
∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅
∆𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 × 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 0). 
With respect to the association of private monitoring with the diversification-systemic stability 
nexus, I find a positive and significant coefficient of the interaction term of diversification with 
private monitoring index in column (8). This result indicates that, in countries with greater 
private monitoring, the negative effect of diversification on systemic stability becomes weaker, 
and the original negative influence turns to be positive when the value of the private monitoring 




zero value of the equation  
∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅
∆𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 × 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥). These 
results are supported by Holod, Kitsul, and Torna’s (2017) analyses, which reveals that higher 
private monitoring decreases the individual banks’ contribution to systemic risk. In addition, 
my findings are consistent with Fernández and González (2005) whose results indicate that 
more private monitoring prevents banks from engaging in excessive risk-taking activities and 
improves financial soundness since it mitigates the moral hazard issue arising from asymmetric 
information. My research extends their findings and treats the private monitoring as an 




Table 3.4. Baseline results: The role of regulatory framework on the relationship between diversification and bank stability 
Dependent Variables Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
CRD 21.01*** 5.489*** 4.908 -5.272 -0.190*** -0.0607*** -0.167*** -0.238*** 
 (4.738) (2.055) (4.015) (5.372) (0.0384) (0.0109) (0.0367) (0.0329) 
         
Supervisory power index 0.357**    -0.0121***    
 (0.143)    (0.00102)    
CRD×Supervisory power index -1.353    0.0183***    
 (0.381)    (0.00318)    
         
Activity restriction index  0.375***    -0.00946***   
  (0.130)    (0.000979)   
CRD×Activity restriction 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥   -0.352    0.0152***   
  (0.321)    (0.00216)   
         
Capital regulation index   0.805***    -0.00268  
   (0.294)    (0.00237)  
CRD×Capital regulation index   -0.730    0.0461***  
   (0.770)    (0.00631)  
         
Private monitoring index    -0.173    0.00528*** 
    (0.229)    (0.00127) 
CRD×Private monitoring index    0.954    0.0268*** 
    (0.628)    (0.00364) 
RD -3.588*** -2.879*** 0.0262 -3.115*** 0.00341 -0.00186 0.00949 -0.00688 
 (1.026) (0.867) (1.109) (0.874) (0.00570) (0.00503) (0.00785) (0.00478) 
Bank Size -0.233 -0.500* -1.568*** -0.602** 0.0197*** 0.0169*** 0.0134*** 0.00790*** 
 (0.289) (0.268) (0.436) (0.271) (0.00113) (0.00107) (0.00264) (0.00113) 
Capitalization 3.032 3.268 1.355 3.267 0.0610*** 0.0712*** 0.0537*** 0.0365*** 
 (3.039) (3.138) (1.077) (3.121) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0147) (0.0116) 




Table 3.4 (continued). Baseline results: The role of regulatory framework on the relationship between diversification and bank stability 
 (2.388) (2.164) (3.096) (2.149) (0.0155) (0.0128) (0.0166) (0.0128) 
Loangrowth -0.343 -0.565** -0.426 -0.452** -0.00425*** -0.00357*** -0.00421** -0.000704 
 (0.221) (0.222) (0.458) (0.219) (0.00125) (0.00115) (0.00185) (0.00112) 
Loan -1.289 -0.858 -1.646 -1.113 -0.0330*** -0.0429*** -0.0399*** -0.0438*** 
 (1.191) (1.098) (1.922) (1.108) (0.00548) (0.00534) (0.00696) (0.00422) 
Deposit -2.252 -2.654** -3.257 -2.734** 0.0348*** 0.0428*** 0.0119 0.0256*** 
 (1.395) (1.293) (2.003) (1.301) (0.00690) (0.00648) (0.0105) (0.00514) 
GDPgrowth 8.156*** 12.19*** 16.47*** 12.53*** 0.277*** 0.318*** 0.216*** 0.249*** 
 (3.090) (2.580) (4.699) (2.817) (0.0242) (0.0202) (0.0288) (0.0154) 
GDPpercap 5.609*** 6.737*** 5.502*** 6.063*** 0.171*** 0.157*** 0.0816*** 0.111*** 
 (1.514) (1.319) (2.009) (1.297) (0.0123) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.00923) 
Inflation 0.579 -1.794 -0.440 0.281 0.0765*** 0.0403*** 0.0226 -0.0176 
 (1.761) (1.908) (3.333) (1.602) (0.0145) (0.0150) (0.0239) (0.0112) 
Constant -31.64** -37.72*** -8.691 -24.75** -1.982*** -1.873*** -1.082*** -1.351*** 
 (12.70) (10.87) (17.12) (10.88) (0.116) (0.0971) (0.111) (0.0887) 
No. of observations 11,909 13,142 5,984 13,076 11,966 13,192 6,241 13,131 
R-squared 0.019 0.022 0.030 0.021 0.421 0.378 0.647 0.501 
No. of banks 1,296 1,320 960 1,310 1,302 1,327 1,000 1,318 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table presents the regression results on the role of regulatory environment on the relationship between diversification and bank stability. CRD is the country-level diversification 
measure calculated based on the form of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by taking sum of each type of revenue streams of banks in each country included in the sample. RD is the bank-level 
revenue diversification indicator. Supervisory power index is an index of the power of regulatory agencies in a country. Activity restriction index is an index capturing the degree of a country’s 
restrictions on banks’ activities allowed to engage in. Capital regulation index is an index that captures a country’s stringency of capital regulations. Private monitoring index is an index of 
regulatory empowerment of private monitoring of banks. CRD×Supervisory power index is the interaction term of diversification and supervisory power index. CRD×Activity restriction index is 
the interaction term of diversification and activity restriction index. CRD×Capital regulation index  is the interaction term of diversification and capital regulation index. 
CRD×Private monitoring index is the interaction term of diversification and private monitoring index. Z-Score is the individual bank stability measure that is the sum of return on assets and the 
equity ratio divided by the standard deviation of bank return on asset. ∆CoVaR is the bank’s systemic risk measure that is defined as the difference between the CoVaR of the banking market 
conditional on the bank being in distress and the banking market’s CoVaR in the median state of the bank. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Capitalization is the ratio of total 
equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired loans to total gross loans. Loangrowth is the growth rate of bank total loans. Loan represents the ratio of bank total loans on total assets. 
Deposit is the ratio of bank total deposits on total assets. GDPgrowth represent the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. GDPpercap is the 
gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Inflation is the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of 
goods and services. Results regarding the role of regulatory environment on the relationship between diversification and bank idiosyncratic risk are reported in columns (1)-(4) and systemic risk 
in columns (5)-(8). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and clustered at the bank level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 




3.5.3 The role of bank size and capital on the relationship between diversification and 
bank stability 
I am also interested in investigating whether the relationship between diversification and bank 
stability varies with essential characteristics of banks. Considering the fact that there are great 
variations across individual banks in terms of their characteristics, such as size, capitalisation 
and liquidity. It is important to investigate whether the diversification-bank stability 
relationship uniformly applies to all banks or is conditional on banks with different 
characteristics. Understanding this is also important to bank managers to formulate suitable 
diversification strategies depending on banks’ characteristics, especially characteristics 
essential to banks’ risk profile. With reference to Laeven, Ratnovski, and Tong (2016), my 
study focuses on two essential risk factors – bank size and capital, and the recent global 
financial crisis has brought about the debate on these two characteristics as key determinants 
of bank systemic risk. The results on the role of bank size and capital on this relationship are 
reported in Table 3.5. I find no significant association of size in the dimension of idiosyncratic 
risk in column (1) and a negative coefficient of CRD-Capitalization interaction variable on 
bank standalone risk in column (3). This finding indicates that the beneficial effect of 
diversification in reducing bank idiosyncratic risk is weakened as capital level increases, and 
this beneficial effect turns to be negative when capital reaches a level with a threshold value of 




= 𝛽4 + 𝛽5 × 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =0). This result may be due to a moral 
hazard problem in increasing banks’ risk-taking as highly capitalized banks want to take the 
upside benefits from risk-taking activities (Calem and Rob, 1999). 
From the perspective of systemic risk, I find significant associations of bank size and capital 
on the diversification-systemic stability relationship as shown in columns (2) and (4). The 




that bank size and capital can mitigate the negative direct effect of diversification on systemic 
stability,19 which implies that larger and well-capitalized banks are less subject to systemic risk 
when the degree of diversification in a country is high. By including both the CRD-Bank Size 
and CRD-Capitalization terms into the same regression, I find the same results that are shown 
in column (6). As suggested by the modern intermediation theory (Diamond, 1984), large banks 
tend to have better capabilities in management and operations and can enjoy the benefits from 
engaging in diversified activities, which provides buffers making those banks less vulnerable 
to macroeconomic shocks (Matutes and Vives, 2000; Boyd, De Nicolo, and Smith, 2004). 
When banks engage in diversified activities, well-capitalized banks typically hold sufficient 
buffers to counteract potential shocks in the market (Repullo, 2004; Von Thadden, 2004). In 
addition, higher capital induces a greater level of borrower screening by banks, which is 
beneficial for bank stability (Coval and Thakor, 2005; Allen, Carletti, and Marquez, 2011). My 
result is in line with the conclusions of Berger and Bouwman (2013) according to which higher 
capital holdings are associated with a higher survival probability for banks. Column (6) shows 
the results that include both size and capital variables, and the results remain the same as what 
are discussed above. 
Table 3.5. The role of bank size and capital on the relationship between diversification and bank stability 
 
19 The negative direct relationship between diversification and systemic stability can be inferred from the negative 
and significant coefficients of CRD in columns (2) and (4) of Table 3.5. My systemic risk indicator, ∆CoVaR, is 
positively (negatively) related to bank systemic stability (risk). 
Dependent Variables Z-Score ∆CoVaR Z-Score ∆CoVaR Z-Score ∆CoVaR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Bank Size Capitalization 
Bank Size and 
Capitalization 
       
CRD 0.509 -0.285*** 39.05*** -0.0872*** 99.70*** -0.515*** 
 (7.938) (0.0475) (4.638) (0.0133) (12.24) (0.0552) 
       
CRD×Bank Size 0.208 0.0162***   -3.647 0.0252*** 
 (0.484) (0.00295)   (0.585) (0.00306) 
       




Notes: This table presents the regression results on the role of bank size and capital on the relationship between 
diversification and bank stability. CRD is the country-level diversification measure calculated based on the form 
of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index by taking sum of each type of revenue streams of banks in each country 
included in the sample. RD is the bank-level revenue diversification indicator. CRD×Bank Size is the interaction 
term of diversification and bank size. CRD×Capitalization is the interaction term of diversification and bank 
capital. Z-Score is the individual bank stability measure that is the sum of return on assets and the equity ratio 
divided by the standard deviation of bank return on asset. ∆CoVaR is the bank’s systemic risk measure that is 
defined as the difference between the CoVaR of the banking market conditional on the bank being in distress and 
the banking market’s CoVaR in the median state of the bank. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of bank total 
assets. Capitalization is the ratio of total equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired loans to total 
gross loans. Loangrowth is the growth rate of bank total loans. Loan represents the ratio of bank total loans on 
total assets. Deposit is the ratio of bank total deposits on total assets. GDPgrowth represent the annual percentage 
growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. GDPpercap is the gross domestic product 
divided by midyear population. Inflation is the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the 
cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services. Results regarding the role of bank size 
on the relationship between diversification and bank idiosyncratic and systemic risks are reported in columns (1) 
and (2) and the role of capital in columns (3) and (4). Columns (5) and (6) show the results of regressions that 
include both the size and capital variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates and clustered at the bank level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Table 3.5 (continued). The role of bank size and capital on the relationship between diversification and 
bank stability 
   (55.12) (0.131) (58.96) (0.158) 
       
RD -4.118*** 0.00987 -4.021*** 0.0158** -2.882*** 0.00841 
 (0.849) (0.00634) (0.822) (0.00628) (0.829) (0.00640) 
Bank Size -0.636* 0.0182*** -0.0194 0.0240*** 1.367*** 0.0147*** 
 (0.328) (0.00167) (0.238) (0.00160) (0.333) (0.00175) 
Capitalization 4.219 0.0516*** 192.1*** -0.221*** 206.3*** -0.339*** 
 (3.919) (0.0142) (23.95) (0.0512) (25.67) (0.0597) 
NPL 1.183 0.173*** -0.281 0.173*** -0.569 0.176*** 
 (2.173) (0.0164) (2.235) (0.0161) (2.219) (0.0163) 
Loangrowth -0.385** -0.00419*** -0.371** -0.00426*** -0.369** -0.00429*** 
 (0.187) (0.00132) (0.184) (0.00135) (0.184) (0.00134) 
Loan -0.946 -0.0433*** -1.185 -0.0419*** -0.958 -0.0432*** 
 (0.993) (0.00710) (0.955) (0.00707) (0.948) (0.00706) 
Deposit -2.639** 0.0267*** 1.585 0.0236*** 1.696 0.0242*** 
 (1.233) (0.00855) (1.134) (0.00837) (1.114) (0.00844) 
GDPgrowth 13.06*** 0.107*** 7.059*** 0.132*** 10.42*** 0.109*** 
 (2.747) (0.0155) (2.551) (0.0157) (2.629) (0.0156) 
GDPpercap 6.260*** 0.186*** 4.077*** 0.184*** 3.345*** 0.188*** 
 (1.243) (0.0168) (1.188) (0.0173) (1.173) (0.0170) 
Inflation 1.783* 0.0688*** 2.316** 0.0706*** 2.869*** 0.0672*** 
 (0.986) (0.0225) (1.016) (0.0228) (0.989) (0.0226) 
Constant -27.82*** -2.233*** -33.39*** -2.278*** -49.80*** -2.154*** 
 (10.44) (0.158) (10.01) (0.157) (10.33) (0.158) 
       
No. of observations 15,232 15,121 15,232 15,121 15,232 15,121 
No. of banks 1,338 1,340 1,338 1,340 1,338 1,340 
R-squared 0.024 0.425 0.107 0.426 0.113 0.430 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 




3.6 Robustness check 
To check whether my results regarding the role of regulatory framework, bank size and capital 
on the relationship between diversification and bank stability hold under different 
diversification and risk measures, I build up alternative diversification and bank risk indicators. 
Similar to the robustness check in Chapter 2, I use country-level income diversity (CID) and 
bank-level income diversity (ID) as alternative diversification indicators at country and bank 
levels, and employ the stock return volatility (ReturnVol) and the marginal expected shortfall 
(MES) as alternative bank idiosyncratic and systemic risk indicators, respectively. 
As for the association of regulatory environment with the diversification-bank stability 
relationship, in Table 3.6, I find consistent results with my baseline results showing that the 
negative relationship between diversification and bank systemic stability is weakened in 
countries with stronger power of supervisory agency, higher stringency of capital regulations, 
greater banks’ activities restrictions, and more private monitoring according to the results in 
columns (1)-(4) using ∆CoVaR as system risk indicator20 and in columns (5)-(8) using MES as 
the alternative systemic risk measure.21 In line with my main results, I do not find consistent 
significant effects of the four regulatory variables considered on the relationship between 
diversification and bank standalone risk based on the results in Table 3.7. 
I also test my findings on the role of bank size and capital on the diversification-bank stability 
nexus by using the country-level income diversity, and I find consistent results in Table 3.8 
confirming that bank size and capital have positive association on the negative relationship 
 
20 I repeat my analyses using the ∆CoVaR as the dependent variable in regressions (1)-(4) in Table 3.6 in order to 
check whether my regressions that use alternative diversification indicators (CID and ID) generate consistent 
results with the baseline results when using the same dependent variables. 
21  Although seven out of eight results in Table 3.6 are consistent with my original analyses regarding the 
association of the regulatory environment on the diversification-systemic risk relationship, the result in columns 




between diversification and systemic risk, which indicates that larger and well-capitalized 




Table 3.6. Robustness check: The role of regulatory framework on the relationship between diversification and systemic risk 
Dependent Variables ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR MES MES MES MES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
CID -0.119*** -0.0222*** -0.0821*** -0.0849*** -0.232*** -0.0287* 0.0932 -0.167** 
 (0.0140) (0.00256) (0.0190) (0.0135) (0.0736) (0.0150) (0.0983) (0.0683) 
         
Supervisory power index -0.0110***    -0.00887***    
 (0.000736)    (0.00261)    
CID×Supervisory power index 0.0110***    0.0203***    
 (0.00125)    (0.00647)    
         
Activity restriction index  -0.00739***    0.00323   
  (0.000620)    (0.00321)   
CID×Activity restriction 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥   0.00677***    0.00587*   
  (0.000785)    (0.00351)   
         
Capital regulation index   0.00586***    0.0208**  
   (0.00195)    (0.0106)  
CID×Capital regulation index   0.0182***    -0.0173  
   (0.00369)    (0.0198)  
         
Private monitoring index    0.00992***    -0.0123*** 
    (0.000865)    (0.00416) 
CID×Private monitoring index    0.0102***    0.0199** 
    (0.00164)    (0.00807) 
         
ID 0.00216 -0.00333 0.00776* -0.00684*** -0.0439*** -0.0419*** -0.0398* -0.0375*** 
 (0.00267) (0.00250) (0.00402) (0.00229) (0.0148) (0.0141) (0.0220) (0.0137) 
Bank Size 0.0197*** 0.0166*** 0.0129*** 0.00800*** -0.0279*** -0.0263*** -0.0189** -0.0233*** 
 (0.00112) (0.00106) (0.00274) (0.00112) (0.00494) (0.00494) (0.00914) (0.00509) 
Capitalization 0.0624*** 0.0727*** 0.0648*** 0.0359*** -0.103* -0.0695 0.0440 -0.0620 




Table 3.6 (continued). Robustness check: The role of regulatory framework on the relationship between diversification and systemic risk 
NPL 0.116*** 0.109*** 0.0395** 0.0715*** -0.0113 0.0762 0.0949 0.0700 
 (0.0156) (0.0130) (0.0170) (0.0129) (0.0655) (0.0743) (0.115) (0.0740) 
Loangrowth -0.00418*** -0.00358*** -0.00365** -0.000793 -0.0264*** -0.0280*** -0.0122 -0.0249*** 
 (0.00126) (0.00115) (0.00185) (0.00112) (0.00731) (0.00778) (0.0141) (0.00755) 
Loan -0.0328*** -0.0438*** -0.0424*** -0.0452*** 0.0463** 0.0447** 0.0566* 0.0363* 
 (0.00547) (0.00535) (0.00724) (0.00424) (0.0219) (0.0209) (0.0322) (0.0209) 
Deposit 0.0346*** 0.0437*** 0.0138 0.0268*** 0.0365 0.00642 -0.0393 0.0158 
 (0.00690) (0.00647) (0.0107) (0.00515) (0.0271) (0.0268) (0.0492) (0.0271) 
GDPgrowth 0.285*** 0.321*** 0.171*** 0.247*** 0.979*** 0.841*** 0.871*** 0.843*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0198) (0.0222) (0.0157) (0.142) (0.0983) (0.141) (0.101) 
GDPpercap 0.170*** 0.158*** 0.0772*** 0.113*** 0.180*** 0.160*** 0.140** 0.165*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0104) (0.0101) (0.00925) (0.0337) (0.0329) (0.0581) (0.0330) 
Inflation 0.0735*** 0.0350** 0.00859 -0.0112 -0.233** -0.293*** 0.00390 -0.246*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0224) (0.0115) (0.107) (0.0932) (0.166) (0.0917) 
Constant -1.981*** -1.886*** -1.055*** -1.419*** -1.434*** -1.374*** -1.347** -1.335*** 
 (0.114) (0.0968) (0.106) (0.0871) (0.302) (0.290) (0.573) (0.300) 
         
No. of observations 11,966 13,192 6,241 13,131 11,890 13,102 6,217 13,043 
R-squared 0.423 0.378 0.630 0.500 0.035 0.028 0.052 0.026 
No. of banks 1,302 1,327 1,000 1,318 1,302 1,326 999 1,317 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table presents the robustness test results on the role of regulatory environment on the relationship between diversification and bank systemic risk. CID and ID are the country- and bank-level income diversity 
measures, respectively. Supervisory power index is an index of the power of regulatory agencies in a country. Activity restriction index is an index capturing the degree of a country’s restrictions on banks’ activities 
allowed to engage in. Capital regulation index is an index that captures a country’s stringency of capital regulations. Private monitoring index is an index of regulatory empowerment of private monitoring of banks. 
CID×Supervisory power index  is the interaction term of diversification and supervisory power index. CID×Activity restriction index  is the interaction term of diversification and activity restriction index. 
CID×Capital regulation index is the interaction term of diversification and capital regulation index. CID×Private monitoring index is the interaction term of diversification and private monitoring index. ∆CoVaR is the 
bank’s systemic risk measure that is defined as the difference between the CoVaR of the banking market conditional on the bank being in distress and the banking market’s CoVaR in the median state of the bank. MES 
is an alternative bank systemic risk indicator and is calculated as the average of a bank’s stock return during the 5% worst trading days for the overall market return in one financial year. Bank Size is the natural logarithm 
of bank total assets. Capitalization is the ratio of total equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired loans to total gross loans. Loangrowth is the growth rate of bank total loans. Loan represents the ratio of bank 
total loans on total assets. Deposit is the ratio of bank total deposits on total assets. GDPgrowth represent the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. GDPpercap is the 
gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Inflation is the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services. Results 
regarding the role of regulatory environment on the relationship between diversification and bank systemic risk are reported in columns (1)-(4) using ∆CoVaR and in columns (5)-(8) using MES as dependent variables. 




Table 3.7. Robustness check: The role of regulatory framework on the relationship between diversification and idiosyncratic risk 
Dependent Variables Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score ReturnVol ReturnVol ReturnVol ReturnVol 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
CID 4.406** 0.499 4.093** -4.349* -0.0990*** -0.00951*** -0.0120 -0.0768*** 
 (1.989) (0.489) (1.889) (2.591) (0.0110) (0.00148) (0.0112) (0.00923) 
         
Supervisory power index 0.00746    -0.000825**    
 (0.103)    (0.000390)    
CID×Supervisory power index -0.299*    0.00911    
 (0.174)    (0.000979)    
         
Activity restriction index  0.223***    -0.00214***   
  (0.0860)    (0.000341)   
CID×Activity restriction 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥   0.0669    0.00328   
  (0.119)    (0.000409)   
         
Capital regulation index   0.942***    -0.00492***  
   (0.213)    (0.00114)  
CID×Capital regulation index   -0.760**    0.00313  
   (0.378)    (0.00220)  
         
Private monitoring index    -0.106    -0.00567*** 
    (0.165)    (0.000553) 
CID×Private monitoring index    0.624**    0.00976 
    (0.317)    (0.00113) 
         
ID -2.387*** -2.382*** -0.539 -2.539*** 0.0141*** 0.00789*** 0.00755*** 0.00989*** 
 (0.506) (0.448) (0.644) (0.436) (0.00211) (0.00197) (0.00278) (0.00193) 
Bank Size -0.242 -0.528** -1.583*** -0.632** -0.00103 -0.000106 0.000853 0.000334 
 (0.291) (0.268) (0.433) (0.271) (0.000877) (0.000753) (0.00141) (0.000764) 
Capitalization 3.088 3.314 1.381 3.310 -0.0845*** -0.0999*** -0.157*** -0.103*** 




Table 3.7 (continued). Robustness check: The role of regulatory framework on the relationship between diversification and idiosyncratic risk 
NPL -0.610 1.564 -0.588 0.872 0.125*** 0.129*** 0.153*** 0.134*** 
 (2.387) (2.164) (3.103) (2.146) (0.0180) (0.0159) (0.0225) (0.0160) 
Loangrowth -0.357 -0.579*** -0.420 -0.463** -0.000448 -0.00198* -0.00689*** -0.00176 
 (0.221) (0.221) (0.457) (0.219) (0.00118) (0.00108) (0.00193) (0.00115) 
Loan -1.395 -0.935 -1.740 -1.218 0.00781* 0.0130*** 0.0152*** 0.0144*** 
 (1.196) (1.098) (1.925) (1.104) (0.00427) (0.00401) (0.00539) (0.00399) 
Deposit -1.812 -2.372* -3.110 -2.417* -0.0143*** -0.0140*** -0.0381*** -0.0156*** 
 (1.395) (1.289) (2.005) (1.297) (0.00501) (0.00446) (0.00646) (0.00455) 
GDPgrowth 5.808* 11.02*** 15.75*** 11.47*** -0.197*** -0.250*** -0.250*** -0.227*** 
 (2.964) (2.549) (4.406) (2.790) (0.0214) (0.0151) (0.0285) (0.0176) 
GDPpercap 5.540*** 6.792*** 5.568*** 5.979*** -0.0186*** -0.0140*** -0.0313*** -0.0132** 
 (1.517) (1.323) (2.028) (1.288) (0.00649) (0.00523) (0.0101) (0.00514) 
Inflation -0.0755 -2.265 -0.436 0.0923 -0.0252* -0.00655 -0.0283 -0.0106 
 (1.771) (1.922) (3.346) (1.594) (0.0130) (0.0106) (0.0236) (0.0113) 
Constant -25.45** -36.02*** -9.189 -23.30** 0.245*** 0.191*** 0.395*** 0.212*** 
 (12.61) (10.91) (17.26) (10.60) (0.0561) (0.0459) (0.0966) (0.0467) 
         
No. of observations 11,909 13,142 5,984 13,076 11,949 13,175 6,232 13,114 
R-squared 0.019 0.024 0.031 0.023 0.235 0.197 0.270 0.191 
No. of banks 1,296 1,320 960 1,310 1,302 1,327 999 1,318 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table presents the robustness test results on the role of regulatory environment on the relationship between diversification and bank idiosyncratic risk. CID and ID are the country- and bank-level income 
diversity measures, respectively. Supervisory power index is an index of the power of regulatory agencies in a country. Activity restriction index is an index capturing the degree of a country’s restrictions on banks’ 
activities allowed to engage in. Capital regulation index is an index that captures a country’s stringency of capital regulations. Private monitoring index is an index of regulatory empowerment of private monitoring of 
banks. CID×Supervisory power index is the interaction term of diversification and supervisory power index. CID×Activity restriction index is the interaction term of diversification and activity restriction index. 
CID×Capital regulation index is the interaction term of diversification and capital regulation index. CID×Private monitoring index is the interaction term of diversification and private monitoring index. Z-Score is the 
individual bank stability measure that is the sum of return on assets and the equity ratio divided by the standard deviation of bank return on asset. ReturnVol is an alternative bank standalone risk indicator and is calculated 
as the standard deviation of bank stock returns on a yearly basis using the daily stock price information. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Capitalization is the ratio of total equity to total assets. NPL 
is the ratio of bank impaired loans to total gross loans. Loangrowth is the growth rate of bank total loans. Loan represents the ratio of bank total loans on total assets. Deposit is the ratio of bank total deposits on total 
assets. GDPgrowth represent the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. GDPpercap is the gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Inflation is the 
consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services. Results regarding the role of regulatory environment on the relationship 
between diversification and bank idiosyncratic risk are reported in columns (1)-(4) using Z-Score and in columns (5)-(8) using ReturnVol as dependent variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below 




Table 3.8. Robustness check: The role of bank size and capital on the relationship between diversification 
and bank stability 
 Notes: This table presents the robustness test results on the role of bank size and capital on the relationship between 
diversification and bank stability. CID and ID are the country- and bank-level income diversity measures, respectively. 
CID×Bank Size  is the interaction term of diversification and bank size. CID×Capitalization  is the interaction term of 
diversification and bank capital. Z-Score is the individual bank stability measure that is the sum of return on assets and the 
equity ratio divided by the standard deviation of bank return on asset. ∆CoVaR is the systemic risk measure that is defined as 
the difference between the CoVaR of the banking market conditional on the bank being in distress and the banking market’s 
CoVaR in the median state of the bank. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Capitalization is the ratio of 
total equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired loans to total gross loans. Loangrowth is the growth rate of bank 
total loans. Loan represents the ratio of bank total loans on total assets. Deposit is the ratio of bank total deposits on total assets. 
GDPgrowth represent the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. GDPpercap 
is the gross domestic product divided by midyear population. Inflation is the consumer price index reflects the annual 
percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services. Results regarding the role 
of bank size on the relationship between diversification and bank idiosyncratic and systemic risks are reported in columns (1) 
and (2) and the role of capital in columns (3) and (4). Columns (5) and (6) show the results of regressions that include both the 
size and capital variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and clustered at 
the bank level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variables Zscore ∆CoVaR Zscore ∆CoVaR Z-Score ∆CoVaR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Bank Size Capitalization 
Bank Size and 
Capitalization 
       
CID 1.440 -0.0693*** 13.00*** -0.0107*** 40.20*** -0.139*** 
 (3.252) (0.00993) (2.074) (0.00306) (6.899) (0.0249) 
       
CID×Bank Size -0.0329 0.00386***   -2.056*** 0.00751*** 
 (0.190) (0.000586)   (0.366) (0.00136) 
       
CID×Capitalization   -176.7*** 0.0907*** -283.2*** 0.422*** 
   (24.19) (0.0300) (35.29) (0.104) 
       
ID -2.854*** 0.00103 -2.376*** 0.00111 -1.311*** 0.00393 
 (0.419) (0.00153) (0.402) (0.00153) (0.404) (0.00322) 
Bank Size -0.550* 0.00701*** -0.0668 0.00879*** 0.856*** 0.0202*** 
 (0.285) (0.000710) (0.242) (0.000712) (0.322) (0.00164) 
Capitalization 4.273 0.0188*** 119.4*** -0.0304* 128.5*** -0.111*** 
 (3.920) (0.00660) (15.56) (0.0172) (15.07) (0.0420) 
NPL 2.255 0.0698*** 1.298 0.0686*** 1.360 0.171*** 
 (2.162) (0.00781) (2.224) (0.00771) (2.204) (0.0165) 
Loangrowth -0.397** -0.00147** -0.434** -0.00146** -0.396** -0.00423*** 
 (0.186) (0.000641) (0.185) (0.000649) (0.180) (0.00133) 
Loan -1.001 -0.0187*** -1.080 -0.0185*** -0.814 -0.0426*** 
 (0.991) (0.00319) (0.956) (0.00319) (0.952) (0.00712) 
Deposit -2.209* 0.0103*** 1.652 0.00874** 1.059 0.0230*** 
 (1.224) (0.00381) (1.139) (0.00376) (1.123) (0.00848) 
GDPgrowth 11.70*** 0.208*** 3.375 0.223*** 8.134*** 0.122*** 
 (2.666) (0.00943) (2.589) (0.00972) (2.691) (0.0158) 
GDPpercap 6.036*** 0.0870*** 3.483*** 0.0874*** 2.584** 0.189*** 
 (1.227) (0.00753) (1.187) (0.00769) (1.183) (0.0172) 
Inflation 1.421 0.0502*** 1.931* 0.0518*** 0.135 0.0746*** 
 (1.017) (0.0122) (1.077) (0.0124) (1.199) (0.0234) 
Constant -26.09*** -1.072*** -18.63* -1.102*** -21.18** -2.290*** 
 (10.11) (0.0704) (9.905) (0.0706) (9.898) (0.158) 
       
No. of observations 15,232 15,121 15,232 15,121 15,232 15,121 
No. of banks 1,338 1,340 1,338 1,340 1,338 1,340 
R-squared 0.024 0.425 0.107 0.426 0.076 0.425 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 





Using a sample of 1,395 international publicly listed banks from 49 countries between 1999 
and 2015, this chapter contributes to the literature by empirically investigating the role of the 
regulatory environment in the relationship between diversification and bank stability. Based on 
the cross-country database on bank regulation and supervision presented by Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2013), I focus on four regulatory variables in the agenda of policymakers (Agoraki, 
Delis, and Pasiouras, 2011; Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu, 2014a): supervisory power 
index, capital regulation index, activity restriction index, and private monitoring index. In 
addition, I investigate whether standalone and systemic risks of banks with different size and 
capital holdings will respond differently to changes in diversification. 
I find that the impact of diversification on bank stability is conditional on the specific regulatory 
environment in a country. In particular, the negative impact of diversification on bank systemic 
stability is mitigated in countries with powerful supervisory agencies, higher stringency of 
capital regulations, more restrictions on the scope of banks’ activities, and more private 
monitoring. Moreover, my study shows that bank size and capital alleviate the negative impact 
of diversification on systemic risk, which implies that larger and well-capitalized banks are less 
subject to systemic risk when the degree of diversification in a country is high. However, I did 
not find a similar role of regulatory framework and banks’ essential risk factors on the 
dimension of bank idiosyncratic risk. 
My findings have important implications for policymaking and bank management. Given that 
a country’s regulatory environment has a significant association with the relationship between 
diversification and bank stability, regulators should consider cross-country variations in 
regulatory environments when setting policies to regulate the diversification of banks. From 
the perspective of bank management, banks’ diversification decisions should be based on the 




that banks may engage in. Excessive diversification may benefit individual bank stability but 
increase exposures to correlated risks among banks with similar portfolios through 
diversification. Bank managers formulating their diversification strategy should evaluate the 
size and capital holdings of their institutions since these characteristics may determine the 
extent of the benefits from diversified activities.  
This chapter only deals with the associations of regulatory framework and banks’ risk 
determinants with the relationship between diversification and bank stability. In future research, 
the potential causality among them could be investigated. In addition, this study can be further 
improved by considering other dimensions of a country’s regulatory framework (i.e. deposit 
insurance scheme and bank governance) and institutional settings (i.e. property rights, 










The scope of activities that U.S. banks are allowed to engage in has changed following some 
key regulations in the financial market. In the aftermath of the Stock Market Crash of 1929, 
the Banking Act of 1933 (the Glass-Steagall Act) was passed to prevent financial institutions 
that provide investment banking services from engaging in commercial banking activities such 
as taking deposits. Then, from the 1980s, the U.S. banking market underwent a deregulation 
wave, and this deregulation trend culminated in the passage of the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999 (the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act), which repealed the Glass-Steagall 
restrictions and allowed U.S. banks to engage in non-traditional banking activities such as 
investment banking, venture capital, securities brokerage, insurance underwriting and asset 
securitization. The cumulative impact of decades of deregulation has paved the way for the 
presence of widely diversified banks that now dominate the U.S. banking market (Berger, 
Molyneux, and Wilson, 2014).22 
There are different explanations on why banks choose to diversify activities or services. First, 
from the risk management perspective, a firm’s idiosyncratic risk can be reduced by holding a 
well-diversified portfolio (Sharpe, 1964). Second, expanding the scope of bank business lines 
can create value for banks’ shareholders. Such values may come from the economy of scale 
since banks can reuse the extensive customer information gathered from long-term customer 
relationships in the area of other non-related activities by cross-selling multiple products to the 
 
22  Diversified financial institutions, especially systemically important banks, are also subject to regulatory 
pressures to maintain financial stability. For example, the Dodd-Frank Act and the Volcker Rule impose 






same customers (Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). Moreover, banks with high operating leverage can 
enjoy cost advantage in the process of diversifying related activities (Elsas, Hackethal, and 
Holzhäuser, 2010). Third, banks may have non-profit-maximizing motives to protect firm-
specific human capital and private benefits through diversification (Berger, Demsetz, and 
Strahan, 1999; Aggarwal and Samwick, 2003). 
Among the extensive studies related to bank diversification, little is known so far regarding 
whether bank diversification activities can be a source or a determinant of market power. 
Diversification may affect banks’ market power through leading changes to banks’ revenues 
and/or marginal costs. A diversified bank earns revenues not only from traditional lending 
activities but also from activities that generate non-interest incomes such as fee-based services. 
Therefore, diversification may allow banks to increase their revenues and gain market power 
while diversification could also induce costs to banks, which weakens banks’ pricing power by 
making them less likely to lower marginal costs in order to reap monopoly rents. 
This chapter contributes to the literature in three aspects. First, to my knowledge, this study is 
the first to investigate how diversification influences banks’ market power. No prior study 
addresses the question about whether diversification is a determinant or source of banks’ 
market power. I investigate both linear and potential non-linear relationships between 
diversification and banks’ market power in order to present a full picture on the extent to which 
banks’ market power is influenced by diversification. I employ a group of bank diversification 
measures to reflect the extent to which banks diversify between traditional interest income and 
non-traditional income-generating activities, which helps to obtain relatively general 
conclusions on the relationship between bank diversification and market power and to exclude 
the possibility that my findings are driven by the specifications of diversification measures. I 






the Lerner Index (Lerner, 1934), which is based on the divergence between product price and 
marginal cost of production. To engage in diversified activities, banks need to allocate 
resources between existing activities (e.g. lending service) and new income-generating 
activities. This process leads to changes in revenue and cost profiles of banks and further affects 
bank output prices and marginal costs of production, or a combination of both. 
Second, I contribute to the literature by investigating the effect of diversification on banks’ 
market power in both lending and funding markets by constructing indicators of loan and 
deposit market power separately, which provides supplementary evidence to my main 
contribution based on the findings using banks’ overall market power. A bank with market 
power in the lending market has information advantage and is less subject to information 
asymmetry, which is beneficial for access to financing (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Boot and 
Thakor, 2000). On the other hand, collecting deposits is the main source of funding for banks 
and the market power in the deposit market determines whether banks can have access to 
funding at a relatively low cost. The Lerner Index only shows information on banks’ market 
power for overall banking activities because this index uses a single output specification so that 
it typically incorporates both interest and non-interest incomes into bank output pricing, and, 
correspondingly, uses associated interest and non-interest costs to calculate marginal cost of 
production. Changes in the degree of diversification could result in different effects to banks’ 
market power in different markets. This raises the necessity of constructing separate measures 
to disentangle banks’ market power in the lending and deposit markets from all markets 
involved. 
Third, I contribute to the literature by examining how the market power of banks with different 
sizes reacts differently to the changes of the degree of diversification by splitting my sample 






whether the effect of bank diversification on market power differs by bank size. Large and 
small banks differ in their capabilities of managing relatively complex non-traditional activities, 
so their revenues and/or costs could exhibit different reactions towards the diversification of 
activities. Therefore, this process could lead to different changes in banks’ market power. 
I find that there exists an inverse U-shaped relationship between revenue diversification and 
banks’ market power, and this observed association holds for banks’ market power in both 
lending and funding markets. In addition, this inverse U-shaped relationship is much more 
pronounced in large banks than in small banks, which indicates that it is dominated by large 
banks. My results remain consistent with those in my baseline analyses by using an 
instrumental variable approach to mitigate the potential endogeneity between diversification 
and banks’ market power. In addition, my results are robust for considering other particular 
forms of diversification indicators. My findings are important for bank managers to understand 
how to proactively manage banks’ market power through engaging in diversified activities. 
Moreover, this study may help regulators and policymakers to evaluate the potential impact of 
diversification on the banking market structure. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents an overview of the 
relevant literature. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 introduce the data, measures and methodology 
employed. My empirical findings and robustness tests are presented in Sections 4.5 and 4.6, 
respectively. Section 4.7 concludes and discusses the main implications of my study. 
 
4.2 Literature review 
A large body of literature investigates the impacts of diversification on different issues in 






1995; Laeven and Levine, 2007; Elsas, Hackethal, and Holzhäuser, 2010), bank performance 
and risk profile (DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004a; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Baele, 
De Jonghe, and Vennet, 2007; Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe, 2007; Chiorazzo, Milani, and 
Salvini, 2008; Lepetit et al., 2008b; Berger, Hasan, and Zhou, 2010; Li and Zhang, 2013; Delis, 
Kokas, and Ongena, 2017) and bank stability (Lepetit et al., 2008a; De Jonghe, 2010; Wagner, 
2010; Sanya and Wolfe, 2011; DeYoung  and Torna, 2013; Williams, 2016; Abuzayed, Al-
Fayoumi, and Molyneux, 2018). 
A few studies link to bank revenues and margins to market power (Maudos and Fernández de 
Guevara, 2004; Valverde and Fernández, 2007; Nguyen, Skully, and Perera, 2012a). Maudos 
and Fernández de Guevara (2004) study the determinants of bank margins based on a sample 
of European banks. They show that market power is positively associated with bank interest 
margins while this effect can be cancelled out by the effect of changes in other determinants of 
bank interest margins. Thus, a decrease in interest margins could be compatible with an 
increase in banks’ market power under the condition that the effect of increasing market power 
is offset by a reduction in operating costs, interest rate risk and credit risk. Despite these 
findings, their study does not investigate whether market power changes with banks’ 
diversification strategy. Valverde and Fernández (2007) find that banks are able to seek new 
sources of market power in non-traditional business, which can serve as a compensation for 
the decrease of market power in traditional banking activities. Nevertheless, their study does 
not directly address the diversification-market power issue but just investigates the relationship 
between bank margins and market power. Nguyen, Skully, and Perera (2012a) find a significant 
non-linear relationship between bank market power and revenue diversification based on the 






the reverse causality from diversification to market power given that diversification could also 
be a source or determinant of banks’ market power. 
One point worth mentioning is that the studies mentioned above only employ ratio-based 
measures to represent bank fee-based activities or revenue diversification. This form of 
indicators only shows the proportion of one specific source of revenues in total incomes but 
cannot fully reflect the information on the overall level of diversification among different 
income-generating activities that include both traditional interest-based activities and different 
types of non-traditional income-generating activities. Thus, it is necessary to construct more 
informative bank diversification measures to precisely reflect banks’ diversification activities 
from different perspectives and further confirm that the association between diversification and 
market power is not driven by specific forms of diversification measures employed. 
Other studies provide some useful discussions and insights for this chapter regarding the 
understanding of the potential effect of diversification on banks’ market power. Buch, Koch, 
and Koetter (2012) study the influence of bank internationalization on market power. They find 
that banks with a higher share of foreign assets exhibit higher market power since banks can 
exploit private information generated from international branches to increase revenues and/or 
decrease costs in the domestic market. On the other hand, banks’ market power can be eroded 
due to increasing complexities in management and control if banks over-expand into too many 
foreign markets.  
 
4.3 Data and measures 
4.3.1 Data 
I construct a large dataset that includes nearly all U.S. commercial and bank holding companies 






comprehensive data coverage in terms of the number of banks (9,991 banks with over 120,000 
observations) and sample periods (27 years from 1991 to 2017), which is essential to draw 
more general conclusions regarding the relationship between diversification and banks’ market 
power. 
This study focuses on U.S. banks because the U.S. banking market has a significant presence 
in the world banking market and provides grounds for investigating banks’ diversification 
activities from traditional interest-based towards non-traditional activities due to its highly 
developed nature. Moreover, as U.S. banks have become more diversified with respect to 
product mix and geographic exposure over the last decades of deregulation in the banking 
market, a large number of them have diverse business lines for both traditional and non-
traditional banking services. This allows me to construct more informative diversification 
measures than those in countries with specialized banking business models. 
Accounting data based on bank balance sheet and income statement are collected from the BvD 
BankFocus database.23 I filter the original sample by excluding banks with fewer than five 
yearly observations, and banks with no available data on key variables (such as total assets, fee 
and commission incomes or staff expenses).24 To account for the influence of extreme values 
and outliers, all variables are winsorized so that the values of the bottom 1% and top 1% of 
observations for each variable are set equal to those with values in the 1st and 99th percentiles, 
respectively. 
 
23 BvD BankFocus has access to very detailed accounting information, which enables us to calculate different 
forms of bank market power and diversification measures. 
24 Before filtering, the original sample has 147,038 observations for 13,662 banks, which includes banks that have 
a relatively small number of observations. The specific criteria for refining my sample are as follows. First, banks 
are from the U.S. and are commercial banks and bank holding companies (BHCs). Second, all accounting data 
are organized in the consolidated form with codes ‘C1’ and ‘C2’ specified by BankFocus to avoid duplications in 
calculating measures. Third, I exclude banks with fewer than five yearly observations. Fourth, banks with no 






4.3.2 Market power measure 
My study employs the Lerner Index as a proxy of banks’ market power. This performance-
based measure has been widely used in previous banking studies (Fernández de Guevara and 
Maudos, 2007; Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss, 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez-Peria, 
2010; Koetter, Kolari, and Spierdijk, 2012; Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013; Amidu and 
Wolfe (2013a); Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu, 2014a). The Lerner Index is defined as the 
relative mark-up of banks’ output price over associated marginal costs in production. The 
premise for this measure is that a bank’s output price is equal to the marginal costs under a 
perfect competitive situation, and the output price rises above marginal cost as banks’ market 
power grows. Compared with other proxies for market power such as concentration ratio and 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), the Lerner Index has advantages in conducting 
parametric estimation at the bank-year level (Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013), which 
makes this indicator more informative in capturing individual banks’ market power. Second, 
the Lerner Index does not require strict assumptions on bank homogeneity and precise 
definitions of geographic and product market (Aghion et al., 2005). Third, the Lerner Index 
does not impose the assumption of long-term equilibrium as required by the Panzar and Rosse 
H-statistic (Panzar and Rosse, 1987). Fourth, the Lerner Index allows the calculation of market 
power for loans and deposits at the bank level separately (Forssbæck and Shehzad, 2014). The 
Lerner Index25 is calculated as follows: 
𝐿𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖,𝑡 =  
Pi,t−MCi,t
Pi,t
    (4.1) 
 
25 Koetter, Kolari, and Spierdijk (2012) proposed the adjusted Lerner Index to take into account the possibility of 
forgone monopoly profits due to the non-profit maximizing pricing of outputs. Their adjusted Lerner Index is 
constructed based on the background of deregulations in the U.S. banking industry during the 1980s, which 
provides grounds for testing the quiet life hypothesis (Hicks, 1935). However, my dataset does not cover the 






where subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 stand for bank i and time t, respectively. 𝑃 represents the average price 
of bank outputs and is calculated as banks’ total revenues that include both interest and non-
interest revenues divided by total assets. Marginal cost 𝑀𝐶 cannot be directly obtained from 
the balance sheet and needs to be estimated by using the translog cost function (Berndt and 
Wood, 1975): 






















2 + 𝜏3𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑄 + ∑ 𝜏4𝑗𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖
3
𝑗=1 + 𝜃1 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +     (4.2) 
The translog cost function includes three inputs (W), one output (Q) and a time trend (𝑡) that 
captures the effect of technology change. 𝑇𝐶  denotes banks’ total costs that is the sum of 
interest expenses, personnel expenses, administrative expenses and other operating expenses. 
𝑄 represents bank output and is proxied by bank total asset in millions of U.S. dollars.26 𝑊𝑗 
and 𝑊𝑖 denote one of the three input prices: the input price of funding calculated as the ratio of 
interest expenses to total assets, the input price of labour, which is the ratio of personnel 
expenses to total assets, and the input price of fixed capital computed as the ratio of 
administrative and other operating expenses to total assets. All variables in the equation are 
expressed in the form of natural logarithm, and the coefficients are estimated using OLS 
regression. I also impose the following restrictions on the estimated coefficients to ensure the 
homogeneity of degree one in input prices: 
∑ 𝛽1𝑗
3
𝑗 = 1; ∑ 𝛽2𝑖,𝑗
3
𝑗 = 0 (𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑊𝑖); ∑ 𝛾1𝑗
3
𝑗 = 0    (4.3) 
Then the 𝑀𝐶 is estimated by the following equation: 
 
26 For the Lerner Index, as in Fernández de Guevara, Maudos, and Perez (2005), I use banks’ total assets as the 

















𝑗=1 + 𝜏3𝑡)    (4.4) 
where 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛾𝑗 and 𝜏3 are coefficients estimated by the translog cost function. 
To investigate the effect of diversification on bank market power in the lending and deposit 
market separately, I further construct bank-year level loan and deposit markets power 
individually following Forssbæck and Shehzad (2014).27 Based on the specification of the 
Lerner Index, I split a bank’s output 𝑄 into two components – loans (L) and deposits (D) – and 
then compute the marginal cost for loans and deposits separately through the equation: 


































2 + 𝜏7𝑡𝑙𝑛𝐿 +
𝜏8𝑡𝑙𝑛𝐷 + ∑ 𝜏9𝑗𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑖
3
𝑗=1 + 𝜃2 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +     (4.5)  
where E represents banks’ total equity. The marginal costs for loans (𝑀𝐶𝐿) and deposits (𝑀𝐶𝐷) 






























𝑗=1 + 𝜏8𝑡)    (4.7) 




    (4.8) 
 
27 Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009) also consider separate indicators to reflect banks’ loans and deposit 
market power. However, their measures are based on country-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) indicators, 
which are less informative compared with a bank-level market power indicator. 
28 Although I disaggregate bank outputs into loans and deposits, the inputs for generating these two outputs remain 
the same as in the estimation of the marginal cost for the Lerner Index, which includes borrowed funds, fixed 









   (4.9) 
where 𝑟𝐿 is the lending rate calculated as the ratio between interest income and total earning 
asset. 𝑟𝐷 is the deposit rate computed as the ratio between interest expense and deposits and 
money market funding. 𝑟𝑀  is the U.S. 3-month Treasury Bill rate representing the money 
market rate. 
 
4.3.3 Diversification measures 
Previous studies typically use two forms of measures to represent bank diversification: the 
ratio-based (Baele, De Jonghe, and Vennet, 2007; Lepetit et al., 2008a; Nguyen, Skully, and 
Perera, 2012b) and the HHI-based measures (Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Berger, Hasan, and 
Zhou, 2010; Elsas, Hackethal, and Holzhäuser, 2010; Abuzayed, Al-Fayoumi, and Molyneux, 
2018). The ratio-based measures involve the ratios of bank non-interest incomes over total 
assets, or ratios of specific types of non-interest incomes (e.g. commissions and fees, trading 
incomes) over total assets or total operating incomes. One potential issue related to ratio-based 
diversification measures is that ratios only depict the absolute proportions of one type of bank 
revenues, which no longer reveals information on the extent of distributions or relative 
proportions among different sources of bank revenues. Compared with ratio-based measures, 
the HHI-based measures take into account different types of bank revenues and each HHI-







I employ the diversification measure proposed by Elsas, Hackethal, and Holzhäuser (2010) to 
reflect the overall extent of bank diversification among four types of revenues. This HHI-based 
bank overall diversification (OD) measure is calculated as:  




















]   (4.10) 
I use gross rather than net values for bank interest income (𝐼𝑁𝑇), fees and commission income 
(𝐶𝑂𝑀 ), trading income (𝑇𝑅𝐷 ) and other operating income (𝑂𝑇𝑂𝑃 ) to avoid distortions 
regarding the profitability of banks’ interest-based and non-interest-based activities. I also take 
the absolute values of all specific revenues to compute the total operating income (𝑇𝑂𝑅) to 
make the final diversification measure not largely influenced by banks’ business unit 
performance.29 Moreover, since I am more interested in the size of each activity rather than 
whether these activities are profitable or not, taking absolute values instead of net values will 
better show the extent to which cannot fully reflect in different activities. To generate a more 
straightforward diversification measure, I modify this diversification measure by using one 
minus the original form of the HHI measure. Under this modification, a high value of my 
diversification measure indicates a high degree of diversification. 
In addition, following Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe (2007), I build up another two 
diversification indicators, revenue diversification (RD) 30  and non-interest income 
diversification (ND). RD captures the degree of bank diversification across interest and non-
interest activities. This measure is calculated as follows: 
 
29 Net revenues have both positive and negative streams, so the values of diversification measures could take on 
large negative values in the case that the sum of total operating revenues is smaller than its single component 
given that negative revenues compensate for positive ones. This would be contrary to the normal case, and it 
would be hard to interpret the meaning of the HHI-based measure with a value far below zero. 
30 Although the RD has been introduced and employed as a control variable in Chapter 2, I treat RD as one of the 
















]    (4.11) 
where subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 denote bank i and year t. 𝑁𝑂𝑁 is bank non-interest income and 𝐼𝑁𝑇 
is interest income. 𝑇𝑂𝑃  is operating income and 𝑇𝑂𝑃 = |𝑁𝑂𝑁| + |𝐼𝑁𝑇| . ND reflects the 
degree of bank diversification within bank non-interest activities that include activities 
generating fees and commissions, trading and other operating incomes. ND is calculated as: 















]    (4.12) 
where 𝐶𝑂𝑀 stands for banks’ fees and commission income, 𝑇𝑅𝐷 represents banks’ trading 
income and 𝑂𝑇𝑂𝑃 is banks’ other operating income. 𝑁𝑂𝑁 denotes banks’ non-interest income, 
𝑁𝑂𝑁 = |𝐶𝑂𝑀| + |𝑇𝑅𝐷| + |𝑂𝑇𝑂𝑃|. 
In summary, these three diversification measures, OD, RD and ND, show information on the 
degree of bank diversification activities with different focuses: OD reflects the diversification 
among all types of bank revenues, RD shows diversification information between interest 
income and non-interest income-generating activities, and ND reveals information on 
diversification within banks’ non-interest income-generating activities. Therefore, this group 
of diversification measures with different specifications are supplementary to each other and 
allow a relatively comprehensive measurement of bank diversification. 
 
4.3.4 Control variables 
Following De Jonghe (2010), Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu (2014a) and Leroy and 
Lucotte (2016), my models consider several bank-specific control variables that may influence 






(BankSize), capitalization (Capitalization), profitability (ROA), cost-to-income ratio 
(Cost/Income Ratio) and fixed asset ratio (Fixed Asset Ratio). BankSize equals the natural 
logarithm of total bank assets in millions of U.S. dollars, and controls for the effect that banks 
may seek market power relying on their scale. Capitalization is the equity-to-total asset ratio 
that controls for the effect of differences in capitalization among banks on their pricing 
capability. Profitability, measured by return on assets ratio, is included to control for the 
possibility that more profitable banks are able to seek greater market power. ROA controls for 
the differences in costs among banks. Fixed Asset Ratio is used to control for the influence of 
long-term investments (e.g. branch networks) on banks’ ability of deriving pricing power in 






Table 4.1. Definitions of Variables 
Note: I retrieve accounting data on an annual basis from BankFocus compiled by the Bureau van Dijk to calculate market power, bank diversification and the bank-specific control variables.
Variables Definitions 
Market power measures 
Lerner Index (LI) The bank-level market power measure that represents the divergence between bank output prices and marginal cost of production, reflecting the 
profit that a bank gains due to its pricing power in the market. Calculated as the divergence between bank price of output and marginal cost divided 
by the price of output (Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez-Peria, 2010). Source: BankFocus and authors’ calculation. 
Lerner Index for loans (𝐿𝐼𝐿) The bank-level market power in the lending market. Source: BankFocus and authors’ calculation. 
Lerner Index for deposits (𝐿𝐼𝐷) The bank-level market power in the funding market. Source: BankFocus and authors’ calculation. 
  
Diversification measures 
Bank overall diversification (OD) Measure of bank diversification at the overall level among interest incomes and three types of non-traditional incomes (Elsas, Hackethal, and 
Holzhäuser, 2010). Source: BankFocus and authors’ calculation. 
Revenue diversification (RD) Measure of bank diversification between interest incomes and overall non-interest incomes (Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe, 2007). Source: 
BankFocus and authors’ calculation. 
Non-interest income diversification (ND) Measure of bank diversification within bank non-interest activities (Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe, 2007). Source: BankFocus and authors’ 
calculation. 
Asset diversity (AD) Alternative diversification measure for diversification across bank assets (Laeven and Levine, 2007). Source: BankFocus and authors’ calculation. 
Income diversity (ID) Alternative diversification measure for diversification across different sources of bank incomes (Laeven and Levine, 2007). Source: BankFocus 
and authors’ calculation. 
Deposit diversification (DD)  Alternative diversification measure for diversification across different types of banks’ deposits. Source: BankFocus and authors’ calculation. 
Loan diversification (LD) Alternative diversification measure for diversification across different types of banks’ loans. Source: BankFocus and authors’ calculation. 
  
Bank-specific control variables 
Bank Size (BankSize) Natural logarithm of bank total assets. Source: BankFocus 
Equity to total assets ratio (Capitalization) The ratio of total equity to total assets. Source: BankFocus 
Return on assets (ROA) The ratio of net income to total assets. Source: BankFocus 
Cost-to-income ratio (Cost/Income Ratio) The ratio of operating expenses to operating income. Source: BankFocus   







To investigate the relationship between bank diversification and market power, I employ the 
fixed effect model to control for unobserved bank and time fixed effects. Fixed effect models 
have been widely used in the banking literature to control for unobserved time-invariant 
variables (Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe, 2007; Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu, 2014a; 
Leroy and Lucotte, 2016; Goetz, 2017). My model is specified as follows: 
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑃𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟i,t = 𝛼1𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿1𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝑖,𝑡    (4.13) 
where DIV denotes one specific form of bank diversification measures that include revenue 
diversification (RD), non-interest income diversification (ND) and overall diversification (OD) 
for each bank-year observation. MarketPower denotes one specific form of the Lerner Index 
that consists of the Lerner Index (LI), the Lerner Index for loans (𝐿𝐼𝐿) and the Lerner Index for 
deposits (𝐿𝐼𝐷). X is a vector of bank-specific control variables. 𝜇𝑖 captures bank fixed effects 
and 𝜈𝑡  captures time fixed effects. 𝑖,𝑡  is the error term. I employ the lagged forms of 
diversification variables to mitigate the endogeneity issue due to bidirectional causality because 
lagged diversification and current banks’ market power are less likely to be jointly determined. 
In addition, the inclusion of bank fixed effects reduces the possibility that my key findings are 
driven by potential omitted time-invariant variables. 
 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Summary statistics 
Table 4.2 and 4.3 present the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this chapter and 






AD, ID, DD and LD)31 have values in their expected range between 0 and 1. The maximum 
values of RD, ND, AD, ID, DD and LD are 0.498, 0.662, 0.993, 0.934, 0.666 and 0.750, 
respectively, which are very close or equal to their maximum theoretical values (0.500 for RD, 
0.667 for ND and DD, 0.750 for LD, and 1.000 for AD and ID). As for my three market power 
variables, LI, LIL, and LID take both positive and negative values. The negative values of market 
power variables indicate the occasion where the average price of outputs is lower than the 
marginal cost. 
In Table 4.3, I find significant positive pairwise correlations between my seven diversification 
variables except for ND-AD, ID-DD, and DD-LD. This indicates that different diversification 
indicators used in my study reflect relatively consistent information on the degree of 
diversification in terms of revenues, loans, and deposits. As for the correlations between 
diversification and market power, I find significant positive correlations between most 
diversification variables and LI except for LI-ID, which suggest a positive association between 
diversification and banks’ overall market power. The majority correlations between 
diversification variables and LIL are also positive but with negative correlations for LID. In the 
next section, I will investigate the relationships between diversification and market power by 
running regressions after controlling a group of variables.
 
31 AD, ID, DD, and LD are alternative diversification indicators that are used in the robustness tests. They represent 
asset diversity, income diversity, deposit diversification, and loan diversification, respectively. Detailed 






Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics  
Note: This table presents information on the descriptive statistics of all variables throughout the chapter. N represents the number of observations for each variable. SD is the 
standard deviation of each variable. Mean, Min, Median, and Max indicate the mean, minimum, median, and maximum value of each variable, respectively. Detailed information 
on each variable’s definition and calculation are reported in Table 4.1. The criteria for selecting banks are as follows. First, banks are from the U.S. and are commercial banks 
and bank holding companies (BHCs). Second, all accounting data are organized in the consolidated form with codes ‘C1’ and ‘C2’ specified by BankFocus to avoid duplications 
in calculating measures. Third, I exclude banks with less than five yearly observations. Fourth, banks with no available data on key variables are excluded. To account for the 
influence of extreme values and outliers, all variables are winsorized and the bottom 1% and top 1% of observations for each variable are set respectively to the values of the 
1st and 99th percentiles. Source: BankFocus and authors’ calculation.
Variables N Mean SD Min Median Max 
LI 133,753 0.225 0.133 -0.499 0.234 0.573 
𝐿𝐼𝐿 133,271 0.687 0.202 -0.063 0.744 1.036 
𝐿𝐼𝐷 133,237 0.057 0.513 -3.657 0.216 1.058 
RD 134,989 0.220 0.105 0.005 0.210 0.498 
ND 134,839 0.414 0.147 0 0.457 0.662 
OD 134,989 0.232 0.117 0.005 0.216 0.601 
AD 134,978 0.535 0.252 0 0.531 0.993 
ID 134,989 0.271 0.166 0.005 0.237 0.934 
DD 134,090 0.070 0.093 0 0.034 0.666 
LD 133,646 0.570 0.126 0 0.602 0.750 
BankSize 135,135 12.14 1.509 8.707 12.020 18.52 
Capitalization 135,135 0.110 0.063 0.005 0.099 0.814 
ROA 135,135 0.008 0.011 -0.083 0.009 0.054 
Cost/Income Ratio 135,020 0.704 0.232 0.02 0.678 9.482 






Table 4.3. Correlation Matrix 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
(1) LI 1.000 
(2) 𝐿𝐼𝐿 0.186* 1.000 
(3) 𝐿𝐼𝐷 -0.002 -0.357* 1.000 
(4) RD 0.041* 0.031* -0.301* 1.000 
(5) ND 0.034* 0.254* -0.062* 0.026* 1.000 
(6) OD 0.039* 0.027* -0.330* 0.986* 0.042* 1.000 
(7) AD 0.034* 0.008* -0.307* 0.979* -0.016* 0.974* 1.000 
(8) ID -0.014* 0.265* -0.110* 0.117* 0.129* 0.105* 0.087* 1.000 
(9) DD 0.020* -0.236* 0.097* 0.135* 0.031* 0.140* 0.146* -0.048* 1.000 
(10) LD 0.036* -0.076* 0.082* 0.124* 0.026* 0.108* 0.091* 0.055* 0.002 1.000 
(11) BankSize 0.201* -0.205* -0.030* 0.355* 0.081* 0.358* 0.350* -0.057* 0.417* 0.042* 1.000 
(12) Capitalization 0.124* 0.033* -0.120* -0.152* -0.212* -0.102* -0.113* -0.109* -0.105* -0.197* -0.196* 1.000 
(13) ROA 0.685* -0.036* 0.009* 0.017* -0.111* 0.031* 0.023* -0.008* 0.007* 0.005 0.024* 0.222* 1.000 
(14) Cost/Income Ratio -0.798* -0.014* -0.164* 0.063* 0.004 0.068* 0.066* 0.015* -0.067* -0.040* -0.169* -0.018* -0.611* 1.000 
(15) Fixed Asset Ratio -0.239* -0.025* -0.020* 0.142* 0.013* 0.143* 0.120* -0.125* -0.060* 0.091* -0.033* -0.032* -0.110* 0.193* 1.000 
Note: This table presents the pairwise correlations of all key variables. LI denotes the Lerner Index. 𝐿𝐼𝐿  and 𝐿𝐼𝐷  are Lerner Index for loans and deposits, respectively. RD is the revenue 
diversification measure, ND is bank non-interest income diversification measure, OD is bank overall diversification measure, AD is asset diversity measure, ID is income diversity measure, DD 
is deposit diversification measure, and LD is loan diversification measure. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Capitalization is the ratio of total equity to total assets. ROA is 
the ratio of net income to total assets. Cost/Income Ratio is the ratio of operating expenses to operating income. Fixed Asset Ratio is the ratio of bank fixed assets to total assets. * indicates 






4.5.2 The relationship between diversification and banks’ overall market power 
This section presents the regression results of my baseline model that examines the relationship 
between diversification and banks’ market power. I employ three forms of bank diversification 
measures that consist of revenue diversification (RD), non-interest income diversification (ND) 
and overall diversification (OD), corresponding to the regressions in columns (1)-(2), (3)-(4), 
and (5)-(6) in Table 4.4, respectively. I note from columns (1), (3) and (5) that the direct 
relationship between diversification and banks’ market power is negative and significant, 
indicating that banks with a higher level of diversification tend to have lower market power. 
This could be due to greater costs incurred from engaging in much more complex non-interest 
income-generating activities, which erodes banks’ capability of setting a higher mark-up price 
over marginal costs. Those results only show the linear relationship between bank 
diversification and market power, but there still exists a potential non-linear relationship 
between them conditional on the extent to which banks diversify among interest and non-
interest activities. Therefore, I add quadratic terms of diversification measures into the 






Table 4.4. The relationship between diversification and banks’ market power 
Note: This table presents the regression results from the baseline model on the relationship between diversification 
and banks’ market power. The dependent variable is the Lerner Index that captures banks’ market power, which 
is calculated as the divergence between bank price of output and marginal cost divided by the price of output. 
Specifications (1) and (2) use bank revenue diversification measure (RD), specifications (3) and (4) use non-
interest income diversification (ND), and specifications (5) and (6) use bank overall diversification measure (OD) 
as the key independent variables. To investigate the potential non-linear relationship between diversification and 
banks’ market power, I construct the quadratic terms, RD2, ND2 and OD2 for these three forms of bank 
diversification measures. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Capitalization is the ratio of total 
equity to total assets. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Cost/Income Ratio is the ratio of operating 
expenses to operating income. Fixed Asset Ratio is the ratio of bank fixed assets to total assets. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and are clustered at the bank level. *** indicate 
statistical significance at 1% level.  
 Dependent Variable: Lerner Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
RD -0.0514*** 0.123***     
 (0.00736) (0.0221)     
RD2  -0.337***     
  (0.0411)     
ND   -0.00156 0.0347***   
   (0.00311) (0.0110)   
ND2    -0.0493***   
    (0.0137)   
OD     -0.0552*** 0.101*** 
     (0.00667) (0.0190) 
OD2      -0.275*** 
      (0.0322) 
       
BankSize 0.0337*** 0.0337*** 0.0342*** 0.0342*** 0.0335*** 0.0336*** 
 (0.00193) (0.00194) (0.00195) (0.00195) (0.00193) (0.00194) 
Capitalization 0.146*** 0.155*** 0.156*** 0.158*** 0.146*** 0.155*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0248) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0248) (0.0248) 
ROA 3.386*** 3.391*** 3.343*** 3.341*** 3.393*** 3.396*** 
 (0.134) (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.134) (0.134) 
Cost/Income Ratio -0.108*** -0.108*** -0.110*** -0.110*** -0.108*** -0.108*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0107) 
Fixed Asset Ratio -1.057*** -1.069*** -1.083*** -1.083*** -1.052*** -1.069*** 
 (0.0645) (0.0647) (0.0656) (0.0658) (0.0646) (0.0649) 
Constant -0.113*** -0.132*** -0.123*** -0.128*** -0.111*** -0.130*** 
 (0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0271) (0.0271) (0.0265) (0.0267) 
       
No. of Obs 123,097 123,097 123,064 123,064 123,097 123,097 
R-squared 0.360 0.361 0.359 0.360 0.360 0.362 
No. of banks 9,991 9,991 9,990 9,990 9,991 9,991 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 






The results in columns (2), (4) and (6) confirm the existence of a non-linear relationship 
between diversification and banks’ market power, which implies an optimal degree of 
diversification activities from the perspective of gaining banks’ market power. I find the 
coefficients of quadratic terms of diversification measures RD, ND and OD are negative and 
significant while their associated coefficients of the linear terms become positive compared 
with the results in specifications with only linear terms. To interpret these results, I need to take 
the first derivative of the diversification functions: 
∂Market Power ∂RD⁄ = 0.123-2×0.337×RD    (4.14) 
∂Market Power⁄∂ND = 0.0347-2×0.0493×ND    (4.15) 
∂Market Power ∂OD⁄ = 0.101-2×0.275×OD    (4.16) 
These expressions indicate that the marginal effect of diversification on banks’ market power 
changes with the level of bank diversification. Their associated critical points are RD =
0.182, ND = 0.352, OD = 0.184 , respectively, which means that bank diversification is 
positively associated with market power when the values of diversification measures are below 
their corresponding critical points while negatively related when above the critical points. The 
values of these critical points of RD and ND are below their corresponding median values 
(0.210 and 0.457), which demonstrates that more than half of the observations of RD and ND 
are in the range in which exhibits a negative relationship between diversification and market 
power. The critical point of OD is above its median of 0.216, indicating that over 50% of the 







My findings suggest that the relationship between diversification and banks’ market power is 
conditional on the degree of bank diversification. When the level of diversification increases 
within a certain range, banks can increase their market power by engaging in more diversified 
activities. This is probably because banks can enjoy greater revenues from newly engaged-in 
activities through diversification, which banks can use to cross-subsidize the costs in price 
competition with rivals by lowering lending rates and increasing deposit rates as suggested by 
Valverde and Fernández (2007). This process enables diversified banks to obtain a new source 
of market power compared with specialized banks, especially in a situation where there are 
barriers of entry in the banking market. Amidu and Wolfe (2013b) also show similar results 
that diversifying into non-interest income activities enhances banks’ market power. 
However, when diversification reaches a relatively high level, banks’ market power can be 
weakened due to greater costs incurred from much more complex activities. These increasing 
costs can occur from greater operating expenses on supporting the expansion of business lines, 
or from an increased exposure to the volatility of non-interest income activities (Stiroh and 
Rumble, 2006). In addition, banks that engage in multiple activities may suffer agency 
problems so that the economies of scale are not sufficient for banks to have a diversification 
premium (Laeven and Levine, 2007), which makes them less likely to have a lower marginal 
cost of production. Table 4.5 presents the results that support my speculations. I employ two 
indicators, cost-to-revenue ratio and marginal cost, to reflect banks’ costs. I can find positive 
and significant coefficients of revenue diversification (in columns 1 and 4) and overall 
diversification (in columns 3 and 6) on these two cost measures, suggesting that banks tend to 
have a higher proportion of cost in revenues and greater marginal cost as their services become 
diverse among interest income and different types of non-traditional income-generating 






the study of Wu et al. (2020) that shows a negative association of income diversification with 
banks’ cost efficiency. I do not find consistent significant coefficients of non-interest income 
diversification on banks’ cost indicators (in columns 2 and 5), which may suggest that the 
changes in banks’ costs are more subject to diversification between interest and non-interest 
activities than that within non-interest income-generating activities. 
With regard to control variables, I find that bank size is positively associated with banks’ 
market power in Table 4.4, which indicates that larger banks tend to have higher market power. 
The significant positive coefficient of capital ratio indicates that well-capitalized banks have 
greater power. The positive and significant coefficient of ROA shows that banks can gain 
market power from greater profits. Cost-to-income ratio and fixed asset ratio are both 
negatively related to market power, suggesting that higher costs incurred from banks’ total 
operating activities and long-term investments may hinder banks’ market power. 
Table 4.5. The relationship between diversification and banks’ cost profile 
Dependent Variables Cost-to-Revenue Ratio Marginal cost (MC) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
RD 0.174***   0.0101**   
 (0.0237)   (0.00487)   
ND  0.0138   -0.00359**  
  (0.00853)   (0.00179)  
OD   0.154***   0.0156*** 
   (0.0211)   (0.00391) 
       
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of Obs 134,896 134,778 134,896 133,753 133,724 133,753 
R-squared 0.098 0.102 0.098 0.116 0.117 0.116 
No. of banks 10,081 10,078 10,081 9,991 9,991 9,991 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: This table presents the regression results on the relationship between diversification and banks’ cost profile. 
The dependent variables are cost-to-revenue ratio and marginal cost. Specifications (1) and (4) use bank revenue 
diversification measure (RD), specifications (2) and (5) use non-interest income diversification (ND), and 
specifications (3) and (6) use bank overall diversification measure (OD) as the main independent variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and are clustered at the bank level. ** 






4.5.3 The relationship between diversification and banks’ market power in loan and 
deposit markets 
Table 4.6 shows the results on the relationship between diversification and banks’ market 
power in loan and deposit markets, respectively. I find consistent statistically significant results 
as in my baseline model that uses the Lerner Index as the indicator of market power. There 
exists an inverse U-shaped relationship between diversification and banks’ market power in 
both loan and deposit markets. When the degree of bank diversification is within a specific 
range, banks with greater diversification level in their activities tend to have higher market 
power in loan and deposit markets. However, banks’ market power in loan and deposits 
markets is eroded when the degree of bank diversification goes beyond a certain level. I can 
follow similar reasoning as that used in Section 4.5.1 to explain the results concerning the 






Table 4.6. The relationship between diversification and banks’ market power in lending and funding markets 
Note: This table presents the regression results from the baseline model on the relationship between diversification and banks’ market power. The dependent variables are the Lerner Index in the 
lending and funding markets, respectively. Specifications (1), (2), (7) and (8) use bank revenue diversification measure (RD), specifications (3), (4), (9) and (10) use non-interest income 
diversification (ND), and specifications (5), (6), (11) and (12) use bank overall diversification measure (OD) as the main independent variables. In order to investigate the potential non-linear 
relationship between bank diversification and market power, I construct the quadratic terms, RD2, ND2 and OD2 for these three forms of bank diversification measures. Robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and are clustered at the bank level. ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent 
Variables: 
Lerner Index for loans Lerner Index for deposits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
RD -0.110*** 0.0437**     -2.221*** 14.42***     
 (0.00799) (0.0214)     (0.463) (1.241)     
RD2  -0.297***      -32.08***     
  (0.0429)      (2.579)     
ND   0.0198*** 0.0432***     0.930*** 1.820***   
   (0.00339) (0.0138)     (0.169) (0.593)   
ND2    -0.0318**      -1.210*   
    (0.0159)      (0.690)   
OD     -0.110*** 0.0441**     -3.496*** 14.42*** 
     (0.00702) (0.0187)     (0.372) (1.085) 
OD2      -0.271***      -31.43*** 
      (0.0336)      (1.941) 
             
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of  Obs 122,634 122,634 122,612 122,612 122,634 122,634 122,614 122,614 122,592 122,592 122,614 122,614 
R-squared 0.882 0.882 0.881 0.881 0.882 0.882 0.544 0.548 0.544 0.544 0.545 0.553 
No. of banks 9,947 9,947 9,947 9,947 9,947 9,947 9,946 9,946 9,946 9,946 9,946 9,946 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 






4.5.4 How bank size affects the relationship between diversification and banks’ market 
power 
Table 4.7 presents the results on the relationship between diversification and banks’ market 
power for small and large banks. I divide the whole sample into two groups by the median 
value of average of total assets (ATA) of each panel group over time: small banks 
(ATA<$174.766 millions) and large banks (ATA>$174,766 millions). I note a significant 
inverse U-shaped relationship in the group of large banks based on the results in columns (8), 
(10) and (12). However, in the group of small banks, I do not find significant coefficients for 
both the linear and quadratic terms of diversification variables as shown in columns (2), (4) 
and (6). This indicates that my previously observed inverse U-shaped relationship for the whole 
sample is dominated by large banks, which implies that the market power of banks with 
different sizes could respond differently to their diversification activities. Compared with small 
banks, large banks tend to have better capabilities for managing relatively complex 
diversification activities, so large banks typically get involved in non-traditional activities to a 
deeper extent. This would make large banks more subject to changes in revenues and costs 
induced from newly engaged-in activities, and the reactions in terms of market power are much 






 Table 4.7. The relationship between diversification and banks’ market power for small and large banks 
Note: This table presents the regression results on the relationship between diversification and banks’ market power based on two  subsamples that include small and large banks, respectively. Specifications (1)-(6) and 
(7)-(12) correspond to the results for small and large banks, respectively. The dependent variable is the Lerner Index that captures banks’ market power, which is calculated as the divergence between bank price of output 
and marginal cost divided by the price of output. Specifications (1), (2), (7) and (8) use bank revenue diversification measure (RD), specifications (3), (4), (9) and (10) use non-interest income diversification (ND), and 
specification (5), (6), (11) and (12) use bank overall diversification measure (OD) as the key independent variables. To investigate the potential non-linear relationship between diversification and banks’ market power, 
I construct the quadratic terms, RD2, ND2 and OD2 for these three forms of bank diversification measures. All regressions are controlled at bank-specific level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below 
the coefficient estimates and are clustered at the bank level. *** indicate statistical significance at 1% level.
 Dependent Variable: Lerner Index 
Small Banks Large Banks 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
RD -0.0902*** 0.0439     -0.0490*** 0.209***     
 (0.0114) (0.0343)     (0.0107) (0.0309)     
RD2  -0.274***      -0.476***     
  (0.0689)      (0.0543)     
ND   0.00607 0.0310     -0.00177 0.0538***   
   (0.00491) (0.0190)     (0.00407) (0.0134)   
ND2    -0.0333      -0.0772***   
    (0.0226)      (0.0174)   
OD     -0.0902*** 0.0310     -0.0569*** 0.172*** 
     (0.0104) (0.0300)     (0.00962) (0.0262) 
OD2      -0.229***      -0.381*** 
      (0.0551)      (0.0416) 
             
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 60,165 60,165 60,139 60,139 60,165 60,165 62,932 62,932 62,925 62,925 62,932 62,932 
R-squared 0.333 0.334 0.331 0.331 0.334 0.334 0.378 0.381 0.378 0.378 0.379 0.382 
No. of banks 4,971 4,971 4,970 4,970 4,971 4,971 5,020 5,020 5,020 5,020 5,020 5,020 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 






4.6 Robustness check 
4.6.1 Alternative bank diversification measures 
I consider four alternative bank diversification measures to examine whether or not my findings 
hold for other dimensions of bank diversification. The first alternative diversification measure 
is income diversity (ID), which refers to diversification across different sources of bank 
incomes and the second one is asset diversity (AD), which measures diversification across 
different types of bank assets (Laeven and Levine, 2007). The third alternative diversification 
measure is deposit diversification (DD), which shows diversification across different types of 
deposits. The fourth alternative diversification measure is loan diversification (LD), which 
represents the degree of diversification among different types of loans. These four alternative 
diversification measures are calculated as follows: 
Income Diversity
i,t
= 1 − |
Net Interest Incomei,t-Other Operating Incomei,t
Total Operating Income
i,t
|    (4.17) 
Asset Diversity
i,t
= 1 − |
Net Loansi,t-Other Earning Assetsi,t
Total Earning Assets
i,t
|    (4.18) 
Deposit Diversification
i,t















]    (4.19) 
Loan Diversification
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]    (4.20) 
where DEPOSIT = CUSD+BANKD+OTHED, CUSD is customer deposit, BANKD is deposit 
from banks and OTHED  is other deposits and short-term borrowing. LOAN =
MTG+CUSL+CORL+OTHEL , MTG  are mortgages, CUSL  are customer loans, CORL  are 






Table 4.8 presents the results by using the four alternative diversification measures as 
independent variables. Although these four measures capture bank diversification from 
different perspectives, I can find consistent results to support the existence of the inverse U-
shaped relationship between diversification and banks’ market power according to the results 
in columns (1) and (9) that use ID and in columns (3) and (11) that employ DD as 
diversification measures.32 However, I do not find consistent results with my main findings in 
the remaining regressions. This could be due to the different natures of these diversification 
measures. Among the four alternative diversification measures, ID is the closest one in terms 
of nature to RD and OD used in my baseline regressions, so I find consistent results using ID. 
As for AD, DD, and LD, these three indicators typically capture the degree of diversification 
from the perspective of banks’ assets and liabilities, which produce different results from those 
using revenue-based diversification measures.
 







Table 4.8. Robustness Check: Using alternative diversification measures 
Dependent 
Variables 
 Lerner Index Lerner Index for loans Lerner Index for deposits 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
ID 0.0230**    -0.0154    4.348***    
 (0.0116)    (0.0115)    (0.659)    
ID2 -0.0730***    -0.0707***    -7.606***    
 (0.0131)    (0.0140)    (0.818)    
AD  -0.0665***    0.0720***    -0.778*   
  (0.00872)    (0.00898)    (0.452)   
AD2  0.0201***    0.000978    -0.595   
  (0.00697)    (0.00728)    (0.389)   
DD   0.0224**    -0.116***    3.467***  
   (0.0110)    (0.0133)    (0.501)  
DD2   -0.0829**    0.234***    -8.108***  
   (0.0330)    (0.0502)    (1.485)  
LD    0.0394    0.0371    -3.673 
    (0.0343)    (0.0478)    (2.760) 
LD2    0.00919    -0.0456    5.906** 
    (0.0321)    (0.0436)    (2.536) 
             
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of Obs 123,097 123,124 123,012 122,728 122,634 122,688 122,604 122,569 122,614 122,668 122,584 122,549 
R-squared 0.361 0.364 0.360 0.362 0.882 0.884 0.881 0.881 0.548 0.545 0.544 0.544 
No. of banks 9,991 9,991 9,980 9,957 9,947 9,947 9,947 9,947 9,946 9,946 9,946 9,946 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: This table presents the regression results of robustness check by using four alternative diversification measures. The dependent variables are three different specifications of the Lerner Index that captures banks’ 
market power, which is calculated as the divergence between bank price of output and marginal cost divided by the price of output. Columns (1)-(4), (5)-(8), and (9)-(12) correspond to the regressions that use Lerner 
Index, Lerner Index for loans, and Lerner Index for deposits, respectively. Specifications (1), (5) and (9) use bank income diversity (ID), specifications (2), (6) and (10) use asset diversity (AD), specifications (3), (7) and 
(11) use deposit diversification (DD), and  specifications (4), (8) and (12) use loan diversification (LD) as the key independent variables. To investigate the potential non-linear relationship between diversification and 
banks’ market power, I construct the quadratic terms, ID2, AD2, DD2 and LD2 for these alternative four bank diversification measures. All regressions are controlled at the bank-specific level. Robust standard errors are 






4.6.2 Instrumental variable analysis 
My results may be subject to endogeneity as are most empirical studies in this field. Banks’ 
decision on diversification is endogenous since there could be some omitted variables that 
affect both diversification choices and banks’ market power. In addition, the choice of 
diversifying activities could also be affected by banks’ market power. There exists the 
possibility that banks with strong market power may be less likely to engage in diversification 
to seek new sources of revenues because these banks can reap enough profits relying on their 
monopoly power in pricing from traditional lending activities. 
To mitigate the endogeneity issue, I first employ the fixed effects estimators to simultaneously 
control for unobserved time-invariant bank-specific characteristics. Relevant results have been 
reported in the baseline model regressions (see Table 4.4). Second, I include lagged 
diversification variables in the baseline model regressions, which could partly address the 
potential issue of reverse causality. Third, in this section, I employ the instrumental variable 
approach using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator to check whether my findings 
hold.33 
In my 2SLS regressions, I construct the instrument for diversification by taking the difference 
between banks’ cost efficiency in each particular year and the averaged cost efficiency of all 
banks in the market in the same period. Banks’ cost efficiency reflects how close a bank is 
from achieving the minimum cost given a particular level of inputs and outputs (Farrell, 1957; 
Berger and DeYoung, 1997), which is potentially related to the bank’s diversification 
decision.34 This is because banks with higher cost efficiency may have better capability of 
 
33 I also consider employing the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to mitigate the endogeneity issue. 
However, the result of the Sargan test that is run to check the validity of the instruments considered does not 
support the use of the GMM estimator with the particular instruments tested. 






managing resources among multiple businesses and controlling the necessary costs in 
operations of diversified activities. Then I conduct the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test 
(Durbin, 1954; Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978) to check the existence of an endogeneity problem. 
According to the statistics of the DWH test reported in Tables 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11, I do reject 
the null hypothesis that the potential endogenous variables are exogenous at the 5% confidence 
level, suggesting that my original results may be subject to an endogeneity problem. To verify 
the relatedness of the instrumental variable (IV) with diversification, I use the F-statistics in 
the first stage of the 2SLS regressions to test the hypothesis that the coefficients of instrumental 
variables are zero (Angrist and Pischke, 2008).35 According to the results shown in Tables 4.9, 
4.10 and 4.11, I find the values of the F-statistics are higher than their relevant critical values, 
which rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients of instruments are zero and supports the 
validity of the instrument. In addition, for most regression results, the negative and positive 
significant coefficients for the linear and quadratic terms of IV respectively imply that the IV 
is positively associated with bank diversification in a certain range. Since the IV for each bank-
year observation includes the information on cost efficiency of all banks in the market, I can 
assume that this IV has no direct relation with the market power and other unobserved factors 
specific for each bank. I also calculated the correlations of cost efficiency with three forms of 
banks’ market power measures (Lerner Index, Lerner Index for loans and Lerner Index for 
deposits), and their associated correlation values are 0.2484, 0.1381 and 0.2174, respectively. 
These values indicate relatively low correlations between the instruments and dependent 
variables, which suggests a low possibility that my instruments affect market power directly. 
According to the 2SLS regression results reported in columns (2), (4), (6) in Tables 4.9, 4.10 
 
35 According to Stock and Watson (2003), the IV estimates will be biased if the endogenous variable and its 






and 4.11, I find a consistent inverse U-shaped relationship between diversification and banks’ 
market power. 




 Lerner Index 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 



















       
Controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 132,477 132,477 132,471 132,471 132,477 132,477 
F-statistics 9499.58 9611.09 221.07 202.12 9354.77 9489.80 
Panel B-Second Stage 
RD -0.0731*** 3.826***     
 (0.0114) (0.607)     
RD2  -7.755***     
  (1.222)     
ND   1.132*** 3.027***   
   (0.211) (0.793)   
ND2    -4.781***   
    (1.494)   
OD     -0.0641*** 1.425*** 
     (0.0100) (0.160) 
OD2      -2.709*** 
      (0.301) 
       
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 132,477 132,477 132,471 132,471 132,477 132,477 
DWH test 512.518  
(p = 0.0000) 
273.146  
(p = 0.0000) 
37.6184  
(p = 0.0000) 
45.284  
(p = 0.0000) 
528.85  
(p = 0.0000) 
285.286  
(p = 0.0000) 
Note: This table presents the regression results of robustness check by using the instrumental variable approach. 
Panel A and Panel B present the results of the first and second stages, respectively. The dependent variable is the 
Lerner Index that captures banks’ market power, which is calculated as the divergence between bank price of 
output and marginal cost divided by the price of output. IV is the instrument for diversification that is calculated 
as the difference between banks’ cost efficiency and the average of cost efficiency of all banks in the market. 
Specifications (1) and (2) use bank revenue diversification measure (RD), specifications (3) and (4) use non-
interest income diversification (ND), and specifications (5) and (6) use bank overall diversification measure (OD) 
as the main independent variables. To investigate the potential non-linear relationship between bank 
diversification and market power, I construct the quadratic terms, RD2, ND2 and OD2 for these three forms of bank 
diversification measures. The F-statistics in the first-stage of the 2SLS regressions is to test the hypothesis that 
the coefficients of the instrumental variables are zero. The Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test is to check the 
existence of endogeneity. All regressions are controlled at bank-specific level. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and are clustered at the bank level. *** indicate statistical 










Lerner Index for loans 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




















       
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 132,274 132,274 132,268 132,268 132,274 132,274 
F-statistics 9773.21 9669.99 216.71 200.86 9659.45 9549.17 
Panel B-Second Stage 
 
RD -.4911117*** 11.10***     
 (.0121625) (1.482)     
RD2  -23.05***     
  (2.968)     
ND   7.405*** 26.70***   
   (0.902) (5.388)   
ND2    -47.14***   
    (10.58)   
OD     -0.431*** 3.928*** 
     (0.0106) (0.374) 
OD2      -7.922*** 
      (0.690) 
       
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 132,274 132,274 132,268 132,268 132,274 132,274 
DWH test 3417.88  
(p = 0.0000) 
1727.27  
(p = 0.0000) 
1657.07  
(p = 0.0000) 
854.716  
(p = 0.0000) 
3460.64  
(p = 0.0000) 
1805.43  
(p = 0.0000) 
Note: This table presents the regression results of robustness check by using the instrumental variable approach. Panel A and 
Panel B present the results of the first and second stages, respectively. The dependent variable is the Lerner Index for loans. 
IV is the instrument for diversification that is calculated as the difference between banks’ cost efficiency and the average of 
cost efficiency of all banks in the market. Specifications (1) and (2) use bank revenue diversification measure (RD), 
specifications (3) and (4) use non-interest income diversification (ND), and specifications (5) and (6) use bank overall 
diversification measure (OD) as the main independent variables. In order to investigate the potential non-linear relationship 
between bank diversification and market power, I construct the quadratic terms, RD2, ND2 and OD2 for these three forms of 
bank diversification measures. The F-statistics in the first-stage of the 2SLS regressions is to test the hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the instrumental variables are zero. The Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test is to check the existence of 
endogeneity. All regressions are controlled at bank-specific level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below 










Lerner Index for deposits 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 




















       
Control 
variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 132,274 132,274 132,268 132,268 132,274 132,274 
F-statistics 9773.21 9669.99 216.71 200.86 9659.45 9549.17 
Panel B-Second Stage 
 
RD -18.55*** 234.7***     
 (0.352) (34.95)     
RD2  -503.5***     
  (70.07)     
ND   279.3*** 1,091***   
   (34.84) (231.0)   
ND2    -1,985***   
    (453.0)   
OD     -16.28*** 72.91*** 
     (0.302) (8.340) 
OD2      -162.1*** 
      (15.44) 
       
Control 
variables 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 132,274 132,274 132,268 132,268 132,274 132,274 
DWH test 220.123  
(p = 0.0000) 
123.719  
(p = 0.0000) 
2882.2  
(p = 0.0000) 
1568.23  
(p = 0.0000) 
122.476  
(p = 0.0000) 
85.2843  
(p = 0.0000) 
Note: This table presents the regression results of robustness check by using the instrumental variable approach. Panel A and 
Panel B present the results of the first and second stages, respectively. The dependent variable is the Lerner Index for deposits. 
IV is the instrument for diversification that is calculated as the difference between banks’ cost efficiency and the average of 
cost efficiency of all banks in the market. Specifications (1) and (2) use bank revenue diversification measure (RD), 
specifications (3) and (4) use non-interest income diversification (ND), and specifications (5) and (6) use bank overall 
diversification measure (OD) as the main independent variables. To investigate the potential non-linear relationship between 
bank diversification and market power, I construct the quadratic terms, RD2, ND2 and OD2 for these three forms of bank 
diversification measures. The F-statistics in the first-stage of the 2SLS regressions is to test the hypothesis that the coefficients 
of the instrumental variables are zero. The Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test is to check the existence of endogeneity. All 
regressions are controlled at bank-specific level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient 





This chapter investigates the relationship between diversification and banks’ market power, 
which fills the gap in the literature that no prior study addresses the question about whether 
diversification is a determinant or source of banks’ market power. Based on a large sample of 
U.S. banks over the period from 1991 to 2017, I find an inverse U-shaped relationship between 
diversification and banks’ market power, which suggests that the relationship between 
diversification and banks’ market power is conditional on the degree of bank diversification. 
When the level of diversification increases within a certain range, banks can increase their 
market power by engaging in more diversified activities. However, when diversification 
reaches a relatively high level, banks’ market power can be weakened due to greater costs 
incurred from much more complex activities. In addition, the results are consistent for banks’ 
market power in both lending and funding markets. This inverse U-shaped relationship is much 
more pronounced for large banks than for small banks, which indicates that this observed 
relationship is dominated by large banks. I also run robustness tests by taking into account 
alternative diversification measures and employing the instrumental variable approach to 
mitigate the potential endogeneity issue between diversification and banks’ market power. The 
results of the robustness check remain consistent. The findings in this study provide important 
implications for bank managers, regulators, and policymakers. For bank managers, this study 
provides information on a potential source or determinant of banks’ market power, which 
means that it is advisable for banks to proactively manage market power through properly 
engaging in diversifying their activities. For regulators and policymakers, this study helps them 
to better understand the potential influence of bank diversification across diverse business lines 










Due to the importance of competition to the stability of the financial system, the relationship 
between competition and bank stability has been extensively explored in the literature. The 
literature shows mixed findings on the competition-stability nexus, 36  which includes 
competition-stability views (Boyd and De Nicoló, 2005; Schaeck, Čihák and Wolfe, 2009; 
Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu, 2014a), competition-fragility views (Keeley, 1990; Allen 
and Gale, 2004; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2006), and non-linear competition-stability 
relationships (Martinez-Miera and Repullo, 2010; Jiménez, Lopez and Saurina, 2013). The 
existence of mixed conclusions indicates the necessity of new evidence to further discuss the 
potential mechanisms behind the relationship between competition and bank stability. 
In line with the influence of competition, the literature also suggests that diversification is an 
important factor in influencing bank stability (DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Stiroh and Rumble, 
2006; Wagner, 2010; DeYoung and Torna, 2013). The degree of diversification in banking 
reflects the scope of activities that banks are allowed to engage in and the extent to which banks 
can generate revenues from different financial services.37  However, little is known so far 
 
36  The term ‘competition-stability nexus’ in this chapter only refers to the general relationship between 
competition and bank stability, and it should not be confused with expressions such as ‘competition-stability’ or 
‘competition-fragility’ views that highlight the positive or negative relationship between competition and bank 
stability. 
37 The scope of banking activities typically changes according to financial regulations. For example, the Second 
Banking Directive of 1989 allowed European banks to provide cross-frontier banking, insurance, and investment 
services throughout the European Community on a single licence from their home country authorities. The 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1998 repealed part of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 in the aspect of banks’ scope 
of activities, and U.S. banks were allowed to engage in non-traditional banking activities such as investment 
banking, venture capital, securities brokerage, insurance underwriting and asset securitization. In response to the 
2008 global financial crisis, the U.S. passed the Dodd-Frank Act in order to strengthen the financial regulations. 
Implemented as part of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Volcker Rule proposed the prohibitions on banks’ speculative 




regarding whether diversification is associated with competition in the process of determining 
bank stability. Investigating the associations between competition and diversification helps in 
understanding whether competition may have a different impact on bank stability under 
different degrees of diversification in the market. Moreover, such investigation may have 
important policy implications for the necessity of having interventions in the diversification 
strategy of banks to counteract possible negative influences on bank stability resulting from 
greater competition in the market. This study is motivated by this gap in the literature and aims 
to provide new empirical evidence regarding the role of diversification on the competition-
bank stability nexus. 
This chapter contributes to the literature in three aspects. First, this work examines the role of 
market diversification in the competition-stability nexus in the dimensions of both individual 
bank and systemic stability, which differentiates my study from previous research that only 
considers one dimension of bank stability (Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009; Anginer, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu, 2014a; Schaeck and Čihák, 2014). This investigation is important to 
reconcile the mixed conclusions regarding the competition-stability nexus in the literature by 
considering the potential changing associations between competition and bank stability 
conditional on different degrees of diversification in the market. Moreover, taking into account 
both individual bank and systemic risks helps to investigate whether the potential relationships 
equally hold in different dimensions of banks’ risk-taking behaviours when responding to 
changes in the degree of bank competition. 
Second, this chapter proposes a novel market-level bank diversification measure38 and defines 
diversification from the perspective of the market. Building up the market-level diversification 
 
38 I build up the diversification indicator at the market level in this chapter, which is different from the country-
level diversification indicators (used in Chapters 2 and 3). The former is calculated based on the information on a 





measure serves as a supplement to the bank-level diversification measure (Laeven and Levine, 
2007; Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe, 2007) and provides a new perspective on showing the 
degree of diversification in a specific market that banks operate. Given that banks with different 
strategies in diversification are simultaneously operating in a same market, there are variations 
in the degree of diversification at the bank level. However, there is a lack of a diversification 
measure in the literature to reflect the whole environment of diversification that is jointly 
determined by diversification activities of all participants in the market. Hence, the market-
level diversification indicator reflects the degree of diversification in banks’ activities 
considering both an individual bank and its competitors, which extends the scope of 
information inherent in the diversification indicator and enables me to examine how banks’ 
risk will respond to outside environment factors such as competition and diversification. To 
construct my market diversification indicator, I firstly identify the market in which each bank 
and its competitors operate by using the geographical information regarding banks’ branches 
or subsidiaries. Second, for each bank-year observation, the corresponding market 
diversification measure can be calculated by taking the sum of each component of revenues of 
all banks that have branches/subsidiaries/headquarters in its corresponding market identified 
in the first step. 
Third, this research contributes to the literature by investigating whether market diversification 
is associated with bank competition. This can be seen as a key point in understanding the role 
of diversification in the relationship between competition and bank stability because banks may 
engage in diverse financial activities to seek new sources of revenue in responding to market 
competition and this process may influence banks’ risk contributions in either their 
idiosyncratic or systemic risk. I employ the Boone Indicator to capture the degree of bank 
competition (Boone, 2008; Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011; Tabak, Fazio, and Cajueiro, 2012; 




advantages in terms of theoretical foundation and practical application compared with other 
traditionally employed competition proxies such as the Lerner Index and the Panzar-Rosse H 
statistic (Leon, 2015). To capture the degree of diversification, I use the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index-based diversification indicators including revenue, non-interest income and 
overall diversification measures, which are more informative in terms of showing the 
distribution among different types of revenues than ratio-based measures such as the non-
interest income ratio and trading income ratio (Baele, De Jonghe, and Vennet, 2007; Lepetit et 
al., 2008a; DeYoung and Torna, 2013). 
Through an analysis based on 467 publicly listed U.S. banks from 1994 to 2017, I find that the 
negative relationship between competition and systemic stability is exacerbated when the 
market diversification is high while this negative competition-systemic stability relationship 
turns to be positive when market diversification is at a low level. However, I do not find 
evidence of the existence of a significant interacting effect of diversification on the 
competition-individual bank stability relationship. Lastly, I find a positive association between 
competition and market diversification, which suggests that restrictions in banks’ 
diversification activities in a competitive environment may help in maintaining systemic 
stability. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents an overview of 
different strands of the relevant literature. Section 5.3 introduces the data and measures, and 
Section 5.4 shows the methodology employed in this research. In Section 5.5, I report the 
empirical findings, followed by robustness tests in Section 5.6. Section 5.7 concludes and 






5.2 Literature review 
5.2.1 Studies on the competition-stability nexus 
Competition-stability views claim that greater competition enhances bank stability. Nalebuff 
and Stiglitz (1983) claim that more competition makes banks more comparable and transparent, 
hence promoting banks’ efforts in conducting screening and monitoring in financial services 
they provide. Boyd and De Nicoló (2005) put forward the ‘risk-shifting’ mechanism according 
to which more competition in the bank loan and deposit market lowers loan rates, decreases 
borrowers’ default risk, and thus improves bank stability. Schaeck, Čihák, and Wolfe (2009) 
find that competitive banking systems are less likely to have systemic crisis. Amidu and Wolfe 
(2013a) investigate how competition affects diversification and bank insolvency risk and find 
that competition increases bank stability due to banks’ decisions to take diversified portfolios 
in response to the competitive environment. Although Amidu and Wolfe (2013a) are closely 
relevant to my research, they do not examine this relationship in dimension of bank systemic 
stability and only view diversification at the bank level. Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu 
(2014a) empirically investigate the relationship between competition and bank systemic risk in 
a global sample of banks and find that greater competition encourages banks to engage in more 
diversified risks, thus enhancing bank systemic stability. However, the study of Anginer, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Zhu (2014a) does not employ specific measures to capture the level of 
diversification, and my study aims to fill this gap by building up a group of new measures to 
show the degree of diversification at the market level. Goetz (2018) examines the impact of 
removing entry barriers to the U.S. bank market and concludes that reducing entry barriers 
significantly enhances bank stability. 
In contrast, competition-fragility views argue that more competition decreases bank stability. 
The charter value views state that bank competition generates stability cost and erodes bank 




provide non-traditional services (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; Hellmann, Murdock, and 
Stiglitz, 2000). Allen and Gale (2000) find that more competition makes banks earn lower 
information rents from relationship lending, thus reducing their incentives for undertaking 
screening and monitoring activities. Allen and Gale (2004) claim that a competitive banking 
market is detrimental to systemic stability since banks have greater exposure to contagions in 
a competitive market. Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2009) show that greater bank 
competition leads to a greater risker portfolio, but this effect is reduced if banks increase their 
capital levels or use risk-mitigating techniques. 
Other studies find non-linear relationships between bank competition and risk (Martinez-Miera 
and Repullo, 2010; Jiménez, Lopez and Saurina, 2013). To reconcile opposite findings on bank 
competition-stability nexus, Leroy and Lucotte (2017) investigate the competition-stability 
trade-off considering both individual bank and systemic dimensions of risk. Their results point 
towards opposite effects indicating that competition increases banks’ overall individual risk 
while competition improves systemic stability by decreasing bank systemic risk. 
 
5.2.2 Studies on the diversification-stability nexus 
Deregulations in developed countries in the last decades have allowed banks to expand the 
scope of their revenue-generating activities. Some studies find that non-interest-generating 
activities, such as non-traditional fee-based activities, are associated with high volatilities and 
risks (DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004a; Stiroh, 2006; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006). 
Other researchers report different findings on the impact of diversification on bank stability 
(De Jonghe, 2010; Sanya and Wolfe, 2011; DeYoung and Torna, 2013). DeYoung and Torna 
(2013) argue that the impact of non-traditional activities on bank stability depends on the nature 




securitization result in a higher probability of bank failures, whereas pure fee-based non-
traditional activities such as brokerage positively affect bank performance. De Jonghe (2010) 
concludes that a diversity towards non-interest activities increases European banks’ tail beta 
and decreases bank systemic stability. Focusing on small European credit institutions, 
Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe (2007) find that there are no diversification benefits for small 
European banks and non-interest activities are negatively associated with bank performance. 
In contrast, some studies have found the risk-decreasing effect of diversification (Boyd, 
Graham, and Hewitt, 1993; Saunders and Walter, 1994). Sanya and Wolfe (2011) argue that 
diversification across and within bank interest and non-interest activities in emerging 
economies reduces bank insolvency risk. Wagner (2010) argues that diversification reduces a 
bank’s individual probability of failure whereas it is more likely to cause systemic crisis.  
Through reviewing the literature, we can see that the relationship between competition and 
bank diversification and the question on the role of market diversification on the competition-
stability nexus in different dimensions of bank stability remains less discussed. My study 
attempts to answer these questions by providing new empirical evidence. 
 
5.3 Data and measures 
5.3.1 Data 
This study builds up an unbalanced panel data set composed of 467 publicly listed U.S. banks 
covering the period from 1994 to 2017. I use annual bank-specific accounting information 
retrieved from BankFocus compiled by the Bureau van Dijk (BvD) to construct banks’ 
competition and diversification indicators. To calculate bank systemic risk measures, I obtain 
daily banks’ stock price information from CRSP and Datastream. I obtain the geographical 




Deposit and Insurance Corporation (FDIC) which provides detailed state-level information on 
the locations of branches or subsidiaries of U.S. banks. According to the SoD dataset, each 
branch or subsidiary has a unique number assigned by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and 
branches or subsidiaries affiliated to the same BHC or commercial bank are also assigned a 
unique number to their top regulatory institution, which allows me to identify the locations of 
an individual bank’s all branches or subsidiaries operating in each state over the whole sample 
period.39  I download the file PERMCO-RSSD links from the Banking Research Datasets 
compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to match the geographical information on 
states of operations from the SoD with the data obtained from other databases such as BvD 
BankFocus and CRSP.40 
This study focuses on the U.S. because its banking market has a great presence in the banking 
market around the world. The data from BvD BankFocus indicates that the number of U.S. 
listed banks accounts for over 35% of the total number of listed banks in the world banking 
market and around 20% in terms of total assets over the last two decades.41 Additionally, 
focusing on a single developed country helps in exploring the relationship between competition, 
diversification and bank stability under a relatively uniform market environment. The sample 
of this study consists of only publicly listed banks since we need market stock price data to 
measure bank systemic stability. 
 
 
39 The dataset of the Summary of Deposits includes the variables RSSDID representing the unique number 
assigned to each affiliated branch or subsidiary and RSSDHCR indicating the unique number assigned to the top 
regulatory banking institution. 
40 The file PERMCO-RSSD links is a dataset that connects regulatory identification numbers (RSSDID and 
RSSDHCR) assigned by the Federal Reserve Board to the permanent company number (PERMCO). The 
PERMCO is a unique number assigned to publicly listed institutions in CRSP. 
41 In terms of the number of banks, I find 1,821 U.S. listed banks and 3,164 non-U.S. listed banks recorded in the 
BvD BankFocus database. As for the proportion of U.S. listed banks’ total assets, I take the average of proportions 
of the sum of U.S. listed banks’ total assets in the sum of all BankFocus recorded listed banks’ total assets in US 




5.3.2 Measure of bank competition 
This chapter uses the Boone Indicator (Boone, 2008) to capture the degree of bank 
competition.42 The Boone Indicator (Boone) is based on the efficient structure hypothesis that 
associates differences in bank efficiency with performance, suggesting that more efficient 
banks (banks with lower marginal costs) make higher profits or enjoy greater market shares at 
the expense of their less efficient counterparties (Demsetz, 1973). This argument is consistent 
with the industrial organization literature according to which competition promotes the 
reallocation of profits towards efficient firms (Olley and Pakes, 1996), which is confirmed by 
Stiroh (2000) in banking studies. In a theoretical work, Boone (2008) claims that the 
reallocation effect is monotonically increasing with the level of bank competition, so this 
measure captures the varying degree of bank competition. Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2011) are 
the first to apply this measure in an empirical banking study, and the Boone Indicator continues 
to be employed in this field (Tabak, Fazio, and Cajueiro, 2012; Schaeck and Čihák, 2014; Leon, 
2015). 
Compared with other competition measures, the Boone Indicator has two main advantages. On 
the one hand, the Boone Indicator is constructed based on strong theoretical foundations and 
captures the degree of bank competition through both the fall in entry barriers and more 
aggressive interactions between banks. On the other hand, this indicator can measure 
competition for specific product markets and different types of banks. To compute the Boone 
 
42 Other popular competition measures used in previous studies include concentration, the Lerner Index, and the 
Panzar-Rosse H Statistics. Concentration ratio has been criticized as a valid competition measure by Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006). The Lerner Index captures the degree of bank competition from the 
perspective of a bank’s profits resulting from its pricing power in the market. The premise for this measure is that 
a bank’s output price equals its marginal cost under a perfect competitive situation, and the output price rises 
above marginal cost as a bank’s market power grows. Although the Lerner Index has been widely used as a bank 
competition measure in previous banking studies (Fernández de Guevara, Maudos, and Pérez, 2007; Berger, 
Klapper and Turk-Ariss, 2009; Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez-Peria, 2010; Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013; 
Amidu and Wolfe, 2013a, 2013b; Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt and Zhu, 2014b), it mainly reflects a bank’s market 
power. Intuitively, it is less appropriate to use a bank-level indicator to reflect a macro-level concept such as ‘bank 
competition’. The implementation of the Panzar-Rosse H Statistics generally requires the assumption that the 




Indicator, I follow Tabak, Fazio, and Cajueiro (2012) and Schaeck and Čihák (2014) and 
include time dummies to allow for the time evolution of the level of competition. The 
calculation is as follows: 
𝑙𝑛(π𝑖,t ) = αi + ∑ 𝛽𝑡𝑑𝑡 𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1 + ∑ 𝛾𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝑇−1
𝑡=1 + ε𝑖,t    (5.1) 
where π is the return on assets and 𝑐 denotes the average costs for bank 𝑖 in year 𝑡 which is 
calculated as a ratio of operating cost to banks’ total income, and cost components include 
interest, staff, administration and other operating expenses. 𝛽𝑡 is the time-dependent Boone 
Indicator. 𝑑𝑡 are the time dummies where 𝑑𝑡 is equal to 1 in year 𝑡 and 0 otherwise. 𝑇 denotes 
the total number of years and 𝑖,𝑡  is the error term. Since the original form of the Boone 
Indicator is inversely proportional to the degree of bank competition (the more negative the 
Boone Indicator, the higher degree of competition), in each year, I multiply 𝛽𝑡 by -1 to make 
this indicator directly proportional to bank competition. 
 
5.3.3 Measures of bank stability 
5.3.3.1 Individual stability 
I use two individual bank stability measures: Z-Score and Distance-to-Default. The Z-Score 
(Z-Score) is an accounting-based bank stability measure and are used in previous banking 
studies (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens, 2013; Ijtsma, Spierdijk, 
and Shaffer, 2017). The Z-Score can be interpreted as the number of standard deviations by 
which banks’ realized returns have to decrease from their mean to wipe out all banks’ equity 
(Boyd and Runkle, 1993). A high Z-Score implies a low probability of bank insolvency and a 










where 𝑅𝑂𝐴 is the return on assets for bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡. E A⁄  represents the equity to asset ratio. 
I use a three-year rolling time window, rather than the whole sample period, to compute the 
standard deviation of return on assets, 𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴), to allow for time variations in the denominator 
of the Z-Score. This approach avoids that the variations in Z-Score within banks over time are 
exclusively driven by the variations in the levels of capital and profitability (Schaeck and Čihák, 
2010). I take the natural logarithm of Z-Score to mitigate the influence from the high 
skewedness of this measure. 
Alternatively, I use a market-based bank stability measure, the distance-to-default (DtD), to 
measure the default risk of a bank. The DtD is defined as the difference between the market 
value of assets of a firm and the face value of its debt, divided by the standard deviation of the 
firm’s market asset values (Merton, 1974). Thus, a high DtD means that a bank keeps a long 
distance away from the default point and that the bank has a low probability of default. The 











    (5.3) 
where 𝑉𝐴 is the bank’s assets value, 𝑋 is the book value of bank’s debt that matures at time T. 
𝜇  is the expected return and 𝜎𝐴  is the standard deviation of bank assets. In practice, the 
estimation of the DtD faces great difficulties in calculating the bank’s asset value (𝑉𝐴) and its 
associated parameters (Duan and Wang, 2012). Different estimation methodologies are 
implemented in the literature to estimate bank asset value.43 This chapter retrieves the data on 
 
43 Methodologies include Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) that obtain asset values and asset volatility by 
solving option-based equations simultaneously, the Moody’s KMV approach introduced by Crosbie and Bohn 





banks’ DtD directly from the Credit Research Initiative (CRI) platform maintained by the 
National University of Singapore.44 
5.3.3.2 Systemic stability 
I use two measures to capture bank systemic risk: the marginal expected short-fall and the 
∆CoVaR. Proposed by Acharya et al. (2010, 2017), the marginal expected shortfall (MES) is 
used to measure a bank’s contribution to systemic risk. MES is defined as the average of a 
bank’s stock returns during the 5% worst trading days of the overall market return in a financial 
year. A high value of MES indicates a low bank’s systemic risk contribution.45 The MES for a 




    (5.4) 
where 𝑅𝑖 denotes the daily stock return of bank i during the 5% market’s worst trading days in 
year t. 𝑁 is the number of 5% worst days of the market return. Following Bisias et al. (2012), 
I use the CRSP Value Weighted Index as the proxy for market return. 
Alternatively, this chapter employs another systemic risk measure, the conditional value-at-
risk (∆CoVaR), proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016). ∆CoVaR is constructed by 
computing the value-at-risk (CoVaR) of the banking system conditional on a financial 
institution being in distress. In this case, a bank’s contribution to systemic risk is defined as the 
difference between the CoVaR of the banking market conditional on this bank being in distress 
and the banking market’s CoVaR in the median state of this bank. The systemic risk 
contribution of bank 𝑖 to the overall bank market M is defined as: 
 
44  The platform Credit Research Initiative (CRI) can be accessed via the link https://www.rmicri.org. The 
estimation methodology implemented by this platform is the transformed-data maximum likelihood estimation 
approach proposed by Duan (1994). 
45 In this study, I keep the original form of the marginal expected shortfall (MES). Typically, it has a negative 










    (5.5) 
where 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑀|𝑖
 represents the VaR of banking system 𝑀 when the asset returns of bank 𝑖 are 
at the qth percentile, and 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅50%
𝑀|𝑖
 denotes the VaR of the market returns conditional on the 
bank 𝑖 being in its median state. The term ∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑞
𝑀|𝑖
 captures how much a bank contributes 
to the overall systemic risk. The conditional market CoVaR is calculated as follows: 
𝑋𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛾𝑖𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡
𝑖    (5.6) 
𝑋𝑡
𝑀 = 𝛼𝑀|𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀|𝑖𝑋𝑡
𝑖 +  𝛾𝑀|𝑖𝑀𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡
𝑀|𝑖
    (5.7) 
where 𝑋𝑡
𝑖 is the growth rate of market-value total assets of bank 𝑖, and relevant data required 
are daily market-value total equity and quarterly book-value total assets and equity. The daily 
market-value data and quarterly book-value data have to be converted to a weekly frequency. 
𝑋𝑡
𝑀 is the market capitalization weighted average of each bank’s asset returns. 𝑀𝑡−1 denotes a 
vector of lagged state variables that capture time variation in the conditional moments of asset 
returns. The state variables include weekly change of 3-month T-bill rate, term spread, market 
return (computed from S&P 500 return), and VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility 
Index). The parameters α, β, and γ are estimated by using quantile regression on the weekly 
basis. The CoVaR of the banking system is computed by using the estimated parameters in the 
above equations: 
𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛾𝑖𝑀𝑡−1    (5.8) 
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑀|𝑖
= 𝛼𝑀|𝑖 + 𝛽𝑀|𝑖𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡
𝑖 +  𝛾𝑀|𝑖𝑀𝑡−1    (5.9) 










In this study, I compute ∆CoVaR at both q=1% and q=5% levels to help with checking the 
robustness of my results. 
 
5.3.4 Measures of diversification 
In line with Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe (2007) and Elsas, Hackethal, and Holzhäuser (2010), 
I build up three diversification measures to capture banks’ diversification at both bank and 
market levels. Diversification measures are computed by constructing the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann Index (HHI) based on bank accounting data. 
5.3.4.1 Bank-level diversification measures 
At the bank level, I build up three diversification measures, revenue diversification (RD), non-
interest income diversification (ND) and overall diversification (OD), which captures bank 
diversification activities from different perspectives. The calculations of RD, ND, and OD have 
been introduced in Chapter 4. To avoid repetitions, I do not show details in computations of 
them in this chapter.   
5.3.4.2 Market-level diversification measures 
I further build up three new diversification measures, market-level revenue diversification 
(MRD), non-interest income diversification (MND) and overall diversification (MOD) to 
capture the degree of diversification in the overall banking market. Taking into account the 
impact of market-level diversification on the competition-stability nexus is one of this chapter’s 
contributions since previous studies examine the effect of diversification only at the bank level. 
The construction of the market-level diversification measure serves as a supplement to the 
bank-level diversification measure and provides a new perspective of showing the whole 




My motivation for constructing market-level bank diversification measures is based on the fact 
that banks with different degrees of diversification are simultaneously operating in the same 
market. In the existing literature, there is a lack of a diversification measure to reflect the degree 
of overall market diversification that is jointly determined by diversification activities of all 
participants in the market. Therefore, market-level diversification measures show the level of 
diversification in banks’ activities considering both an individual bank and its competitors, 
which extends the scope of information inherent in the diversification indicator and allows me 
to investigate how banks’ risk will respond to outside environment factors such as competition 
and diversification. 
To construct banks’ market-level diversification indicators, we need to define the scope of the 
market in which each bank and its competitors operate. Let 𝑆 be the set of 50 U.S. states, and 
𝑁 be the set of all banks in the sample. For any 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑆(𝑖) is the set of states in which bank 𝑖 
operates. Bank 𝑗 is connected to bank 𝑖, if 𝑆(𝑖) ∩ 𝑆(𝑗) ≠ ∅. I define 𝑁(𝑖) by the set of banks 
connected to bank 𝑖. That is, set 𝑁(𝑖) consists of bank 𝑖 and its (direct) competitors, and bank 
j represents a particular bank in 𝑁(𝑖). Therefore, 𝑁(𝑖) can be viewed as the market in which 
bank 𝑖 and its competitors are operating. In year 𝑡, for each form of diversification measure, 
bank 𝑖’s market-level diversification measure can be constructed by taking the sum of each 
component of revenues of all banks that have branches/subsidiaries/headquarters in its 
corresponding market 𝑁(𝑖), with reference to the main approach of bank-level diversification 
measures introduced in Section 4.3.3. A high value of this new market-level indicator indicates 
a high market diversification level. The SoD dataset reports detailed information on states of 
operations for each bank over the whole sample period, which allows me to construct time-
varying market-level diversification measures for a given bank. Based on the structure of bank-




Elsas, Hackethal, and Holzhäuser, 2010), I calculate my market diversification indicators, 
MRD, MND and MOD, as follows: 










]    (5.11) 
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All variables used to construct these market-level diversification measures are defined in 
Section 4.3.3. 
 
5.3.5 Control variables 
Following Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004), Laeven and Levine (2009), and Berger, 
Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009), I use several bank-specific control variables that possibly 
affect bank stability. These control variables include bank-level diversification indicators (RD, 
ND, and OD), bank size (Bank Size), capitalization (Capitalization), profitability (ROA), non-
performing loans (NPL), and liquidity (Liquidity). Bank Size equals the natural logarithm of 
total bank assets in millions of U.S. dollars, and controls for the effect that larger banks expect 
to be more stable than smaller ones because of economies of scale in transaction costs, 
monitoring, and information management. Capitalization equals the equity to total asset ratio 
and is included considering the fact that better capitalized banks face lower bankruptcy costs 
and are less vulnerable to market shocks. Profitability, measured by return on assets ratio 
(ROA), is included to control for the possibility that less profitable banks seek revenues from 




short-term funding, is used to control for the risk from less liquid banks. I use the non-
performing loans ratio (NPL) to control for bank credit risk since banks with bad quality of 
loan portfolio typically face higher probability of default. Table 5.1 presents the definitions of 




Table 5.1. Definitions of Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Bank stability measures 
Marginal expected shortfall (MES) 
 
 
Bank systemic stability measure and is calculated as the average of a bank’s stock return during the 5% worst 
trading days for the overall market return in one financial year (Acharya et al., 2017). Source: CRSP, Datastream, 
and authors’ calculation. 
∆CoVaR (∆CoVaR) Alternative systemic risk measure that is defined as the difference between the CoVaR of the banking market 
conditional on this bank being in distress and the banking market’s CoVaR in the median state of this bank (Adrian 
and Brunnermeier, 2016). Source: CRSP, Datastream, Compustat North America, and authors’ calculation. 
Z-Score (Z-Score) 
 
Individual bank stability measure and is calculated as the sum of return on assets and the equity ratio divided by 
the standard deviation of bank return on assets. Source: BankFocus and authors’ calculation. 
Distance-to-default (DtD) Alternative individual bank stability measure that is defined as the difference between the market value of assets of 
a firm and the face value of its debt, divided by the standard deviation of the firm’s market asset values. Source: 
Credit Research Initiative (CRI). 
Competition measure 
Boone Indicator (Boone) Bank competition measure calculated as the elasticity of bank profits to marginal costs (Boone, 2008). Source: 
BankFocus and authors’ calculation. 
  
Diversification measures 
Revenue diversification (RD) Measure of bank diversification between interest income and non-interest income (Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe, 
2007). Source: BankFocus and authors’ calculation. 
Non-interest income diversification 
(ND) 
Measure of bank diversification within bank non-interest activities (Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe, 2007). Source: 
BankFocus and authors’ calculation. 
Overall diversification (OD) Measure of overall bank diversification between interest income, fees and commission, trading and other operating 
incomes (Elsas, Hackethal, and Holzhäuser, 2010). Source: BankFocus and authors’ calculation. 
Market revenue diversification (MRD) Market-level measure of bank diversification between interest income and non-interest income. Source: BankFocus 
and authors’ calculation.  
Market non-interest diversification 
(MND) 
Market-level measure of bank diversification within bank non-interest activities. Source: BankFocus and authors’ 
calculation. 
Market overall diversification (MOD) Market-level measure of overall bank diversification between interest income, fees and commission, trading, and 
other operating incomes. Source: BankFocus and authors’ calculation. 
Income diversity (ID) Alternative diversification measure for diversification across different sources of bank incomes (Laeven and 
Levine, 2007). Source:  BankFocus and authors’ calculation. 




Notes: This chapter use accounting data on an annual basis to calculate competition and bank diversification measures from BankFocus compiled by the Bureau van Dijk and 
from Compustat North America. To calculate systemic risk measures, I retrieve daily market data on banks’ stock prices and returns from Datastream and CRSP. Data for all 
bank control variables are retrieved from BankFocus. Accounting- and market-based measures have been converted to the same data frequency before conducting the regression 
analyses.
 
Table 5.1 (continued). Definitions of Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Bank-specific control variables 
Bank Size (Bank Size) Natural logarithm of bank total assets. Source: BankFocus. 
Equity to total assets ratio 
(Capitalization) 
The ratio of total equity to total assets. Source: BankFocus. 
Non-performing loans ratio (NPL) The ratio of bank impaired loans to total gross loans. Source: BankFocus. 
Return on assets (ROA) The ratio of net income to total assets. Source: BankFocus. 





5.4.1 The relationship between competition, diversification, and bank stability 
To investigate the association of bank diversification with the relationship between competition 
and bank stability, I run regressions by employing the fixed effects estimator to control for 
unobserved time-invariant bank-specific fixed effects.46 Fixed effect models have been widely 
used in the banking literature to control for unobserved time-invariant variables (Mercieca, 
Schaeck, and Wolfe, 2007; Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu, 2014a; Leroy and Lucotte, 2016; 
Goetz, 2017). My model is specified as follows: 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1 × 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡 + 𝛿 × 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +
𝜃 × 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡 × 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡    (5.14) 
where subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 denote bank 𝑖 and time𝑡. Bank stability stands for one of the individual 
bank stability measures, Z-Score and DtD, or one of the bank systemic stability measures, MES 
and ∆CoVaR. Boone is my bank competition measure. Market diversification denotes one of 
market-level diversification measures: MRD, MND and MOD. Boone×Market diversification 
is the interaction term of competition with market-level diversification. A bank-level 
diversification indicator is also included into the regression since each individual bank 
contributes to the market diversification, which implies that market-level diversification 
measures are mechanically related to their bank-level indicators. Therefore, the estimations 
could be inconsistent if individual banks’ diversification variables are omitted. In addition, the 
inclusion of bank-level diversification can control for the possibility of inducing biased 
information on the degree of diversification in a market if the distribution of each individual 
bank’s interest and different types of non-interest revenues used for constructing my different 
 
46 Since my competition measure is at the country level and the sample includes only one country, the models in 
this study do not consider the time fixed effects to avoid the possibility that variations in Boone are absorbed by 




specifications of market diversification measures is not considered.47 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is a vector of bank 
control variables. Time effect 𝑇 is included to control for the gradual changes in the regulatory 
and economic environments over the long period from 1994 to 2017. 𝑇 is computed as the 
difference between the current year and the starting year 1994. 𝜇𝑖 captures bank fixed effects. 
𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 𝛼, 𝛽, and 𝛾 are the parameters to be estimated.  
I also separately examine the direct relationship between competition and bank stability by 
using Equation (5.15) below, which provides the foundations for undertaking analyses on the 
role of market diversification in the competition-bank stability relationship. 
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽2 × 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡    (5.15) 
 
5.4.2 The relationship between competition and market diversification 
I also investigate the association of competition with market diversification, which aims to 
reflect the information on the corresponding diversification level for a specific degree of 
competition in the market. I specify the following model for this analysis: 
 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼3 + 𝛽3 × 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑇 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑖,𝑡    (5.16) 
diversification represents one of bank- or market-level diversification measures that include 
RD, ND, OD, MRD, MND and MOD. The other variables and terms are defined as before. 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Summary statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the variables used in this chapter are presented in Table 5.2 and the 
 
47 Consider two extreme situations regarding the distributions of interest and non-interest revenues of two banks 
in a market. Assuming that these two banks have the same total operating revenues (the sum of interest and non-
interest revenues), in situation one, one bank is fully concentrated on interest incomes while the other one on non-
interest incomes, and, in situation two, the distribution of revenues of these two banks is perfectly balanced 
between interest and non-interest revenues. The values of market-level diversification will be the same under these 
two extreme situations according to my specification. Therefore, it is necessary to include the bank-level 




correlation matrix for all variables is shown in Table 5.3. Boone has a mean of 0.039 and a 
standard deviation of 0.012, with minimum and maximum values of 0.011 and 0.054, 
respectively. Especially, its median (0.043) is very close to its maximum values, which 
indicates that competition in the U.S. keeps at a relatively high level in most years in my sample. 
The means of MES (-0.017) and ∆CoVaR (-0.050) are negative while Z-Score (3.791) and DtD 
(2.917) are positive, which is in accordance with the natures of these risk indicators in terms 
of calculation. As for my market diversification indicators, MRD, MND and MOD have means 
of 0.453, 0.499 and 0.524, respectively, and their maximum values (0.500 for MRD, 0.644 for 
MND, and 0.681 for MOD) are equal or very close to their theoretical maximum values (0.500 
for MRD, 0.667 for MND, and 0.750 for MOD). As for the pairwise correlations among the key 
variables, Boone is negatively correlated with the two systemic risk indicators, which is 
consistent with the negative relationship between competition and bank systemic stability 
suggested in the literature. Boone is also negatively correlated with the two idiosyncratic risk 
measures, which suggests a negative association between competition and banks’ standalone 
risk. In the next section, I will investigate their relationships by considering the role of market 




Table 5.2. Descriptive Statistics  







Boone 7,535 0.039 0.012 0.011 0.035 0.043 0.045 0.054 
MES 6,479 -0.017 0.020 -0.141 -0.022 -0.013 -0.004 0.038 
∆CoVaR 4,558 -0.050 0.019 -0.124 -0.063 -0.041 -0.036 -0.023 
DtD 2,982 2.917 1.561 -1.185 1.823 2.860 3.914 8.781 
Z-Score 6,976 3.791 1.217 -3.469 3.142 3.869 4.583 7.018 
RD 7,533 0.265 0.109 0.024 0.186 0.257 0.339 0.500 
ND 7,533 0.397 0.151 0 0.300 0.434 0.503 0.662 
OD 7,533 0.282 0.126 0.024 0.190 0.266 0.360 0.648 
MRD 7,418 0.453 0.045 0.149 0.437 0.468 0.484 0.500 
MND 7,418 0.499 0.083 0.096 0.482 0.519 0.549 0.644 
MOD 7,418 0.524 0.071 0.153 0.488 0.540 0.576 0.681 
ID 7,533 0.342 0.190 0.024 0.207 0.303 0.433 0.981 
MID 7,418 0.725 0.132 0.162 0.645 0.746 0.823 0.990 
Bank Size 7,535 14.293 1.629 11.017 13.163 13.907 15.074 21.254 
Capitalization 7,535 0.098 0.026 0.001 0.298 0.082 0.095 0.298 
NPL 7,534 0.014 0.019 0 0.004 0.008 0.016 0.200 
ROA 7,535 0.008 0.010 -0.092 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.038 
Liquidity 7,534 0.072 0.087 0.009 0.032 0.049 0.078 1.866 
Notes: This table contains information on the descriptive statistics of all variables throughout the chapter. N represents the number of observations for each variable. SD is the 
standard deviation of each variable. Mean, Min, 25th percentile, Median, 75th percentile, and Max indicate the mean, minimum, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile, and 
maximum value of each variable, respectively. Detailed information on each variable’s definition and calculation are reported in Table 5.1. The criteria for selecting banks are 
as follows. First, banks are from the U.S. and consist of commercial banks and bank holding companies (BHCs). Second, all accounting data are organized in the consolidated 
form with code ‘C1’ and ‘C2’ specified by BvD BankFocus to avoid duplications in calculating measures. Third, the dataset includes both listed and delisted banks to mitigate 
survivorship bias. Fourth, this study excludes banks with less than three consecutive years of observations. To account for the influence of extreme values and outliers, all 
variables are winsorized and the bottom 1% and top 1% of observations for each variable are set respectively to the value of the 1st and 99th percentiles. Source: BankFocus, 






Table 5.3. Correlation Matrix 
Notes: This table presents the pairwise correlations of main variables. Boone is the competition measure. MES is the main bank systemic risk measure that is the average of a bank’s stock return during the 5% worst trading days for the overall market 
return in one financial year. ∆CoVaR is the alternative systemic risk measure. Z-Score is individual bank stability measure that is the sum of return on assets and the equity ratio divided by the standard deviation of bank return on asset. DtD is an 
alternative individual bank stability measure that is defined as the difference between the market value of assets of a firm and the face value of its debt, divided by the standard deviation of the firm’s market asset values. RD, ND and OD are bank-
level revenue, non-interest income and overall diversification measures. MRD, MND and MOD are market-level revenue, non-interest income and overall diversification measures, respectively. ID is an alternative bank diversification measure, defined 
as income diversity. MID is the market-level asset and income diversity, respectively. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Capitalization is the ratio of total equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired loans to total gross 
loans. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of bank liquid assets over bank deposits and short-term funding. * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level.
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) Boone 1.000 
(2) MES -0.102* 1.000 
(3) ∆CoVaR -0.512* 0.398* 1.000 
(4) DtD -0.212* 0.254* 0.341* 1.000 
(5) Z-Score -0.532* 0.189* 0.499* 0.430* 1.000 
(6) RD -0.192* -0.214* 0.014 -0.023 0.224* 1.000 
(7) ND -0.059* -0.110* -0.030* -0.130* -0.000 -0.007 1.000 
(8) OD -0.200* -0.236* 0.012 -0.034* 0.231* 0.983* 0.031* 1.000 
(9) MRD -0.415* -0.152* 0.034* -0.085* 0.200* 0.220* 0.252* 0.235* 1.000 
(10) MND -0.173* -0.274* -0.200* -0.165* 0.095* 0.177* 0.295* 0.191* 0.689* 1.000 
(11) MOD -0.435* -0.173* 0.023 -0.101* 0.200* 0.233* 0.254* 0.252* 0.980* 0.735* 1.000 
(12) ID -0.180* -0.214* 0.011 -0.038* 0.216* 0.974* -0.033* 0.968* 0.214* 0.166* 0.226* 1.000 
(13) MID -0.480* -0.142* 0.072* -0.078* 0.214* 0.235* 0.234* 0.255* 0.963* 0.654* 0.985* 0.228* 1.000 
(14) Bank Size -0.256* -0.410* 0.059* 0.042* 0.299* 0.470* 0.145* 0.516* 0.230* 0.211* 0.245* 0.480* 0.239* 1.000 
(15) Capitalization -0.191* -0.079* 0.060* 0.159* 0.271* 0.001 -0.065* 0.017 0.077* 0.077* 0.100* 0.009 0.102* 0.103* 1.000 
(16) NPL -0.146* 0.251* 0.322* 0.517* 0.483* 0.078* -0.081* 0.080* -0.064* -0.102* -0.074* 0.075* -0.068* 0.107* 0.264* 1.000 
(17) ROA 0.106* -0.315* -0.309* -0.475* -0.361* 0.088* 0.129* 0.093* 0.170* 0.244* 0.205* 0.088* 0.191* 0.055* -0.130* -0.566* 1.000 




5.5.2 The relationship between competition, diversification, and bank stability 
Table 5.4 shows the results on the role of market diversification in the relationship between 
competition and bank systemic stability. I employ both the MES and ∆CoVaR to capture banks’ 
contributions to systemic risk. The results in columns (1) and (5) indicate a negative direct 
relationship between competition and bank systemic stability for both systemic risk indicators. 
This can be explained by the charter value views which states that banks are likely to engage 
in riskier portfolios and non-traditional activities in response to their eroded charter values 
(Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000). The negative influence 
of competition on bank systemic stability is also consistent with Allen and Gale (2004). I 
further find that the coefficients of competition measures switch signs and become positive 
after taking into account the interacting effects of market diversification according to the results 
shown in the remaining columns in Table 5.4. The corresponding market diversification 
measures, MRD, MND and MOD, are positive and significant, and their interaction terms with 
competition measure, Boone×MRD , Boone×MND  and Boone×MOD , are negative and 
significantly different from zero in columns (2)-(4) and (6)-(8). This implies that competition 





Table 5.4. Relationship between competition, diversification and bank systemic stability 
Dependent Variables MES MES MES MES ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Boone -0.796*** 5.182*** 0.981*** 2.476*** -0.917*** 5.150*** 2.484*** 2.216*** 
 (0.0388) (0.398) (0.205) (0.262) (0.0239) (0.494) (0.241) (0.315) 
RD  -0.0177***    -0.0324***   
  (0.00456)    (0.00480)   
MRD  0.614***    0.511***   
  (0.0418)    (0.0489)   
Boone×MRD  -12.52***    -12.66***   
  (0.858)    (1.033)   
ND   0.00125    0.00432*  
   (0.00205)    (0.00227)  
MND   0.146***    0.204***  
   (0.0193)    (0.0217)  
Boone×MND   -3.407***    -6.172***  
   (0.417)    (0.462)  
OD    -0.0158***    -0.0278*** 
    (0.00400)    (0.00393) 
MOD    0.287***    0.199*** 
    (0.0229)    (0.0272) 
Boone× MOD    -5.819***    -5.537*** 
    (0.485)    (0.559) 
         
Bank Size -0.00369*** -0.00458*** -0.00367*** -0.00434*** -0.00457*** -0.00495*** -0.00359*** -0.00494*** 
 (0.000713) (0.000748) (0.000746) (0.000742) (0.000867) (0.000881) (0.000894) (0.000875) 
Capitalization -0.1000*** -0.0966*** -0.102*** -0.0979*** -0.149*** -0.154*** -0.154*** -0.151*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0160) (0.0163) (0.0161) (0.0165) (0.0170) (0.0173) (0.0168) 
ROA 0.458*** 0.450*** 0.454*** 0.448*** 0.440*** 0.485*** 0.458*** 0.487*** 
 (0.0585) (0.0587) (0.0584) (0.0588) (0.0353) (0.0357) (0.0370) (0.0361) 
NPL -0.0901*** -0.0793*** -0.0948*** -0.0866*** -0.185*** -0.140*** -0.179*** -0.135*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0263) (0.0209) (0.0206) (0.0211) (0.0206) 
Liquidity 0.0176*** 0.0176*** 0.0170*** 0.0184*** 0.0242*** 0.0234*** 0.0203*** 0.0258*** 
 (0.00452) (0.00448) (0.00445) (0.00466) (0.00634) (0.00644) (0.00662) (0.00614) 
T -0.00153*** -0.00168*** -0.00146*** -0.00165*** 0.000137 0.000507*** 0.000763*** 0.000616*** 
 (9.98e-05) (0.000107) (0.000105) (0.000109) (9.38e-05) (9.98e-05) (9.96e-05) (0.000100) 
Constant 0.0927*** -0.181*** 0.0150 -0.0536*** 0.0625*** -0.175*** -0.0751*** -0.0455** 




Table 5.4 (continued). Relationship between competition, diversification, and bank systemic stability 
No. of Observations 6,478 6,381 6,381 6,381 4,558 4,489 4,489 4,489 
No. of Banks 467 462 462 462 349 344 344 344 
R-squared 0.367 0.392 0.376 0.390 0.378 0.419 0.430 0.419 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Sign-switch point n/a 0.4139 0.2879 0.4255 n/a 0.4068 0.4025 0.4002 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from the baseline model on the relationship between competition, diversification, and bank systemic stability. Boone is the competition measure 
calculated as the elasticity of bank profits to marginal costs. MES is the bank systemic risk measure that is the average of a bank’s stock returns during the 5% worst trading days for the overall 
market return in one financial year. ∆CoVaR is another systemic risk measure that is defined as the difference between the CoVaR of the banking market conditional on the bank being in distress 
and the banking market’s CoVaR in the median state of the bank. RD, ND, and OD are bank-level revenue, non-interest income, and overall diversification measures. MRD, MND, and MOD are 
market-level revenue, non-interest income, and overall diversification measures, respectively. 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒 × 𝑀𝑅𝐷, 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒 × 𝑀𝑁𝐷 and 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒 × 𝑀𝑂𝐷 are corresponding interaction terms between 
competition and market diversification. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Capitalization is the ratio of total equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired loans to 
total gross loans. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of bank liquid assets over bank deposits and short-term funding. Time effect 𝑇 is included to control for the 
gradual changes in the regulatory and economic environments over the long period from 1994 to 2017 and is computed as the difference between the current year and the starting year 1994. The 
estimating method is the fixed effects model that considers bank-specific fixed effects. The dependent variables reflect bank systemic stability (measured by MES and ∆CoVaR). Independent 
variables consist of bank competition measure (Boone Indicator), bank diversification measures and bank-specific control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the 




To identify the cut-off points for splitting the two-way effects, I have calculated and reported 
the values of each market diversification measure at which the relationship between 
competition and systemic stability switches sign in relevant regressions as shown in Table 5.4. 
For example, based on the results in column (2), the cut-off point value of MRD is calculated 
by taking the first derivative of Equation (5.14) with respect to Boone and making it equal to 
zero, which is 
∆𝑀𝐸𝑆
∆𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒
= 𝛽1 + 𝜃 × 𝑀𝑅𝐷 = 0. I have the equation 5.182 − 12.52 × 𝑀𝑅𝐷 = 0 
and the corresponding threshold of MRD is 0.4139. Then I can further compute the range of 
MRD at which competition positively influences bank systemic stability as 
MRD=[0.149, 0.4139].48 A one standard deviation increase in Boone for a bank at the 5th MRD 
percentile leads to an increase in the MES of 0.00715, which accounts for a 43% increase in 
MES on average in the sample.49 This marginal effect of Boone on MES is economically 
significant, taking into consideration the interacting effect of market diversification. Given that 
the value of MRD at the cut-off point that splits the two-way effects of competition on systemic 
stability is below its 25th percentile values, I can conclude that competition has a positive 
influence on bank systemic stability only when the market diversification is low. 
Such beneficial effect of market diversification on the negative relationship between 
competition and systemic stability can be due to banks’ higher extent of engagements in 
traditional activities when the degree of market diversification is low. A low market 
diversification indicates that banks are less likely to engage in diversified activities and thus 
concentrate on a few assets or activities. Under this situation, less volatile and more stable 
traditional interest-based activities would be the first choice to meet their risk-averse demands. 
Previous literature suggests that non-traditional activities are much more volatile (DeYoung 
 
48 The lower limit value of MRD is set to this variable’s minimum value (0.149) in the sample as shown in Table 
5.2. 
49 The standard deviation of Boone is 0.0118. The 5th percentile of MRD is 0.3655 in the sample. Then I can 




and Roland, 2001; Stiroh, 2004a; Stiroh, 2006; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006), and can induce tail 
risks that are detrimental to systemic stability (De Jonghe, 2010). To verify this explanation, I 
undertake additional analyses that examine the associations between market diversification and 
banks’ revenue ratios. According to the results in Table 5.5, I find negative associations 
between my three market diversification indicators (MRD, MND and MOD) and two revenue 
ratios (Interest Revenue Ratio and Fee and Commission Ratio). 50  With respect to the 
diversification between interest and non-interest revenues, the Interest Revenue Ratio increases 
as MRD and MOD decline (in columns 1 and 3), which shows that banks tend to engage in 
more traditional interest-income-generating activities when the market diversification is low. 
As for diversification within banks’ non-interest revenues, the Fee and Commission Ratio 
grows with the decrease in MND as shown in column 2, which indicates that banks generate 
more income from less volatile fee-based activities than from more volatile activities such as 
trading activities when the degree of market non-interest diversification is low. These results 
imply that an appropriate control for banks’ diversification in the market may benefit the 
systemic stability in a competitive market.
 
50 I construct the Interest Revenue Ratio to capture the proportion of the total interest incomes from the total 
operating revenues in the market where a particular bank and its competitors operate. Fee and Commission Ratio 
is built up to capture the proportion of fees and commissions from the total non-interest revenues in the market 




Table 5.5. Relationship between diversification and banks’ revenue ratio  
Notes: This table shows the regression results on the relationship between diversification and banks’ revenue 
ratios. MRD, MND, and MOD are market-level revenue, non-interest income, overall diversification measures, 
respectively. I construct the Interest Revenue Ratio to capture the proportion of the total interest incomes from 
the total operating revenues in the market where a particular bank and its competitors operate. Fee and 
Commission Ratio is built up to capture the proportion of fees and commissions from the total non-interest 
revenues in the market where a particular bank and its competitors operate. The means of Interest Revenue Ratio 
and Fee and Commission Ratio are 0.637 and 0.649, respectively. This indicates that banks’ interest incomes 
account for the majority of total operating revenues over total non-interest incomes (36.3%), and banks’ fees and 
commissions make up the majority of total non-interest incomes over trading and other operating incomes (35.1% 
in total). Regressions (1) and (3) use the Interest Revenue Ratio as dependent variables and regression (2) uses 
the Fee and Commission Ratio as dependent variable. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. 
Capitalization is the ratio of total equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired loans to total gross loans. 
ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of bank liquid assets over bank deposits and 
short-term funding. Time effect 𝑇 is included to control for the gradual changes in the regulatory and economic 
environments over the long period from 1994 to 2017, and is computed as the difference between the current year 
and the starting year 1994. The estimating method is the fixed effects model that considers bank-specific fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and clustered at the 









 (1) (2) (3) 
    
MRD -1.288***   
 (0.0261)   
MND  -1.009***  
  (0.0127)  
MOD   -0.912*** 
   (0.00967) 
    
Bank Size 0.00550*** 0.00427*** 0.00362*** 
 (0.000948) (0.00155) (0.000652) 
Capitalization -0.0375* -0.0459** -0.000215 
 (0.0217) (0.0231) (0.0162) 
ROA -0.0927*** -0.104*** -0.00784 
 (0.0351) (0.0386) (0.0217) 
NPL -0.0903*** -0.111*** 0.0763*** 
 (0.0320) (0.0397) (0.0267) 
Liquidity -0.0210*** -0.00992* -0.00835** 
 (0.00626) (0.00534) (0.00369) 
T -0.00165*** 0.000863*** -0.000470*** 
 (0.000168) (0.000295) (0.000148) 
Constant 1.168*** 1.088*** 1.068*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0239) (0.0113) 
    
No. of Observations 7,416 7,416 7,416 
No. of Banks 462 462 462 
R-squared 0.873 0.893 0.927 




When the value of MRD is within the range of [0.4139, 0.500] , competition will have a 
negative impact on systemic stability, and this negative effect is exacerbated with an increase 
in the value of market diversification.51 This result implies that, under a competitive market 
environment, banks have motivations to engage in diversified activities, and the resulting 
greater diversification in the market makes banks become more similar to each other in terms 
of holding portfolios and engaging in financial activities (Wagner, 2008; 2010), which makes 
banks have more systemic risk contributions when exposed to market shocks. Eventually, the 
joint effect of competition and diversification leads to a detrimental effect on systemic stability. 
After computing all sign-switch points of Boone, I find that Boone is only positively associated 
with MES or ∆CoVaR when the degree of market diversification remains at a low level. The 
threshold values of MRD, MND and MOD at which Boone has positive and significant 
coefficients are all below their 25th percentile values. However, competition turns to have a 
negative effect on systemic stability for over 75% of observations of these three market 
diversification indicators, and this competition-systemic fragility relationship is exacerbated 
with the increase in diversification in the market. 
In terms of bank-specific control variables, I find that bank size is negatively associated with 
bank systemic stability in all specifications. This implies that larger banks may contribute more 
to systemic risk due to their systemic importance in the market in terms of total assets. The 
coefficients of capitalization are negative and significant, which shows that better capitalized 
banks may contribute more to systemic risks due to their incentives in more risk-taking 
activities since they are holding sufficient buffers to absorb potential shocks. The negative and 
significant coefficients of NPL implies that banks with bad quality of loans contribute more to 
systemic risks. The coefficients of ROA are positive and significant both for MES and ∆CoVaR, 
 




which implies that more profitable banks contribute less to systemic instability. The 
coefficients of time trends do not appear to be consistent for MES and ∆CoVaR, which indicates 
that the time trend leads to mixed effects on the changes in different bank systemic stability 
indicators. 
Table 5.6 presents the results on the relationship between competition, diversification, and 
individual bank stability. I use both the DtD and Z-Score to capture individual bank stability. 
In line with systemic stability, I find a negative direct relationship between competition and 
individual bank stability according to the results of columns (1) and (5) in Table 5.6. However, 
I do not find consistently positive and significant effects of market diversification on the 
competition-individual bank stability relationship even though the coefficients of Boone switch 
signs in particular regressions (as shown in columns 3, 6 and 8), which indicates that low 
correlations among banks due to their concentration on their own portfolios in a lower market 
diversification may not contribute to the enhancement in bank stability at the individual level. 
This implies that the source of bank standalone risk is more related to the insolvency condition 




Table 5.6. Relationship between competition, market diversification and individual bank stability 
Dependent Variables Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score Z-Score DtD DtD DtD DtD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Boone -26.14*** -41.57 11.49 -26.45 -53.97*** 117.7*** -32.86 58.07** 
 (1.905) (27.42) (17.08) (18.00) (2.897) (39.62) (25.24) (27.40) 
RD  -2.084***    0.0797   
  (0.283)    (0.535)   
MRD  -2.073    17.55***   
  (2.739)    (3.996)   
Boone×MRD  31.47    -358.8***   
  (57.71)    (84.34)   
ND   -0.481***    0.782***  
   (0.114)    (0.238)  
MND   2.673*    3.656*  
   (1.465)    (2.176)  
Boone×MND   -67.40**    -54.07  
   (32.84)    (48.96)  
OD    -1.899***    0.206 
    (0.245)    (0.484) 
MOD    -0.438    9.542*** 
    (1.463)    (2.305) 
Boone× MOD    0.227    -198.1*** 
    (32.02)    (49.37) 
         
Bank Size 0.0964* 0.0565 0.121** 0.0568 -0.0648 -0.100 -0.157 -0.0893 
 (0.0531) (0.0531) (0.0545) (0.0530) (0.0950) (0.101) (0.0990) (0.0997) 
Capitalization 4.786*** 4.868*** 4.427*** 4.936*** 0.312 0.118 0.921 0.0166 
 (0.958) (0.947) (0.963) (0.947) (1.943) (1.964) (1.921) (1.972) 
ROA 44.43*** 46.54*** 44.99*** 46.77*** 36.59*** 35.81*** 33.62*** 35.67*** 
 (2.784) (2.740) (2.843) (2.717) (5.415) (5.402) (5.428) (5.384) 
NPL -15.99*** -14.65*** -16.12*** -14.42*** -19.66*** -19.81*** -20.31*** -20.11*** 
 (1.677) (1.694) (1.694) (1.686) (2.390) (2.410) (2.471) (2.392) 
Liquidity -1.079* -0.980* -1.118* -0.927 0.232 0.178 0.320 0.165 
 (0.589) (0.574) (0.608) (0.566) (0.486) (0.476) (0.516) (0.472) 
T -0.0367*** -0.0200*** -0.0288*** -0.0189*** 0.0300*** 0.0243** 0.0132 0.0244** 
 (0.00656) (0.00669) (0.00692) (0.00667) (0.0110) (0.0120) (0.0116) (0.0120) 
Constant 3.303*** 5.182*** 1.582* 4.378*** 5.544*** -2.218 5.203*** 0.575 




Table 5.6 (continued). Relationship between competition, market diversification and individual bank stability 
No. of Observations 6,976 6,872 6,872 6,872 2,981 2,958 2,958 2,958 
No. of Banks 467 462 462 462 168 167 167 167 
R-squared 0.347 0.359 0.351 0.360 0.475 0.478 0.483 0.478 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from the baseline model on the relationship between competition, diversification, and individual bank stability. Boone is the competition measure 
calculated as the elasticity of bank profits to marginal costs. Z-Score is individual bank stability measure that is the sum of return on assets and the equity ratio divided by the standard deviation 
of bank return on asset. DtD is another individual bank stability measure that is defined as the difference between the market value of assets of a firm and the face value of its debt, divided by the 
standard deviation of the firm’s market asset values. RD, ND and OD are bank-level revenue, non-interest income, and overall diversification measures. MRD, MND and MOD are market-level 
revenue, non-interest income and overall diversification measures, respectively. 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒 × 𝑀𝑅𝐷 , 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒 × 𝑀𝑁𝐷  and 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒 × 𝑀𝑂𝐷  are interaction terms between competition and market 
diversification. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Capitalization is the ratio of total equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired loans to total gross loans. ROA is 
the ratio of net income to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of bank liquid assets over bank deposits and short-term funding. Time effect 𝑇 is included to control for the gradual changes in the 
regulatory and economic environments over the long period from 1994 to 2017 and is computed as the difference between the current year and the starting year 1994. The estimating method is 
the fixed effects model that considers bank-specific fixed effects. The dependent variables reflect individual bank stability (measured by Z-Score and DtD). Independent variables consist of bank 
competition measure (Boone Indicator), bank diversification measures and bank-specific control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and 




5.5.3 The relationship between competition and diversification 
After analyzing the association of market diversification with the relationship between 
competition and bank stability, I further examine the potential association between competition 
and diversification. Although this part of my analyses does not aim to identify the causality 
between competition and diversification, investigating this relationship helps me to understand 
the corresponding diversification level for a particular degree of competition in the market, 
which might give hints on whether restrictions are needed to control banks’ diversification 
activities in a competitive environment in order to maintain systemic stability. According to 
the results reported in Table 5.7, I find positive associations between competition and 
diversification by using both bank- and market-level diversification indicators as shown in 
columns (1) to (6). These results are consistent with Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Zhu (2014a), 
according to whom greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks. 
Looking back on my findings in Section 5.5.2, I can infer that, as the level of market 
diversification increases, the influence of competition on bank systemic stability becomes 
negative. This is perhaps due to more similarities in portfolios that banks hold when market 
diversification is high. Therefore, the result of a positive association between competition and 
diversification suggests that interventions in restricting banks to engaging in diversified 
activities may be necessary when competition is at a high level, at which point the degree of 
market diversification is also high. This may help to reduce the similarities of portfolios that 
banks hold and limit the accumulation of correlated risks among banks’ financial activities, 




Table 5.7. The relationship between competition and market diversification 
Dependent Variables RD MRD ND MND OD MOD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Boone 0.617*** 0.512*** 3.650*** 3.307*** 0.763*** 0.911*** 
 (0.132) (0.0446) (0.248) (0.0961) (0.149) (0.0623) 
       
Bank Size -0.0211*** 0.00792*** 0.0502*** 0.0209*** -0.0223*** 0.00911*** 
 (0.00448) (0.00191) (0.00728) (0.00346) (0.00505) (0.00255) 
Capitalization 0.0607 -0.126*** -0.568*** -0.140*** 0.0972 -0.137*** 
 (0.0706) (0.0319) (0.128) (0.0531) (0.0812) (0.0431) 
ROA 0.699*** 0.295*** 0.664** 0.346*** 0.844*** 0.507*** 
 (0.191) (0.0512) (0.280) (0.0982) (0.223) (0.0817) 
NPL 0.316*** 0.0418 -0.187 -0.0187 0.404*** 0.206*** 
 (0.113) (0.0334) (0.178) (0.0554) (0.129) (0.0477) 
Liquidity 0.0314 0.00597 -0.0296 -0.0304** 0.0541* 0.0223** 
 (0.0233) (0.00632) (0.0278) (0.0131) (0.0277) (0.00896) 
T 0.00753*** 0.00460*** 0.00642*** 0.00889*** 0.00867*** 0.00800*** 
 (0.000448) (0.000205) (0.000827) (0.000348) (0.000504) (0.000286) 
Constant 0.437*** 0.275*** -0.487*** -0.0212 0.445*** 0.269*** 
 (0.0614) (0.0266) (0.0998) (0.0490) (0.0689) (0.0352) 
       
No. of observations 7,025 6,921 7,025 6,921 7,025 6,921 
No. of banks 467 462 467 462 467 462 
R-squared 0.240 0.450 0.135 0.438 0.254 0.502 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table shows the regression results on the relationship between competition and diversification. Boone is the competition measure calculated as the elasticity of bank profits to marginal 
costs. RD, ND, and OD are bank-level revenue, non-interest income, overall diversification measures, respectively. MRD, MND, and MOD are their corresponding market-level indicators. Bank 
Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Capitalization is the ratio of total equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired loans to total gross loans. ROA is the ratio of net income 
to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of bank liquid assets over bank deposits and short-term funding. Time effect 𝑇 is included to control for the gradual changes in the regulatory and economic 
environments over the long period from 1994 to 2017, and is computed as the difference between the current year and the starting year 1994. The estimating method is the fixed effects model that 
considers bank-specific fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and clustered at the bank level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance 




5.6 Robustness tests 
5.6.1 Endogeneity 
To reinforce the credibility of my conclusions, the potential endogeneity between competition 
and bank stability needs to be considered.52 Knowing the causality from competition to bank 
stability enables me to understand how banks’ risks will respond to changes in competition, 
which will confirm that my bank-level risk indicator is affected by the country-level 
competition measure, not the opposite. Moreover, this analysis mitigates the concern that 
omitted variables that could jointly determine competition and bank risk. In addition, 
identifying the competition-bank stability causality is the foundation in interpreting the results 
on how market diversification is associated with the competition-bank stability relationship.53  
Since my essential objective is to show how the relationship between competition and bank 
stability changes with market diversification, the causality from competition to bank stability 
needs to discussed before introducing the moderating role of market diversification. 
Identifying the influence of competition on bank stability is empirically challenging due to 
endogeneity concerns. Firstly, there could be omitted variables that jointly drive competition 
and bank risk. Although this study conducts the fixed-effect estimations in the baseline models 
to control for unobserved time-invariant bank-specific fixed effects, there could also exist 
omitted time-varying variables. Secondly, the risk levels of individual banks could inversely 
affect banks’ decision to undertake monopolistic behaviours. The potential reverse causality 
from bank risk to competition may not be a concern in my case because my competition 
variable is calculated at the country level by using all banks’ cost and profit information in my 
sample, and, therefore,  my bank-level risk indicators could hardly reversely affect this country-
 
52 The endogeneity issue to be treated here is related to the relationship between competition and bank stability, 
which is analyzed by using the Equations (5.14) and (5.15). 
53 This chapter is only concerned about the association of diversification with the competition-bank stability nexus. 




level competition indicator. Therefore, this chapter does not use the time-lagged competition 
indicators in the baseline regressions in Equations (5.14) and (5.15). 
To check the existence of an endogeneity problem between competition and bank stability, I 
first conduct the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test to testify the use of the IV-2SLS. According 
to the statistics of the DWH test reported in Table 5.8, we do reject the null hypothesis that the 
potential endogenous variables are exogenous, suggesting that my original results may be 
subject to the endogeneity problem. I then use the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator to 
mitigate the endogeneity between competition and bank stability. In empirical banking studies, 
it is typically difficult to identify instrumental variables that are correlated with an endogenous 
variable, bank competition in my case, but not to the other endogenous variables, bank stability 
or other omitted factors influencing those two variables. Previous studies use regulatory and 
institutional environment factors, such as Banking Freedom, Activity Restriction, and Entry 
Restriction, as instruments for bank competition in cross-country studies (Berger, Klapper and 
Turk-Ariss, 2009; Schaeck and Čihák, 2012). However, these types of instruments would not 
work in my case since the competition measure, the Boone Indicator, is constructed at the 
country level and my sample only consists of U.S. banks. Using country-level instruments for 
competition will result in the same instruments for all banks in a given year, which would not 
be as appropriate as using bank-level instruments. Therefore, we need to use bank-level 
variables as instruments for competition.  
Following Schaeck and Čihák (2014), I employ an interaction term of loan growth rate and 
market share as the instrument for the Boone Indicator. This interaction term decreases 
whenever loan growth and/or market share decreases. Such decreases signal higher competition 
that results in the erosion of monopoly power of large banks with great market shares and 
reduction of benefits from the relationship lending relying on monopoly power. Loan growth 




market strategies. My study assumes that these potential factors take constant values in my 
sample, and these factors will be absorbed by fixed effects, which makes this instrument hardly 
related to omitted factors. In addition, I employ a novel instrument, banks’ cost efficiency 
score54, as the second instrument for competition. Based on the efficient structure hypothesis, 
more efficient banks (banks with lower marginal cost) will achieve greater performance in 
terms of higher profits at the expense of less efficient ones. This effect is monotonically related 
to the degree of bank competition. Therefore, we can justify the relevance of banks’ cost 
efficiency scores with competition. As for the exogeneity of this instrument, I assume that cost 
efficiency score is mainly related to banks’ profitability because the cost profile of banks is an 
important determinant of bank profits. To control for this potential factor, I include ROA into 
my regression model. I undertake several statistical tests to check the relevance and the 











Table 5.8. Robustness check: Results based on two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions  
Dependent 
Variables 
MES MES MES MES ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 





































         
Bank-Level 
Controls 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F-statistic 129.55*** 21.41*** 48.93*** 42.87*** 79.58*** 36.89*** 39.06*** 37.69*** 
Panel B-Second Stage 
Boone -1.010*** 13.20*** -2.219*** 3.277*** -0.715*** 74.12*** 0.0170 21.62*** 
 (0.0953) (3.474) (0.706) (1.263) (0.138) (28.41) (1.035) (4.605) 
RD  -0.0168***    0.000285   
  (0.00425)    (0.0164)   
MRD  1.396***    7.045***   
  (0.329)    (2.693)   
Boone×MRD  -29.30***    -151.6***   
  (7.069)    (57.45)   
ND   0.00145    0.000576  
   (0.00219)    (0.00242)  
MND   -0.0971    -0.0713  
   (0.0732)    (0.102)  
Boone×MND   2.235    -0.579  
   (1.525)    (2.156)  
OD    -0.0154***    -0.00748 
    (0.00374)    (0.00682) 
MOD    0.363***    1.680*** 
    (0.0975)    (0.353) 
Boone× MOD    -7.470***    -37.35*** 
    (2.121)    (7.584) 




Table 5.8 (continued). Robustness check: Results based on two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions 
Bank Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of observation 6,153 6,062 6,062 6,062 4,448 4,382 4,382 4,382 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
DWH test 58.43*** 32.72*** 72.05*** 55.13*** 14.00** 2.53 13.36** 16.82*** 
Hansen J statistic 0.591 0.375 0.617 0.561 2.268 1.671 1.967 2.159 
Hansen J statistic 
(p-value) 
0.442 0.550 0.432 0.454 0.132 
0.196 0.1607 0.1417 
Notes: This table presents the results of robustness check by using the two-stage least squares regressions. Panel A reports the results in the first stage and Panel B represents the results in the 
second stage. Boone is the bank competition measure. MES is the bank systemic risk measure that is the average of a bank’s stock returns during the 5% worst trading days for the overall market 
return in one financial year. ∆CoVaR is another systemic risk measure that is defined as the difference between the CoVaR of the banking market conditional on the bank being in distress and the 
banking market’s CoVaR in the median state of the bank. Cost efficiency represents banks’ cost efficiency score. Market share×Loan growth is the interaction of term of banks’ market share and 
loan growth ratio. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Capitalization is the ratio of total equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired loans to total gross loans. ROA 
is the ratio of net income to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of bank liquid assets over bank deposits and short-term funding. Time effect 𝑇 is included to control for the gradual changes in the 
regulatory and economic environments over the long period from 1994 to 2017, and is computed as the difference between the current year and the starting year 1994. Robust standard errors are 




To check the relevance of instruments with the endogenous variable, I report the F-statistic in 
the first-stage results of the 2SLS regressions to test the hypothesis that the coefficients of 
instrumental variables are zero. According to the results of the first-stage regressions as shown 
in Panel A, the values of the F-statistics are higher than their relevant critical values at 1% 
significance level, which rejects the null hypothesis and indicates the relevance of my 
instruments with respect to the competition measure. The coefficients of instruments are 
negative and significant, which is in line with my hypotheses regarding the potential 
association between instruments and bank competition measure. To check the validity of 
instruments, I undertake the overidentification test and report the Hansen J statistic.55 As 
reported in Table 5.8, the p-values of Hansen J statistic in all regressions exceed 0.1, indicating 
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all instruments are uncorrelated with the error 
term. Based on the second-stage results in Panel B, I find a consistent significant negative direct 
relationship between competition and individual bank and systemic stability (in columns 1 and 
5). The results in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) confirm my findings in the baseline results that 
competition has a significant positive effect on bank systemic stability when the market 
diversification level is low. In sum, the IV-2SLS regression results confirm that my baseline 
results are relatively robust even though the coefficients of interaction terms of competition 
and market-level non-interest income diversification (MND) are not statistically significant in 
columns (3) and (7).56 
 
 
55 I use the heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in 2SLS regressions. Otherwise, I need to report the Sargan 
J statistic when taking the overidentification test. 
56 I do not report the results of IV-2SLS regressions that use individual stability (Z-score and DtD) as dependent 
variables since my main findings regarding the role of market diversification in the competition-bank stability 
nexus are only valid in the dimension of bank systemic stability. Results focusing on the dimension of 




5.6.2 Alternative diversification measure 
This study takes into account one alternative bank diversification measure, income diversity 
(ID), to examine whether or not my findings hold for using another specification of 
diversification. ID measures diversification across different sources of bank incomes (Laeven 
and Levine, 2007). I also build up a market-level income diversity (MID) measure to reflect 
the overall degree of diversification in the banking market. ID and MID are calculated as: 
𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 1 − |
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡−𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡
|    (5.17) 
𝑀𝐼𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 1 − |
∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑗,𝑡𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖) −∑ 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑗,𝑡𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖)
∑ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑗,𝑡𝑗∈𝑁(𝑖)
|    (5.18) 
where 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑗,𝑡  includes fees, commissions, and other operating incomes. 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑗,𝑡 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡. According to 
the results shown in columns (1) and (2) in Table 5.9, I have consistent findings with my 
baseline results according to which competition has a significant positive impact on bank 
systemic stability when the degree of market income diversity maintains within a certain range. 
This positive interacting effect of market diversification still leads no significant effects on the 





Table 5.9. Robustness check: Results based on alternative diversification measure 
Dependent Variables MES ∆CoVaR Zscore DtD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Boone 1.031*** 0.657*** -23.91* 14.92 
 (0.148) (0.176) (12.40) (18.15) 
ID -0.00941*** -0.0157*** -1.084*** 0.171 
 (0.00241) (0.00260) (0.159) (0.290) 
MID 0.115*** 0.0625*** -0.151 3.859*** 
 (0.00878) (0.0104) (0.702) (1.057) 
Boone×MID -2.259*** -1.979*** -3.306 -84.34*** 
 (0.192) (0.220) (15.37) (22.80) 
     
Bank Size -0.00413*** -0.00502*** 0.0594 -0.0760 
 (0.000729) (0.000857) (0.0534) (0.0985) 
Capitalization -0.0972*** -0.148*** 4.926*** -0.0560 
 (0.0161) (0.0167) (0.947) (1.969) 
ROA 0.458*** 0.484*** 46.67*** 36.26*** 
 (0.0587) (0.0363) (2.750) (5.382) 
NPL -0.0861*** -0.135*** -14.45*** -19.92*** 
 (0.0265) (0.0208) (1.697) (2.389) 
Liquidity 0.0173*** 0.0246*** -0.987* 0.175 
 (0.00453) (0.00665) (0.579) (0.467) 
T -0.00165*** 0.000556*** -0.0210*** 0.0280** 
 (0.000107) (9.73e-05) (0.00664) (0.0118) 
Constant 0.0112 0.0166 4.080*** 2.560 
 (0.0124) (0.0146) (0.891) (1.562) 
     
No. of Observations 6,381 4,489 6,872 2,958 
No. of Banks 462 344 462 167 
R-squared 0.387 0.409 0.358 0.478 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table reports the regression results of robustness check by using alternative bank diversification 
measure. Boone is the competition measure calculated as the elasticity of bank profits to marginal costs. ID is the 
alternative bank diversification measure, defined as income diversity. MID is the market-level income diversity. 
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒 × 𝑀𝐼𝐷 is the interaction term between competition and market diversification. The estimating method is 
the fixed effects model that considers bank-specific fixed effects. MES is the bank systemic risk measure that is 
the average of a bank’s stock returns during the 5% worst trading days for the overall market return in one financial 
year. ∆CoVaR is another systemic risk measure that is defined as the difference between the CoVaR of the banking 
market conditional on the bank being in distress and the banking market’s CoVaR in the median state of this bank. 
Z-Score is individual bank stability measure that is the sum of return on assets and the equity ratio divided by the 
standard deviation of bank return on asset. DtD is another individual bank stability measure that is defined as the 
difference between the market value of assets of a firm and the face value of its debt, divided by the standard 
deviation of the firm’s market asset values. I use the same control variables as in baseline regressions. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and clustered at the bank level. *, ** 




5.6.3 Checking whether the results are driven by the financial crisis 
I also check whether my results are driven by the 2008-2009 financial crisis by running 
subsample regressions in the pre-crisis period (1994-2007) and the post-crisis period (2010-
2017), separately. The financial crisis may lead to some structural changes in the competitive 
nature in the market and further affect the scope of activities that banks engage in. According 
to the results shown in Tables 5.10 and 5.11, I find consistent results with baseline results 
regarding the interacting effect of market diversification on the relationship between 
competition and bank systemic stability (measured by MES and ∆CoVaR in separate tables) in 
both pre- and post-crisis subsamples, which confirms that my results are not driven by the 
financial crisis.57
 
57 I do not report regression results that focus on the dimension of individual bank stability since my main findings 
regarding the role of market diversification in the competition-bank stability nexus are only valid in the dimension 




Table 5.10. Robustness check: Testing the influence of the financial crisis 
Dependent 
Variables 
MES MES MES MES MES MES MES MES 
 Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Boone -0.267*** -1.189*** 1.678*** 3.877*** 1.317*** 2.412*** 2.501*** 1.241*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0617) (0.382) (1.284) (0.236) (0.391) (0.621) (0.281) 
         
RD   -0.00545 0.0155**     
   (0.00442) (0.00636)     
MRD   0.208*** 0.0976     
   (0.0389) (0.0825)     
Boone×MRD   -4.192*** -10.35***     
   (0.833) (2.537)     
ND     -0.00244 0.00313   
     (0.00159) (0.00301)   
MND     0.148*** 0.0885***   
     (0.0216) (0.0196)   
Boone×MND     -3.186*** -5.510***   
     (0.472) (0.643)   
OD       0.0113** -0.00504 
       (0.00555) (0.00387) 
MOD       0.0967*** 0.141*** 
       (0.0336) (0.0244) 
Boone× MOD       -5.865*** -2.807*** 
       (0.965) (0.534) 
         
Bank Size -0.000991 -0.0139*** -0.00137 -0.0143*** -0.000814 -0.0121*** -0.0140*** -0.00141 
 (0.000857) (0.00139) (0.000925) (0.00137) (0.000901) (0.00142) (0.00135) (0.000925) 
Capitalization -0.0485*** 0.0258 -0.0461*** 0.0304 -0.0499*** 0.0352* 0.0346* -0.0471*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0191) (0.0154) (0.0191) (0.0156) (0.0202) (0.0193) (0.0154) 
ROA 0.0359 0.113* 0.0371 0.115* 0.0281 0.119* 0.111* 0.0352 
 (0.0548) (0.0610) (0.0568) (0.0618) (0.0556) (0.0621) (0.0623) (0.0569) 
NPL -0.115*** -0.0336 -0.123*** -0.0372 -0.124*** -0.0347 -0.0424 -0.125*** 
 (0.0397) (0.0278) (0.0409) (0.0281) (0.0405) (0.0282) (0.0281) (0.0409) 
Liquidity 0.0226*** 0.0102*** 0.0219*** 0.0129*** 0.0210*** 0.00962*** 0.0139*** 0.0220*** 
 (0.00718) (0.00346) (0.00726) (0.00370) (0.00713) (0.00367) (0.00411) (0.00730) 
T -0.00112*** -0.00272*** -0.00120*** -0.00235*** -0.00114*** -0.000433 -0.00125** -0.00121*** 
 (0.000117) (0.000319) (0.000119) (0.000535) (0.000124) (0.000339) (0.000512) (0.000120) 
Constant 0.0280** 0.269*** -0.0611*** 0.214*** -0.0466*** 0.135*** 0.175*** -0.0393** 




         
Table 5.10 (continued). Robustness check: Testing the influence of the financial crisis 
No. of observation 3,583 2,248 3,519 2,226 3,519 2,226 2,226 3,519 
No. of banks 390 374 383 370 383 370 370 383 
R-squared 0.195 0.326 0.203 0.351 0.207 0.391 0.367 0.204 
Bank fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from the baseline model on the relationship between competition, diversification, and bank systemic stability. Boone is the competition measure 
calculated as the elasticity of bank profits to marginal costs. MES is the bank systemic risk measure that is the average of a bank’s stock returns during the 5% worst trading days for the overall 
market return in one financial year. RD, ND and OD are bank-level revenue, non-interest income and overall diversification measures. MRD, MND and MOD are market-level revenue, non-
interest income and overall diversification measures, respectively. 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒 × 𝑀𝑅𝐷, 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒 × 𝑀𝑁𝐷 and 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒 × 𝑀𝑂𝐷 are interaction terms between competition and market diversification. Bank 
Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Capitalization is the ratio of total equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired loans to total gross loans. ROA is the ratio of net income 
to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of bank liquid assets over bank deposits and short-term funding. Time effect 𝑇 is included to control for the gradual changes in the regulatory and economic 
environments over the long period from 1994 to 2017, and is computed as the difference between the current year and the starting year 1994. The estimating method is the fixed effects model that 
considers bank-specific fixed effects. The dependent variables reflect bank systemic stability (measured by MES and ∆CoVaR). Independent variables consist of bank competition measure (Boone 
Indicator), bank diversification measures and bank-specific control variables. Pre-crisis covers the periods from 1994 to 2007 and Post-crisis covers the period from 2010 to 2017. Robust standard 
errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and clustered at the bank level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 5.11. Robustness check: Testing the influence of the financial crisis 
Dependent 
Variables 
∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR ∆CoVaR 
 Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis Pre-crisis Post-crisis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Boone -0.500*** -1.304*** 6.631*** -0.832 4.317*** 2.770*** 4.749*** 1.127* 
 (0.0318) (0.0301) (0.739) (1.044) (0.438) (0.327) (0.572) (0.621) 
         
RD   -0.0553*** 0.0171***     
   (0.00872) (0.00592)     
MRD   0.565*** -0.110     
   (0.0729) (0.0727)     
Boone×MRD   -16.93*** -1.019     
   (1.609) (2.068)     
ND     -0.0160*** 0.00131   
     (0.00331) (0.00162)   
MND     0.344*** 0.137***   
     (0.0377) (0.0207)   
Boone×MND     -9.727*** -6.439***   
     (0.847) (0.580)   




Table 5.11 (continued). Robustness check: Testing the influence of the financial crisis 
OD       -0.0498*** 0.0120** 
       (0.00719) (0.00465) 
MOD       0.368*** 0.0595 
       (0.0482) (0.0370) 
Boone× MOD       -11.33*** -3.785*** 
       (1.086) (0.991) 
         
Bank Size -0.0124*** -0.0204*** -0.00582*** -0.0206*** -0.00717*** -0.0186*** -0.00560*** -0.0209*** 
 (0.00167) (0.00133) (0.00151) (0.00147) (0.00145) (0.00126) (0.00136) (0.00144) 
Capitalization -0.158*** -0.0388* -0.123*** -0.0379 -0.127*** -0.0258 -0.113*** -0.0346 
 (0.0350) (0.0228) (0.0252) (0.0240) (0.0277) (0.0249) (0.0237) (0.0237) 
ROA -0.258** 0.0975*** -0.255** 0.0887*** -0.145 0.0814*** -0.240** 0.0854*** 
 (0.126) (0.0251) (0.106) (0.0263) (0.109) (0.0240) (0.104) (0.0255) 
NPL -0.258*** -0.0238 -0.304*** -0.0256 -0.249*** -0.0258 -0.306*** -0.0265 
 (0.0744) (0.0167) (0.0649) (0.0171) (0.0597) (0.0166) (0.0625) (0.0172) 
Liquidity 0.0124 0.0129* 0.000791 0.0148** -0.00108 0.0134* 0.00401 0.0159** 
 (0.0101) (0.00766) (0.0115) (0.00723) (0.00922) (0.00746) (0.0103) (0.00737) 
T 0.00293*** -0.000637*** 0.00349*** -0.000649* 0.00396*** 0.00174*** 0.00356*** 0.000707* 
 (0.000159) (0.000230) (0.000141) (0.000344) (0.000133) (0.000331) (0.000133) (0.000370) 
Constant 0.147*** 0.312*** -0.175*** 0.363*** -0.105*** 0.149*** -0.112*** 0.248*** 
 (0.0230) (0.0168) (0.0380) (0.0441) (0.0290) (0.0211) (0.0306) (0.0316) 
No. of 
Observations 
2,534 1,525 2,495 1,505 2,495 1,505 2,495 1,505 
No. of Banks 302 281 295 277 295 277 295 277 
R-squared 0.288 0.746 0.504 0.752 0.472 0.810 0.519 0.763 
Bank fixed 
effect 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: This table presents the regression results from the baseline model on the relationship between competition, diversification, and bank systemic stability. Boone is the competition measure 
calculated as the elasticity of bank profits to marginal costs. ∆CoVaR is another systemic risk measure that is defined as the difference between the CoVaR of the banking market conditional on 
the bank being in distress and the banking market’s CoVaR in the median state of the bank. RD, ND and OD are bank-level revenue, non-interest income and overall diversification measures. 
MRD, MND and MOD are market-level revenue, non-interest income and overall diversification measures, respectively. 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒 × 𝑀𝑅𝐷, 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒 × 𝑀𝑁𝐷 and 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑒 × 𝑀𝑂𝐷 are interaction terms 
between competition and market diversification. Bank Size is the natural logarithm of bank total assets. Capitalization is the ratio of total equity to total assets. NPL is the ratio of bank impaired 
loans to total gross loans. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of bank liquid assets over bank deposits and short-term funding. Time effect 𝑇 is included to control 
for the gradual changes in the regulatory and economic environments over the long period from 1994 to 2017, and is computed as the difference between the current year and the starting year 
1994. The estimating method is the fixed effects model that considers bank-specific fixed effects. The dependent variables reflect bank systemic stability (measured by MES and ∆CoVaR). 
Independent variables consist of bank competition measure (Boone Indicator), bank diversification measures and bank-specific control variables. Pre-crisis covers the periods from 1994 to 2007 
and Post-crisis covers the period from 2010 to 2017. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates and clustered at the bank level. *, ** and *** indicate 





This study contributes to the important debate among academics and policymakers regarding 
the relationship between competition and bank stability. I build up new market-level 
diversification measures that are supplementary to traditional bank-level diversification 
measures to examine how the influence of competition on bank stability changes with the 
degree of diversification in the whole market. By focusing on a sample of U.S. banks, I show 
that the negative relationship between competition and systemic stability is exacerbated when 
the market diversification is high while this negative competition-systemic stability 
relationship turns to be positive when the market diversification is low. However, I do not find 
evidence of the existence of a significant interacting effect of diversification on the 
competition-individual bank stability relationship. Lastly, I find a positive association between 
competition and market diversification, which suggests that diversified activities should be 
properly controlled in a competitive environment in order to maintain systemic stability. My 
results are robust to several robustness tests such as using instrumental variable regression, 
employing alternative diversification indicators, and considering the influence of the financial 
crisis. 
My results provide important insights and implications for bank regulation and policymaking. 
Promoting competition in the banking market would have mixed relations to bank stability. 
The banking market becomes less stable in a more competitive environment from the 
perspectives of both individual bank and systemic stability. In addition, my findings suggest 
that policymakers should consider the interacting effect between competition and market 
diversification in the process of formulating the pro-competition policy because competition 
may enhance systemic stability if bank diversification activities in the market are controlled at 




geographical information should be conducted in the future in order to figure out whether my 




Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
 
6.1 Summary  
My thesis consists of four empirical studies that investigate bank diversification in the context 
of bank stability, market power, and competition. In Chapter 2, I undertake an empirical 
analysis to test the theory of Wagner (2010) regarding the effects of diversification on bank 
idiosyncratic and systemic risk. My results confirm Wagner’s theory that an increase in 
diversification leads to more systemic risk but less idiosyncratic risk. That is, a higher 
diversification indicates that banks hold more similar portfolios, which makes them suffer 
systemic risks that are common to all banks in the market. My results imply that policies 
encouraging bank diversification may be beneficial to individual bank stability but could 
deteriorate systemic stability in the meantime. 
In Chapter 3, I extend my findings in Chapter 2 regarding the direct diversification-bank 
stability relationship and show evidence of the moderating effects of regulatory environments 
and banks’ essential characteristics on this relationship. Based on my results of significant 
moderating effects of four country-level regulatory variables, I can conclude that the negative 
relationship between diversification and systemic stability is mitigated in countries with 
powerful supervisory agencies, higher stringency of capital regulations, more restrictions on 
the scope of banks’ activities, and more private monitoring. In addition, according to my results 
of significant moderating effects of two bank-level characteristics, I draw the conclusion that 
larger and well-capitalized banks are less subject to systemic risk when diversification in a 
country is high. The heterogeneity in the diversification-bank stability relationship depending 
on a country’s regulatory environments and banks’ own characteristics provides important 




cross-country variations in regulatory environments when formulating policies that regulate 
banks’ diversified activities. Bank managers should evaluate the potential idiosyncratic and 
systemic risk inherent from the activities that banks may engage in and take account of the size 
and capital levels of their institutions when setting their diversification decisions. 
In Chapter 4, I investigate the relationship between diversification and banks’ market power 
and answer the research question about whether diversification can be a determinant or source 
of market power of banks. My results show that there is an inverse U-shaped relationship 
between diversification and banks’ overall market power. That is, as the level of diversification 
increases within a certain range, banks possibly enjoy greater revenues from newly engaged-
in activities, and banks can use these incomes to cross-subsidize the costs in price competition, 
which makes banks gain market power. However, banks’ market power can be eroded due to 
greater costs incurred from much more complex activities if bank diversification reaches a high 
level. My findings provide insights for bank managers to proactively manage market power by 
engaging in diversification. My study is advisable for regulators and policymakers to 
understand the potential effect of bank diversification on the microstructure of the banking 
market. 
In Chapter 5, I investigate the role of market diversification in the relationship between 
competition and bank stability, which provides a new empirical analysis to reconcile the mixed 
findings regarding the competition-stability nexus in the literature. Based on my results, I 
conclude that the negative relationship between competition and systemic stability is 
exacerbated when the market diversification is high while this negative competition-systemic 
stability relationship turns out to be positive when the market diversification is low. Moreover, 
the positive association between competition and diversification suggests that restrictions in 
banks’ diversification activities in a competitive environment may help in maintaining 




effect of market diversification on the process of formulating the pro-competition policy since 
competition may enhance systemic stability if bank diversification activities are appropriately 
managed. 
 
6.2 Limitations and future research 
My thesis may have some limitations due to data restrictions, limited forms of essential 
indicators employed, and insufficient investigation on underlying causality and channels in 
particular relationships. This implies that my studies can be improved by future research taking 
into account above restrictions.  
I construct the market diversification indicators based on a sample of listed U.S banks in 
Chapter 5. Future research can be conducted if data on banks’ geographic information (e.g. 
locations of banks’ headquarters and branches) in more countries are publicly available and 
accessible to researchers. The inclusion of more detailed banks’ geographic information across 
countries would allow me to construct a market diversification indicator for a particular bank 
in a given country, which would help in exploring and comparing within- and cross-country 
variations in the degree of diversification in a specific market where a particular bank and its 
competitors operate. Future studies based an international sample of banks could also help in 
figuring out whether my findings would change under different region and market settings.  
Moreover, my study can be further improved by considering other dimensions of a country’s 
regulatory framework (i.e. deposit insurance scheme and bank governance) and institutional 
environment (i.e. property rights, information sharing, and stock market development) in 
Chapter 4. As for banks’ market power indicators, future research can construct alternative 
forms of market power indicators employed in the literature (Maudos and Fernández de 




Lastly, my findings that diversification leads to more systemic risk while less standalone risk 
imply a desired degree of diversification among banks from the perspective of society. 
Therefore, future research can be conducted to find out the optimal degree of diversification to 
achieve relatively greater social welfare. The potential causality from the regulatory framework 
and banks’ risk determinants to the relationship between diversification and bank stability 
could also be investigated. My research suggests that diversification can influence banks’ 
market power through leading potential changes to revenue and cost profiles of banks in 
Chapter 4. Admittedly, there could exist other channels behind the influence of diversification 
on banks’ market power. Therefore, future studies may be needed to explore alternative 
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1. Calculation of bank-level diversification measure 
The bank-level revenue diversification (RD) is computed as follows: 











where subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 denote bank i and year t. 𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is bank’s non-interest income and 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is interest income. 𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is total operating income, 𝑇𝑂𝑃𝑖,𝑡 = |𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡| + |𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑖,𝑡|. 
2. Estimating banks’ cost efficiency 
Bank efficiency is estimated based on the frontier efficiency (called X-efficiency in economic 
studies), which is the distance of a firm’s observed behaviour from its best-practice behaviour 
implied by economic theory. The literature on the measurement of bank cost efficiency can be 
classified into two competing approaches: parametric and non-parametric approaches. The 
parametric approach such as the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) uses econometric 
techniques to estimate economic functions imposed by assumptions and the deviation of the 
efficient frontier. In contrast, the non-parametric approach represented by the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) employs linear programming techniques to calculate piecewise 
segments of the efficient frontier. 
This study uses the standard SFA method proposed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) to 
estimate cost efficiency for each bank-year observation. Under the SFA, I can extract the 
inefficiency from the error term of the cost function. In addition, the SFA offers a richer 
specification than the DEA, especially in the case of a panel dataset (Hjalmarsson, Kumbhakar, 
and Heshmati, 1996). This approach has widely been used in banking studies to estimate bank 




2010). Compared with the parametric approach, the non-parametric approach such as the DEA 
is more sensitive to measurement errors and outliers (Fiorentino, Karmann, and Koetter, 2006).  
Following Battese and Coelli (1992) and Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez, and Molyneux (2011),58 
I employ the time-varying stochastic frontier approach and construct the following translog 
cost function to estimate cost efficiency: 















































+ 𝜈 + 𝜐 
𝑇𝐶 denotes total cost and 𝐸 is equity capital. 𝑌 and 𝑊 are vectors of outputs and inputs for 
each bank-year observation, respectively. An appropriate definition of bank inputs and outputs 
is an essential issue in the estimation of bank cost efficiency. I opt for the same three inputs, 
denoted by 𝑊𝑗 and 𝑊𝑖, as in the functions that calculate market power, which consist of the 
costs of funding, labour and fixed capital. As for outputs, I choose total loans and other earning 
assets. 𝜈 is the random disturbance and assumed to be independently and identically distributed 
as 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜈
2). 𝜐, a non-negative random error, is assumed to be truncated or half normally 
distributed as 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜐
2) and to capture the inefficiency level relative to the frontier. To impose 
the restriction of linear homogeneity in input prices, I divide the three input prices by the price 
of fixed capital (𝑊3). 
 
58 Different from the consistent definition of bank inputs in the literature, the choice of bank outputs is mixed in different studies. 
